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abstract
The paper proposes a framework for assessing the impact of system-wide and bank-level 
capital buffers. The assessment rests on a factor-augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) 
model that relates individual bank adjustments to macroeconomic dynamics. We estimate 
FAVAR models individually for eleven euro area economies and identify structural shocks, 
which allow us to diagnose key vulnerabilities of national banking systems and estimate 
short-run economic costs of increasing banks’ capitalisation. On this basis, we run a fully-
fledged cost-benefit assessment of an increase in capital buffers. The benefits are related 
to an increase in bank resilience to adverse shocks. Higher capitalisation allows banks to 
withstand negative shocks and moderates the reduction of credit to the real economy that 
ensues in adverse circumstances. The costs relate to transitory credit and output losses 
that are assessed both on an aggregate and bank level. An increase in capital ratios is 
shown to have a sharply different impact on credit and economic activity depending on the 
way banks adjust, i.e. via changes in assets or equity.
Keywords: FAVAR, capital regulation, cost-benefit analysis, banking system resilience.
JEL classification: E51, G21, G28.
resumen
El artículo propone un marco para evaluar el impacto de los colchones de capital a 
nivel de todo el sistema y a nivel bancario. La evaluación se basa en un modelo FAVAR 
(Factor-Augmented Vector Autoregression) que relaciona los ajustes bancarios individuales 
con la dinámica macroeconómica. El modelo FAVAR se estima individualmente para once 
economías de la zona del euro y se identifican impactos estructurales, lo que permite 
diagnosticar las principales vulnerabilidades de los sistemas bancarios nacionales y al mismo 
tiempo estimar los costes económicos a corto plazo del aumento de capital de los bancos. 
Sobre esta base, se realiza una evaluación completa de la relación coste-beneficio de 
un incremento en los colchones de capital. Los beneficios están relacionados con un 
aumento en la capacidad de resistencia de los bancos a perturbaciones adversas. 
Una mayor capitalización permite a los bancos hacer frente a impactos negativos y modera la 
reducción del crédito a economía real que se produce en circunstancias adversas. Los costes 
se relacionan con pérdidas transitorias de crédito y producción que son evaluadas tanto a 
nivel agregado como bancario. Se obtiene que un aumento en los ratios de capital tienen un 
impacto muy diferente en la actividad crediticia y económica, dependiendo de la forma en que 
los bancos se ajustan, es decir, bien a través de cambios en los activos o en capital.
Palabras clave: FAVAR, regulación de capital, análisis coste-beneficio, capacidad de 
resistencia del sistema bancario.
Códigos JEL: E51, G21, G28.
 
Non-technical summary  
 
This paper explores the merits of a structural factor-augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) 
model for the assessment of macroprudential policies. The FAVAR model ties together a rich set of 
individual bank-level data with key macroeconomic aggregates, such as GDP and residential and 
commercial property prices. It is estimated on national data for eleven euro area countries: Belgium, 
Cyprus, France, Ireland, Italy, Finland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain, and 
employed to assess: (i) structural vulnerabilities of national banking systems and individual banks, (ii) 
long-term benefits from capital-based regulation, and (iii) short-term costs of the tightening of capital-
based regulation. 
Combining micro- and macroeconomic data within a FAVAR framework has several advantages from 
the policy perspective. First, we can use the model to gauge both macroeconomic effects, i.e. how 
much total credit or GDP of a country are affected, and bank-level reactions to a structural shock or a 
policy change. As such, a FAVAR-based analysis provides more than system-wide insights and helps 
diagnose the vulnerabilities of single institutions depending on their business model, ownership or 
exposure structure. Second, a FAVAR analysis informs about the distributional effects of shocks and 
policy actions. Third, a FAVAR model may be employed to look at the propagation of shocks 
affecting only selected institutions in the system. Last, irrespective of its complexity, the model 
remains very flexible and can be applied to a broad range of policy questions. 
Three different specifications of a FAVAR model are employed to address three types of policy 
questions. The first exercise evaluates the role of capital buffers in the propagation of macroeconomic 
shocks into bank lending. The second exercise assesses the effects of changes in the average 
capitalisation level of banks on their lending, and later on economic activity. The third exercise 
distinguishes between the effects of changes in bank-level capital ratios accommodated either by an 
adjustment of banks assets or by an adjustment in the level of banks’ capital. The last simulation 
presents the effects of capital shocks which affect the majority of banks in the system. 
The first exercise is designed to inform about the long-run benefits from high bank capitalisation. We 
choose the specification of a FAVAR model which describes the propagation of aggregate demand 
and real property prices into bank lending, credit risk, capitalisation and profits. This specification of 
FAVAR allows us to assess system-wide and bank-level vulnerabilities. As the next step, we link the 
differences in banks’ responses to structural shocks to their initial capitalisation levels in a series of 
bank-level regressions. The regression estimates point to a moderating impact of higher capital 
buffers on the propagation of structural shocks.  
Our notion of benefits from capital regulation relates to the impact of banks’ capital on their 
resilience, i.e. their ability to withstand adverse shocks originating outside the banking system with 
minimum impact on the supply of credit to the private sector. While assessing the benefits from 
capital regulation, we derive the difference between the reduction in credit by highly capitalised and 
lower capitalised banks in response to a combination of adverse structural shocks. This difference is a 
measure of the benefits from holding higher capital buffers. As a numerical example, we consider the 
benefits related to building-up of capital buffers as in 2015, starting from their 2010 levels and the 
reference level of 8.5% of Tier1 ratio. 
The costs of an increase in bank capitalisation relate to short-term losses in credit and GDP. In our 
second exercise, we look at the consequences of an immediate increase in the average (system-wide) 
capital ratio, which is assumed to have a negative impact on banks’ assets and a positive effect on 
lending spreads. This specification emphasises that an increase in capital requirements can trigger 
deleveraging, and banks will aim at reducing risk-weighted assets (the denominator of the capital 
ratio) by shrinking their balance sheet or shifting the risk profile of their assets towards less risky 
exposures. Banks' deleveraging limits the availability of bank credit for the real economy. If other 
financial intermediaries or forms of financing (bonds issuance by firms) do not substitute this shortfall 
in bank credit, the cost of financing for the private sector will increase and ultimately harm aggregate 
output. In order to separate the capital shock from other credit supply shocks, we additionally assume 
that it involves an immediate fall in banks’ financing costs (deposit spreads or CDS).  
The alternative avenue of estimating short-term costs involves restrictions on the bank-level impact of 
structural capital shocks. We extend the structural shock identification and express an increase in a 
system-wide capital buffer as a series of capital increases on a bank-level rather than an increase in 
the average capitalisation level. This approach allows us to explore bank-level information more 
comprehensively and increases the precision of structural identification in cases when we know that 
an increase in capital buffers affects only selected banks (e.g. the imposition of an O-SII buffer).   
In the specification with the bank-level identification of structural shocks, we recognise that an 
increase in capital ratios can have a different impact on credit supply and economic activity depending 
on the way banks adjust their assets versus capital. To this end, we distinguish between a deleveraging 
shock, where an increase in capital ratios is accommodated by a reduction in bank assets, and a 
‘beefing-up’ capital shock, where an increase in capital ratios is accommodated by an increase in 
regulatory capital (with no initial effect on assets).  
Our empirical results suggest that higher bank capitalisation smoothens the supply of credit to the 
economy over the business cycle. Further, we document a different relationship between banks’ 
capitalisation and their reaction to structural shocks for large (G-SII and O-SII) banks and other 
(medium and small size) banks. In particular, the moderating effect of higher bank capitalisation on 
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A permanent increase in a system-wide Tier1 ratio triggers significant though country-specific effects. 
Our estimates suggest that following an increase in the average system-wide capital ratio by 1pp 
accommodated by banks' deleveraging leads to a fall in credit to the non-financial private sector by 1-
3% and in output by 0-2% (depending on the country). However, an increase in capital ratios will 
have an expansionary effect on credit and economic activity if most of the banks in the system adjust 
their balance sheets by beefing up capital rather than reducing assets. Irrespective of banks adjustment 
path, an increase in capital ratios is likely to increase lending and reduce deposit margins. 
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1 Introduction  
 
Last years witnessed an increased use of macroprudential instruments by European supervisory 
authorities. This trend boils down to two factors: an increased awareness of systemic risks, and the 
availability of the standardised macroprudential toolbox in all European countries, that followed the 
implementation of Basel III (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011) into the European 
framework. The increased use of macroprudential instruments urges the assessment of their 
effectiveness and transmission channels. 
This paper explores the merits of a structural factor-augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) 
model for the assessment of macroprudential policies. The FAVAR model ties together a rich set of 
individual bank-level data with key macroeconomic aggregates, such as GDP and residential and 
commercial property prices. It is estimated on national data for eleven euro area countries: Belgium, 
Cyprus, France, Ireland, Italy, Finland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain, and 
employed to assess: (i) structural vulnerabilities of national banking systems and individual banks, (ii) 
long-term benefits from capital-based regulation, and (iii) short-term costs of capital-based regulation. 
Combining micro- and macroeconomic data within a FAVAR framework has several advantages from 
the policy perspective. First, we can use the model to gauge both macroeconomic effects, i.e. how 
much total credit or GDP of a country are affected, and bank-level reactions to a structural shock or a 
policy change. As such, a FAVAR-based analysis provides more than system-wide insights and helps 
diagnose the vulnerabilities of single institutions depending on their business model, ownership or 
exposure structure. Second, a FAVAR analysis informs about the distributional effects of shocks and 
policy actions. Third, a FAVAR model may be employed to look at the propagation of shocks 
affecting only selected institutions in the system. Last, irrespective of its complexity, the model 
remains very flexible and can be applied to a broad range of policy questions. 
Applications of FAVAR models to banking data are a relatively small but fast expanding literature. 
Closest to ours are the papers by Buch et al. (2014), who use US data (‘Call reports’), and Jimborean 
and Mésonnier (2010), who use confidential French data in an application to monetary policy.  
Another paper sharing methodological similarities with this paper is Budnik and Bochmann (2017) 
who discuss how macroprudential and monetary policy impact the lending and interest rates of euro 
area banks.   
Three different specifications of a FAVAR model are employed to address three types of policy 
questions. The first exercise evaluates the role of capital buffers in the propagation of macroeconomic 
shocks into bank lending. The second exercise assesses the effects of changes in the average 
capitalisation level of banks on their lending, and later on economic activity. The third exercise 
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authorities. This trend boils down to two factors: an increased awareness of systemic risks, and the 
availability of the standardised macroprudential toolbox in all European countries, that followed the 
implementation of Basel III (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011) into the European 
framework. The increased use of macroprudential instruments urges the assessment of their 
effectiveness and transmission channels. 
This paper explores the merits of a structural factor-augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) 
model for the assessment of macroprudential policies. The FAVAR model ties together a rich set of 
individual bank-level data with key macroeconomic aggregates, such as GDP and residential and 
commercial property prices. It is estimated on national data for eleven euro area countries: Belgium, 
Cyprus, France, Ireland, Italy, Finland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain, and 
employed to assess: (i) structural vulnerabilities of national banking systems and individual banks, (ii) 
long-term benefits from capital-based regulation, and (iii) short-term costs of capital-based regulation. 
Combining micro- and macroeconomic data within a FAVAR framework has several advantages from 
the policy perspective. First, we can use the model to gauge both macroeconomic effects, i.e. how 
much total credit or GDP of a country are affected, and bank-level reactions to a structural shock or a 
policy change. As such, a FAVAR-based analysis provides more than system-wide insights and helps 
diagnose the vulnerabilities of single institutions depending on their business model, ownership or 
exposure structure. Second, a FAVAR analysis informs about the distributional effects of shocks and 
policy actions. Third, a FAVAR model may be employed to look at the propagation of shocks 
affecting only selected institutions in the system. Last, irrespective of its complexity, the model 
remains very flexible and can be applied to a broad range of policy questions. 
Applications of FAVAR models to banking data are a relatively small but fast expanding literature. 
Closest to ours are the papers by Buch et al. (2014), who use US data (‘Call reports’), and Jimborean 
and Mésonnier (2010), who use confidential French data in an application to monetary policy.  
Another paper sharing methodological similarities with this paper is Budnik and Bochmann (2017) 
who discuss how macroprudential and monetary policy impact the lending and interest rates of euro 
area banks.   
Three different specifications of a FAVAR model are employed to address three types of policy 
questions. The first exercise evaluates the role of capital buffers in the propagation of macroeconomic 
shocks into bank lending. The second exercise assesses the effects of changes in the average 
capitalisation level of banks on their lending, and later on economic activity. The third exercise 
distinguishes between the effects of changes in bank-level capital ratios accommodated either by an 
adjustment of banks' assets or by an adjustment in the level of banks’ capital. The last simulation 
describes the effects of capital shocks which affect the majority of banks in the system. 
The first exercise is designed to inform about the long-run benefits from high bank capitalisation. We 
choose the specification of a FAVAR model which describes the propagation of aggregate demand 
and real property prices into bank lending, credit risk, capitalisation and profits. This specification of 
FAVAR allows us to assess system-wide and bank-level vulnerabilities. As the next step, we link the 
differences in banks’ responses to structural shocks to their capitalisation levels in a series of bank-
level regressions. The regression estimates point to a moderating impact of higher capital buffers on 
the propagation of structural shocks.  
Our notion of benefits from capital regulation relates to the impact of banks’ capital on their 
resilience, i.e. their ability to withstand adverse shocks originating outside the banking system with 
minimum impact on the supply of credit to the private sector. While assessing the benefits from 
capital regulation, we derive the difference between the reduction in credit by highly capitalised and 
lower capitalised banks in response to a combination of negative structural shocks. This difference is 
a measure of the benefits from holding higher capital buffers. As a numerical example, we consider 
the benefits related capital buffers as in 2015 compared to their 2010 levels and compared to the 
reference level of 8.5% of Tier1 ratio. 
In our assessment, the benefits from capital buffers correspond with additional credit granted by banks 
under an adverse scenario. This approach deviates from the empirical literature discussing the long-
term benefits of higher capital buffers related to reducing the probability of bank insolvency and 
banking crisis. Miles et al. (2013) measure the benefits of higher capital buffers as the product of a 
change in the probability of insolvency and the cost of insolvency resulting from banks holding more 
equity. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s long-term economic impact exercise 
(Macroeconomic Assessment Group, 2010) and later Behn et al. (2016) measure the gains of capital 
regulation as the expected output increase associated with the reduction in the likeliness and severity 
of banking crises. Arregui et al. (2013) also assume that changes in the regulation affect the expected 
probability of a crisis. The cost-benefit analysis takes place through a comparison of the 2-step-ahead 
output forecasts: one in a scenario with and another in a scenario without policy implementation. 
The costs of bank capitalisation correspond with short-term losses in credit and GDP. In our second 
exercise, we look at the consequences of an immediate increase in the average system-wide capital 
ratio, which is assumed to have a negative impact on banks’ assets and a positive effect on lending 
spreads. This specification emphasises that an increase in capital requirements can trigger 
deleveraging, and banks will aim at reducing risk-weighted assets (the denominator of the capital 
ratio) by shrinking their balance sheet or shifting the risk profile of their assets towards less risky 
distinguishes between the effects of changes in bank-level capital ratios accommodated either by an 
adjustment of banks' assets or by an adjustment in the level of banks’ capital. The last simulation 
describes the effects of capital shocks which affect the majority of banks in the system. 
The first exercise is designed to inform about the long-run benefits from high bank capitalisation. We 
choose the specification of a FAVAR model which describes the propagation of aggregate demand 
and real property prices into bank lending, credit risk, capitalisation and profits. This specification of 
FAVAR allows us to assess system-wide and bank-level vulnerabilities. As the next step, we link the 
differences in banks’ responses to structural shocks to their capitalisation levels in a series of bank-
level regressions. The regression estimates point to a moderating impact of higher capital buffers on 
the propagation of structural shocks.  
Our notion of benefits from capital regulation relates to the impact of banks’ capital on their 
resilience, i.e. their ability to withstand adverse shocks originating outside the banking system with 
minimum impact on the supply of credit to the private sector. While assessing the benefits from 
capital regulation, we derive the difference between the reduction in credit by highly capitalised and 
lower capitalised banks in response to a combination of negative structural shocks. This difference is 
a measure of the benefits from holding higher capital buffers. As a numerical example, we consider 
the benefits related capital buffers as in 2015 compared to their 2010 levels and compared to the 
reference level of 8.5% of Tier1 ratio. 
In our assessment, the benefits from capital buffers correspond with additional credit granted by banks 
under an adverse scenario. This approach deviates from the empirical literature discussing the long-
term benefits of higher capital buffers related to reducing the probability of bank insolvency and 
banking crisis. Miles et al. (2013) measure the benefits of higher capital buffers as the product of a 
change in the probability of insolvency and the cost of insolvency resulting from banks holding more 
equity. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s long-term economic impact exercise 
(Macroeconomic Assessment Group, 2010) and later Behn et al. (2016) measure the gains of capital 
regulation as the expected output increase associated with the reduction in the likeliness and severity 
of banking crises. Arregui et al. (2013) also assume that changes in the regulation affect the expected 
probability of a crisis. The cost-benefit analysis takes place through a comparison of the 2-step-ahead 
output forecasts: one in a scenario with and another in a scenario without policy implementation. 
The costs of bank capitalisation correspond with short-term losses in credit and GDP. In our second 
exercise, we look at the consequences of an immediate increase in the average system-wide capital 
ratio, which is assumed to have a negative impact on banks’ assets and a positive effect on lending 
spreads. This specification emphasises that an increase in capital requirements can trigger 
deleveraging, and banks will aim at reducing risk-weighted assets (the denominator of the capital 
ratio) by shrinking their balance sheet or shifting the risk profile of their assets towards less risky 
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availability of the standardised macroprudential toolbox in all European countries, that followed the 
implementation of Basel III (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011) into the European 
framework. The increased use of macroprudential instruments urges the assessment of their 
effectiveness and transmission channels. 
This paper explores the merits of a structural factor-augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) 
model for the assessment of macroprudential policies. The FAVAR model ties together a rich set of 
individual bank-level data with key macroeconomic aggregates, such as GDP and residential and 
commercial property prices. It is estimated on national data for eleven euro area countries: Belgium, 
Cyprus, France, Ireland, Italy, Finland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain, and 
employed to assess: (i) structural vulnerabilities of national banking systems and individual banks, (ii) 
long-term benefits from capital-based regulation, and (iii) short-term costs of capital-based regulation. 
Combining micro- and macroeconomic data within a FAVAR framework has several advantages from 
the policy perspective. First, we can use the model to gauge both macroeconomic effects, i.e. how 
much total credit or GDP of a country are affected, and bank-level reactions to a structural shock or a 
policy change. As such, a FAVAR-based analysis provides more than system-wide insights and helps 
diagnose the vulnerabilities of single institutions depending on their business model, ownership or 
exposure structure. Second, a FAVAR analysis informs about the distributional effects of shocks and 
policy actions. Third, a FAVAR model may be employed to look at the propagation of shocks 
affecting only selected institutions in the system. Last, irrespective of its complexity, the model 
remains very flexible and can be applied to a broad range of policy questions. 
Applications of FAVAR models to banking data are a relatively small but fast expanding literature. 
Closest to ours are the papers by Buch et al. (2014), who use US data (‘Call reports’), and Jimborean 
and Mésonnier (2010), who use confidential French data in an application to monetary policy.  
Another paper sharing methodological similarities with this paper is Budnik and Bochmann (2017) 
who discuss how macroprudential and monetary policy impact the lending and interest rates of euro 
area banks.   
Three different specifications of a FAVAR model are employed to address three types of policy 
questions. The first exercise evaluates the role of capital buffers in the propagation of macroeconomic 
shocks into bank lending. The second exercise assesses the effects of changes in the average 
capitalisation level of banks on their lending, and later on economic activity. The third exercise 
distinguishes between the effects of changes in bank-level capital ratios accommodated either by an 
adjustment of banks' assets or by an adjustment in the level of banks’ capital. The last simulation 
describes the effects of capital shocks which affect the majority of banks in the system. 
The first exercise is designed to inform about the long-run benefits from high bank capitalisation. We 
choose the specification of a FAVAR model which describes the propagation of aggregate demand 
and real property prices into bank lending, credit risk, capitalisation and profits. This specification of 
FAVAR allows us to assess system-wide and bank-level vulnerabilities. As the next step, we link the 
differences in banks’ responses to structural shocks to their capitalisation levels in a series of bank-
level regressions. The regression estimates point to a moderating impact of higher capital buffers on 
the propagation of structural shocks.  
Our notion of benefits from capital regulation relates to the impact of banks’ capital on their 
resilience, i.e. their ability to withstand adverse shocks originating outside the banking system with 
minimum impact on the supply of credit to the private sector. While assessing the benefits from 
capital regulation, we derive the difference between the reduction in credit by highly capitalised and 
lower capitalised banks in response to a combination of negative structural shocks. This difference is 
a measure of the benefits from holding higher capital buffers. As a numerical example, we consider 
the benefits related capital buffers as in 2015 compared to their 2010 levels and compared to the 
reference level of 8.5% of Tier1 ratio. 
In our assessment, the benefits from capital buffers correspond with additional credit granted by banks 
under an adverse scenario. This approach deviates from the empirical literature discussing the long-
term benefits of higher capital buffers related to reducing the probability of bank insolvency and 
banking crisis. Miles et al. (2013) measure the benefits of higher capital buffers as the product of a 
change in the probability of insolvency and the cost of insolvency resulting from banks holding more 
equity. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s long-term economic impact exercise 
(Macroeconomic Assessment Group, 2010) and later Behn et al. (2016) measure the gains of capital 
regulation as the expected output increase associated with the reduction in the likeliness and severity 
of banking crises. Arregui et al. (2013) also assume that changes in the regulation affect the expected 
probability of a crisis. The cost-benefit analysis takes place through a comparison of the 2-step-ahead 
output forecasts: one in a scenario with and another in a scenario without policy implementation. 
The costs of bank capitalisation correspond with short-term losses in credit and GDP. In our second 
exercise, we look at the consequences of an immediate increase in the average system-wide capital 
ratio, which is assumed to have a negative impact on banks’ assets and a positive effect on lending 
spreads. This specification emphasises that an increase in capital requirements can trigger 
deleveraging, and banks will aim at reducing risk-weighted assets (the denominator of the capital 
ratio) by shrinking their balance sheet or shifting the risk profile of their assets towards less risky 
distinguishes between the effects of changes in bank-level capital ratios accommodated either by an 
adjustment of banks' assets or by an adjustment in the level of banks’ capital. The last simulation 
describes the effects of capital shocks which affect the majority of banks in the system. 
The first exercise is designed to inform about the long-run benefits from high bank capitalisation. We 
choose the specification of a FAVAR model which describes the propagation of aggregate demand 
and real property prices into bank lending, credit risk, capitalisation and profits. This specification of 
FAVAR allows us to assess system-wide and bank-level vulnerabilities. As the next step, we link the 
differences in banks’ responses to structural shocks to their capitalisation levels in a series of bank-
level regressions. The regression estimates point to a moderating impact of higher capital buffers on 
the propagation of structural shocks.  
Our notion of benefits from capital regulation relates to the impact of banks’ capital on their 
resilience, i.e. their ability to withstand adverse shocks originating outside the banking system with 
minimum impact on the supply of credit to the private sector. While assessing the benefits from 
capital regulation, we derive the difference between the reduction in credit by highly capitalised and 
lower capitalised banks in response to a combination of negative structural shocks. This difference is 
a measure of the benefits from holding higher capital buffers. As a numerical example, we consider 
the benefits related capital buffers as in 2015 compared to their 2010 levels and compared to the 
reference level of 8.5% of Tier1 ratio. 
In our assessment, the benefits from capital buffers correspond with additional credit granted by banks 
under an adverse scenario. This approach deviates from the empirical literature discussing the long-
term benefits of higher capital buffers related to reducing the probability of bank insolvency and 
banking crisis. Miles et al. (2013) measure the benefits of higher capital buffers as the product of a 
change in the probability of insolvency and the cost of insolvency resulting from banks holding more 
equity. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s long-term economic impact exercise 
(Macroeconomic Assessment Group, 2010) and later Behn et al. (2016) measure the gains of capital 
regulation as the expected output increase associated with the reduction in the likeliness and severity 
of banking crises. Arregui et al. (2013) also assume that changes in the regulation affect the expected 
probability of a crisis. The cost-benefit analysis takes place through a comparison of the 2-step-ahead 
output forecasts: one in a scenario with and another in a scenario without policy implementation. 
The costs of bank capitalisation correspond with short-term losses in credit and GDP. In our second 
exercise, we look at the consequences of an immediate increase in the average system-wide capital 
ratio, which is assumed to have a negative impact on banks’ assets and a positive effect on lending 
spreads. This specification emphasises that an increase in capital requirements can trigger 
deleveraging, and banks will aim at reducing risk-weighted assets (the denominator of the capital 
ratio) by shrinking their balance sheet or shifting the risk profile of their assets towards less risky 
exposures. Accordingly, bank credit for the real economy becomes scarcer. If other financial 
intermediaries or forms of financing (bonds issuance by firms) do not pick this shortfall in bank 
credit, it will drive an increase in the cost of financing for the private sector and ultimately harm 
aggregate output. In order to separate the capital shock from other credit supply shocks, we assume 
that it involves an immediate fall in banks’ financing costs (deposit spreads or CDS). 
An aggregate bank capital shock is specified similarly to other VAR-based studies. Meeks (2017) 
applies a Bayesian VAR with 11 variables to UK data and explores the information on actual and 
prudential capital ratios. His main result is that an increase in capital requirements lowers lending to 
firms and households, reduces aggregate expenditures and raises credit spreads. Noss and Toffano 
(2016) use a five-variable VAR and impose a set of directional constraints on the responses of 
macroeconomic variables to capital requirement shocks. Following an exogenous increase in capital, 
bank lending falls, non-financial corporates substitute bank capital by bonds, bank returns fall relative 
to market returns. The authors find that a positive capital shock has a significant negative effect on 
bank lending but not on GDP. The analysis conducted by the Macroeconomic Assessment Group 
(2010) also falls under this category and infers the macroeconomic impact of increases in capital 
requirements under the assumption that higher capital requirements would raise the weighted average 
cost of capital and prompt an increase in lending spreads. Their results point to small effects of capital 
requirements on output (see also Cecchetti, 2014). 
Our alternative approach to estimating short-term costs of increasing capital buffers explores bank-
level impact restrictions. We extend the structural shock identification in a FAVAR framework 
beyond what has been presented in the literature. An increase in a system-wide capital buffer 
corresponds to a series of capital increases on a bank-level rather than an increase in the average 
capitalisation level. Such an identification scheme allows us to explore bank-level information more 
efficiently and increases the precision of structural identification in cases when an increase in capital 
buffers affects only selected banks (e.g. the imposition of an O-SII buffer).   
In the last specification involving bank-level identification of structural shocks, we also recognise that 
an increase in capital ratios can have a different impact on credit supply and economic activity 
depending on the way banks adjust their assets versus capital. The evidence collected by Cohen and 
Scatigna (2014) shows that between 2009 and 2013 euro area banks used a mix of deleveraging and 
equity issuance to meet higher capital requirements. Banks based in the US and European countries 
reached higher capital ratios by raising equity, at the same time increasing rather than reducing assets. 
Two-thirds of an increase in equity attributes to retaining of earnings, the remaining one-third to 
issuing new equity. Accordingly, we distinguish between a deleveraging shock, where banks 
accommodate an increase in capital ratios by a reduction in bank assets, and a ‘beefing-up’ capital 
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exposures. Accordingly, bank credit for the real economy becomes scarcer. If other financial 
intermediaries or forms of financing (bonds issuance by firms) do not pick this shortfall in bank 
credit, it will drive an increase in the cost of financing for the private sector and ultimately harm 
aggregate output. In order to separate the capital shock from other credit supply shocks, we assume 
that it involves an immediate fall in banks’ financing costs (deposit spreads or CDS). 
An aggregate bank capital shock is specified similarly to other VAR-based studies. Meeks (2017) 
applies a Bayesian VAR with 11 variables to UK data and explores the information on actual and 
prudential capital ratios. His main result is that an increase in capital requirements lowers lending to 
firms and households, reduces aggregate expenditures and raises credit spreads. Noss and Toffano 
(2016) use a five-variable VAR and impose a set of directional constraints on the responses of 
macroeconomic variables to capital requirement shocks. Following an exogenous increase in capital, 
bank lending falls, non-financial corporates substitute bank capital by bonds, bank returns fall relative 
to market returns. The authors find that a positive capital shock has a significant negative effect on 
bank lending but not on GDP. The analysis conducted by the Macroeconomic Assessment Group 
(2010) also falls under this category and infers the macroeconomic impact of increases in capital 
requirements under the assumption that higher capital requirements would raise the weighted average 
cost of capital and prompt an increase in lending spreads. Their results point to small effects of capital 
requirements on output (see also Cecchetti, 2014). 
Our alternative approach to estimating short-term costs of increasing capital buffers explores bank-
level impact restrictions. We extend the structural shock identification in a FAVAR framework 
beyond what has been presented in the literature. An increase in a system-wide capital buffer 
corresponds to a series of capital increases on a bank-level rather than an increase in the average 
capitalisation level. Such an identification scheme allows us to explore bank-level information more 
efficiently and increases the precision of structural identification in cases when an increase in capital 
buffers affects only selected banks (e.g. the imposition of an O-SII buffer).   
In the last specification involving bank-level identification of structural shocks, we also recognise that 
an increase in capital ratios can have a different impact on credit supply and economic activity 
depending on the way banks adjust their assets versus capital. The evidence collected by Cohen and 
Scatigna (2014) shows that between 2009 and 2013 euro area banks used a mix of deleveraging and 
equity issuance to meet higher capital requirements. Banks based in the US and European countries 
reached higher capital ratios by raising equity, at the same time increasing rather than reducing assets. 
Two-thirds of an increase in equity attributes to retaining of earnings, the remaining one-third to 
issuing new equity. Accordingly, we distinguish between a deleveraging shock, where banks 
accommodate an increase in capital ratios by a reduction in bank assets, and a ‘beefing-up’ capital 
shock, where banks accommodate an increase in capital ratios by an increase in regulatory capital 
(with no initial effect on assets). 
Our empirical results suggest that higher bank capitalisation smoothens the supply of credit to the 
economy over the business cycle. Further, we document that the relationship between banks’ 
capitalisation and their reaction to structural shocks differs for large (G-SII and O-SII) and other 
(medium and small size) banks. In particular, the moderating effect of higher bank capitalisation on 
the propagation of real economic shocks is more pronounced and long-lasting for large banks. 
A permanent increase in Tier1 ratio triggers significant though country and adjustment specific 
effects. Our estimates suggest that following an increase in the system-wide capital ratio by 1pp 
accommodated predominantly via banks' deleveraging, there is a fall in credit to the non-financial 
private sector by 1-3% and in output by 0-2% (depending on the country). However, an increase in 
capital ratios will have an expansionary effect on credit and economic activity as long as most of the 
banks in the system adjust by beefing up capital rather than reducing assets. Irrespective of a banks’ 
adjustment profile an increase in capital ratios is likely to increase lending margins and reduce deposit 
margins.  
Our study contributes to the emerging literature on the effects of capital regulation. Other authors 
have assessed the macroeconomic effects of changes in capital requirements using micro-level bank 
data. Aiyar et al. (2014a, 2014b) find that banks that were subject to UK capital regulation between 
1998 and 2007 responded by reducing by more than 5pp the rate of growth of lending. Bridges et al. 
(2014) refine the study by Aiyar et al. (2014a) and find that in the year following an increase in 
capital requirements, banks cut loans backed by commercial property more than other loans to 
corporates and households. Berrospide and Edge (2010) find minimal effects of capital changes on 
bank lending. Using a similar setup, but extending the sample to a large number of advanced and 
emerging countries, De Nicolò (2015) finds significant and negative short-run, and long-run impact of 
an increase in capital requirements on bank lending. Other studies exploit the announcement of higher 
capital needs by the European Banking Authority in 2012. Applying this approach Mésonnier and 
Monks (2014) find that an increase in the regulatory ratio by 1pp reduced bank credit growth in a 
sample of euro area banks by 1.2%. Fraisse et al. (2015) extend the analysis to study the impact on 
corporate borrowing and business activity. In their analysis, a 1 pp increase in capital requirements is 
found to lead to a reduction in lending between 3 and 8 per cent, and reduce firms’ investment and 
employment.  
The paper is structured as follows. The next two sections discuss the methodology and the datasets 
employed in the analysis. Section 4 provides a summary of the results on the transmission of business 
and housing cycle shocks into bank-level variables. Elaborating on these results, Section 5 presents 
the assessment of benefits from capital regulation. Finally, Sections 6 and 7 discuss two different 
shock, where banks accommodate an increase in capital ratios by an increase in regulatory capital 
(with no initial effect on assets). 
Our empirical results suggest that higher bank capitalisation smoothens the supply of credit to the 
economy over the business cycle. Further, we document that the relationship between banks’ 
capitalisation and their reaction to structural shocks differs for large (G-SII and O-SII) and other 
(medium and small size) banks. In particular, the moderating effect of higher bank capitalisation on 
the propagation of real economic shocks is more pronounced and long-lasting for large banks. 
A permanent increase in Tier1 ratio triggers significant though country and adjustment specific 
effects. Our estimates suggest that following an increase in the system-wide capital ratio by 1pp 
accommodated predominantly via banks' deleveraging, there is a fall in credit to the non-financial 
private sector by 1-3% and in output by 0-2% (depending on the country). However, an increase in 
capital ratios will have an expansionary effect on credit and economic activity as long as most of the 
banks in the system adjust by beefing up capital rather than reducing assets. Irrespective of a banks’ 
adjustment profile an increase in capital ratios is likely to increase lending margins and reduce deposit 
margins.  
Our study contributes to the emerging literature on the effects of capital regulation. Other authors 
have assessed the macroeconomic effects of changes in capital requirements using micro-level bank 
data. Aiyar et al. (2014a, 2014b) find that banks that were subject to UK capital regulation between 
1998 and 2007 responded by reducing by more than 5pp the rate of growth of lending. Bridges et al. 
(2014) refine the study by Aiyar et al. (2014a) and find that in the year following an increase in 
capital requirements, banks cut loans backed by commercial property more than other loans to 
corporates and households. Berrospide and Edge (2010) find minimal effects of capital changes on 
bank lending. Using a similar setup, but extending the sample to a large number of advanced and 
emerging countries, De Nicolò (2015) finds significant and negative short-run, and long-run impact of 
an increase in capital requirements on bank lending. Other studies exploit the announcement of higher 
capital needs by the European Banking Authority in 2012. Applying this approach Mésonnier and 
Monks (2014) find that an increase in the regulatory ratio by 1pp reduced bank credit growth in a 
sample of euro area banks by 1.2%. Fraisse et al. (2015) extend the analysis to study the impact on 
corporate borrowing and business activity. In their analysis, a 1 pp increase in capital requirements is 
found to lead to a reduction in lending between 3 and 8 per cent, and reduce firms’ investment and 
employment.  
The paper is structured as follows. The next two sections discuss the methodology and the datasets 
employed in the analysis. Section 4 provides a summary of the results on the transmission of business 
and housing cycle shocks into bank-level variables. Elaborating on these results, Section 5 presents 
the assessment of benefits from capital regulation. Finally, Sections 6 and 7 discuss two different 
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shock, where banks accommodate an increase in capital ratios by an increase in regulatory capital 
(with no initial effect on assets). 
Our empirical results suggest that higher bank capitalisation smoothens the supply of credit to the 
economy over the business cycle. Further, we document that the relationship between banks’ 
capitalisation and their reaction to structural shocks differs for large (G-SII and O-SII) and other 
(medium and small size) banks. In particular, the moderating effect of higher bank capitalisation on 
the propagation of real economic shocks is more pronounced and long-lasting for large banks. 
A permanent increase in Tier1 ratio triggers significant though country and adjustment specific 
effects. Our estimates suggest that following an increase in the system-wide capital ratio by 1pp 
accommodated predominantly via banks' deleveraging, there is a fall in credit to the non-financial 
private sector by 1-3% and in output by 0-2% (depending on the country). However, an increase in 
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1998 and 2007 responded by reducing by more than 5pp the rate of growth of lending. Bridges et al. 
(2014) refine the study by Aiyar et al. (2014a) and find that in the year following an increase in 
capital requirements, banks cut loans backed by commercial property more than other loans to 
corporates and households. Berrospide and Edge (2010) find minimal effects of capital changes on 
bank lending. Using a similar setup, but extending the sample to a large number of advanced and 
emerging countries, De Nicolò (2015) finds significant and negative short-run, and long-run impact of 
an increase in capital requirements on bank lending. Other studies exploit the announcement of higher 
capital needs by the European Banking Authority in 2012. Applying this approach Mésonnier and 
Monks (2014) find that an increase in the regulatory ratio by 1pp reduced bank credit growth in a 
sample of euro area banks by 1.2%. Fraisse et al. (2015) extend the analysis to study the impact on 
corporate borrowing and business activity. In their analysis, a 1 pp increase in capital requirements is 
found to lead to a reduction in lending between 3 and 8 per cent, and reduce firms’ investment and 
employment.  
The paper is structured as follows. The next two sections discuss the methodology and the datasets 
employed in the analysis. Section 4 provides a summary of the results on the transmission of business 
and housing cycle shocks into bank-level variables. Elaborating on these results, Section 5 presents 
the assessment of benefits from capital regulation. Finally, Sections 6 and 7 discuss two different 
shock, where banks accommodate an increase in capital ratios by an increase in regulatory capital 
(with no initial effect on assets). 
Our empirical results suggest that higher bank capitalisation smoothens the supply of credit to the 
economy over the business cycle. Further, we document that the relationship between banks’ 
capitalisation and their reaction to structural shocks differs for large (G-SII and O-SII) and other 
(medium and small size) banks. In particular, the moderating effect of higher bank capitalisation on 
the propagation of real economic shocks is more pronounced and long-lasting for large banks. 
A permanent increase in Tier1 ratio triggers significant though country and adjustment specific 
effects. Our estimates suggest that following an increase in the system-wide capital ratio by 1pp 
accommodated predominantly via banks' deleveraging, there is a fall in credit to the non-financial 
private sector by 1-3% and in output by 0-2% (depending on the country). However, an increase in 
capital ratios will have an expansionary effect on credit and economic activity as long as most of the 
banks in the system adjust by beefing up capital rather than reducing assets. Irrespective of a banks’ 
adjustment profile an increase in capital ratios is likely to increase lending margins and reduce deposit 
margins.  
Our study contributes to the emerging literature on the effects of capital regulation. Other authors 
have assessed the macroeconomic effects of changes in capital requirements using micro-level bank 
data. Aiyar et al. (2014a, 2014b) find that banks that were subject to UK capital regulation between 
1998 and 2007 responded by reducing by more than 5pp the rate of growth of lending. Bridges et al. 
(2014) refine the study by Aiyar et al. (2014a) and find that in the year following an increase in 
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sample of euro area banks by 1.2%. Fraisse et al. (2015) extend the analysis to study the impact on 
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employment.  
The paper is structured as follows. The next two sections discuss the methodology and the datasets 
employed in the analysis. Section 4 provides a summary of the results on the transmission of business 
and housing cycle shocks into bank-level variables. Elaborating on these results, Section 5 presents 
the assessment of benefits from capital regulation. Finally, Sections 6 and 7 discuss two different 
approaches to measur ment f short-term costs of imposing higher capital buffers. Section 8 
concludes. 
 
2 FAVAR model and its application to bank-level data 
 
A factor-augmented vector autoregressive model (FAVAR) augments a standard VAR with a set of 
latent variables. The latter variables are called unobserved factors and commonly summarise a large 
amount of additional information.  Bernanke et al. (2005) and later Boivin and Giannoni (2007) 
proposed the model to overcome potential misspecification error in cases when only a narrow set of 
variables are perfectly observable in a data-rich environment.  
The advantage of the FAVAR model that we exploit is its ability to summarise the behaviour of a 
large dataset of bank-level information. The model captures the co-movements of hundreds of these 
variables in a limited number of common factors, only moderately increasing the number of estimated 
VAR model parameters. Thus, the FAVAR approach allows us to model the banking system in detail 
while preventing the curse of dimensionality. 1  
Endogenous variables in a FAVAR include a narrow set of observable variables 𝐹𝐹𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 and a set of 
latent factors 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥. Let 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = [𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦′ 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥′]’ be the (𝑀𝑀 + 𝐾𝐾) x 1 vector which collects both the 𝑀𝑀 x 1  vector 
of observed variables and the 𝐾𝐾 x 1   vector of unobserved common factors 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥. The structural VAR 
model can be expressed as: 
 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = Γ(𝐿𝐿)𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡             (1) 
      
where Γ(𝐿𝐿) is a lag polynomial of order p  and 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑. (0,Ω) is a (𝑀𝑀 + 𝐾𝐾) x 1  vector of structural 
shocks with mean zero and diagonal covariance matrix Ω. The VAR model can also be expressed in 
its reduced-form representation as: 
𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = 𝜙𝜙(𝐿𝐿)𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡                                                          (2)
         
where 𝜙𝜙(𝐿𝐿) = 𝐴𝐴−1Γ(𝐿𝐿) and vector of reduced form innovation 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴−1𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡~𝑁𝑁(0, Σ) with Σ =
𝐴𝐴−1Ω(𝐴𝐴−1)′.  
                                                          
1 In the original application of Boivin and Giannoni (2007) the policy instrument of the central bank is perfectly observable 
and the underlying dynamics of the economy are less perfectly observable. 
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The latent factors 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥 are computed on the basis of a large set of N time series contained in 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡. The 
observation equation links the 𝑁𝑁 x 1 vector 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡  of observable variables to both observed and 
unobserved factors in 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡: 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 = Δ𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦  + Δ𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥  + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 = Λ𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡          (3)
  
where Δ𝑦𝑦 and Δ𝑥𝑥are, respectively, 𝑁𝑁 x M and 𝑁𝑁 x K matrices of factor loadings, which measure the 
sensitivity of the individual variables in 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 to each common factor (observed and unobserved), and 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 
is a 𝑁𝑁 x 1 vector of idiosyncratic disturbances that are normally distributed with mean zero and 
diagonal covariance matrix 𝐻𝐻.2 Furthermore, it is assumed that: 
 latent factors 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥  are orthogonal to the observed variables 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦; 
 latent factors are mutually orthogonal; 
 disturbances are uncorrelated with the factors, 𝐸𝐸[𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡] = 0,∀𝑖𝑖 = 1 …𝑁𝑁; 
 disturbances are not serially or cross-sectionally correlated: 
𝐸𝐸[𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗,𝑠𝑠] = 0,∀𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 = 1 …𝑁𝑁 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ∀𝑡𝑡, 𝑠𝑠 = 1, …𝑇𝑇, 𝑡𝑡 ≠ 𝑠𝑠.   
In our application, 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡  consists of 𝑁𝑁 bank-level variables that are assumed to be covariance-stationary. 
Hence, 𝐾𝐾 ≪ 𝑁𝑁 unobserved factors in 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥 reflect the common dynamics of the bank-level variables in 
each period 𝑡𝑡 after controlling for the evolution of observed factors. Equations (2) and (3) taken 
together summarise the structure of a FAVAR model. 
The structural FAVAR is estimated in three steps as in e.g. Boivin and Giannoni (2007). First, we 
select the observed macroeconomic variables 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡
𝑦𝑦 and a set of bank level variables 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 and estimate the 
latent factors 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥 as in (3). Second, we replace 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥 in equation (2) by the latent factors estimated in the 
first step, and estimate the reduced-form VAR model. Third, we search for a set of structural shocks 
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 by imposing zero and sign impact restrictions. 
For the purpose of deriving  𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥 we apply the algorithm described by Budnik and Bochmann (2018). 
We regress 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 on 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡
𝑦𝑦, and derive the latent factors as the first principal components (PC) of the full set 
of regression residuals. Further, we impose a standard normalization restriction on factor loadings to 
uniquely identify the unobserved factors (up to a sign). When choosing the number of unobserved 
factors, K, we aim at explaining at least 50% of the contemporaneous variation in bank-level variables 
(on average).  
                                                          
2 Bai and Ng (2002) and Stock and Watson (2002) refer to this equation as an approximate dynamic factor model, which 
means that 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥 can include lags of fundamental factors. 
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In the next step, we estimate reduced form VAR model applying Bayesian methods. We use Gibbs 
sampler and the independent Normal-Wishart prior with mean VAR coefficients set at zero (with no 
shrinkage). The number of lags, p, is set based on a set of standard lag selection criteria (AIC, BIC).  
The algorithm of Arias et al. (2014) offers an efficient way to draw from the unrestricted posterior of 
model parameters knowing the distribution of the reduced-form VAR parameters. We search for a set 
of structural shocks 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 imposing zero and sign restrictions motivated by the existing literature on 
impulse response functions (IRFs).  
Last, we analyse impulse response functions of variables entering 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 and 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡. The IRFs of all common 
factors, observable and latent, are derived from the moving average representation of our VAR model, 
i.e. from 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = Ψ(𝐿𝐿)𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡=Ψ(𝐿𝐿)𝐴𝐴−1𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 where Ψ(𝐿𝐿) = 𝐼𝐼 − 𝜙𝜙(𝐿𝐿). The IRFs of  bank-level variables 
entering 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 are derived conditional on the estimates of Ψ(𝐿𝐿) and Λ from 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 = ΛΨ(𝐿𝐿)𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 =
ΛΨ(𝐿𝐿)𝐴𝐴−1𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡.3 
 
3 Data 
 
3.1  Macro variables 
Macroeconomic variables stem from public data sources. These include GDP, GDP deflator, 
residential real estate prices, and commercial property prices, when available. We also use the 
aggregate measure of system-wide credit to the non-financial private sector, stock prices, CDS, 
lending and deposit rates. 
3.2 Bank-level datasets 
We reach to two different and confidential sources of information on bank-level variables.4 These are: 
(i) supervisory reports consisting of the balance sheet and income statements collected by national 
authorities for supervisory purposes, and if the former were not available, (ii) monetary financial 
institutions (MFI) 5 balance sheet statistics collected by national central banks for monitoring 
monetary developments.  Appendix A discusses the differences between these data sources and 
provides a detailed overview of country-level datasets. 
Bank-level information is used mostly on a consolidated or semi-consolidated level (see Table 3.1). 
Exceptions are Belgium, Lithuania and Spain, where models refer to bank-level variables on a solo 
                                                          
3 IRFs are computed as the partial derivative with respect to a structural shock. 
4 The confidentiality of bank-level datasets prohibited pooling of bank-level variables for different countries to estimate 
multi-country rather than single-country FAVAR models. This technical impediment made it impossible to e.g. study cross-
border spillover effects.   
5 Monetary financial institutions’ (MFI) balance sheet and interest rate statistics conform to international and European 
statistical standards, currently the European System of Accounts (ESA 2010). 
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Macroeconomic variabl  stem from public data sources. These include GDP, GDP deflator, 
residential real est te price , and commercial property prices, when available. We also use the 
aggregate m sure of syst m-wide credit to the non-finan ial private sector, stock prices, CDS, 
lending and deposit rate . 
3.2 Bank-level datasets 
We reach to two different and confidential sources of information on bank-level variables.4 These are: 
(i) supervisory reports consisting of the balance sheet and income statements collected by national 
authorities for su ervisory purposes, and if the former were n t available, (ii) monetary financial 
institutions (MFI) 5 balance sheet statistics collected by natio al centr l banks for monitoring 
monetary developments.  App ndix A discusses the differences b tween these data sources and 
pr vides a detailed overview of country-level datasets. 
Bank-level information is used mostly on a consolidated or semi-consolidated level (see Table 3.1). 
Exceptions are Belgium, Lithuania and Sp in, where model  refer to bank-l vel ariabl s on a solo 
                                                        
3 IRFs are computed as the partial derivative with respect to a structural shock. 
4 The confidentiality of bank-level datasets prohibited pooling of bank-level variables for different countries to estimate 
multi-country rather than single-country FAVAR models. This technical impediment made it impossible to e.g. study cross-
border spillover effects.   
5 Monetary financial institutions’ (MFI) balance sheet and interest rate statistics conform to international and European 
statistical standards, currently the European System of Accounts (ESA 2010). 
level. F r Lithuania, there is no difference between solo and s mi-c nsolidated data.  For Belgium 
and Spain, the ntention of using solo data was to focus on banks’ activity n the d mestic marke , and 
abstract from the rel tively arge inte nat onal perations of nationa  banking groups.   
 
Table 3.1: Consolidation level of bank-level data 
Legend: For Dutch, French and Portuguese models original consolidation level differs by data source. E.g. consolidated data is used for such variables as own funds and total assets, while 
semi-consolidated data for the remaining variables.  
Relatedly, country datasets differ in the definition of loans to the non-financial private sector that may 
also include loans to non-residents (see Table 3.2).  
Table 3.2: Treatment of loans to non-residents 
 
 
 
3.3 Bank-level variables 
When selecting bank-level variables, we focus on the developments in the domestic non-financial 
private credit, credit risk, banks’ profitability and capitalisation. Appendix A includes the full 
overview of bank-level variables.  
We distinguish between loans to non-financial corporates (NFC) and households. If possible, we also 
separate loans for housing purposes (or loans to households backed by residential property) from 
loans for consumption and other purposes. For Belgium, the dynamics of mortgage credit is 
approximated by long-term loans to households, and consumption credit, by short-term loans to 
households. For countries, where the dynamics of long and short-term credit to NFC have been 
markedly different in a sample, we separate these two subcategories of credit. Last but not least, due 
to distinctively different dynamics of small and large volume loans to NFC in Italy, we distinguish 
between them in the Italian model. All credit variables are seasonally and outlier corrected and used in 
quarter-on-quarter growth rates.  
 BE CY ES FI FR IE IT LT NL PT SI 
Institution level (solo)     ●      ●             ●      ● 
Semi-consolidated         ●    ●    ●      ●     ●  
Consolidated      ●      ●     ●    ●       ●     ●  
 BE CY ES FI FR IE IT LT NL PT SI 
Includes loans to residents  ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Includes loans to non-residents  ●  ● ●       
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level. For Lithuania, there is no difference between solo and semi-consolidated data.  For Belgium 
and Spain, the intention of using solo data was to focus on banks’ activity in the domestic market, and 
abstract from the relatively large international operations of national banking groups.   
 
Table 3.1: Consolidation level of bank-level data 
Legend: For Dutch, French and Portuguese models original consolidation level differs by data source. E.g. consolidated data is used for such variables as own funds and total assets, while 
semi-consolidated data for the remaining variables.  
Relatedly, country datasets differ in the definition of loans to the non-financial private sector that may 
also include loans to non-residents (see Table 3.2).  
Table 3.2: Treatment of loans to non-residents 
 
 
 
3.3 Bank-level variables 
When selecting bank-level variables, we focus on the developments in the domestic non-financial 
private credit, credit risk, banks’ profitability and capitalisation. Appendix A includes the full 
overview of bank-level variables.  
We distinguish between loans to non-financial corporates (NFC) and households. If possible, we also 
separate loans for housing purposes (or loans to households backed by residential property) from 
loans for consumption and other purposes. For Belgium, the dynamics of mortgage credit is 
approximated by long-term loans to households, and consumption credit, by short-term loans to 
households. For countries, where the dynamics of long and short-term credit to NFC have been 
markedly different in a sample, we separate these two subcategories of credit. Last but not least, due 
to distinctively different dynamics of small and large volume loans to NFC in Italy, we distinguish 
between them in the Italian model. All credit variables are seasonally and outlier corrected and used in 
quarter-on-quarter growth rates.  
 BE CY ES FI FR IE IT LT NL PT SI 
Institution level (solo)     ●      ●             ●      ● 
Semi-consolidated         ●    ●    ●      ●     ●  
Consolidated      ●      ●     ●    ●       ●     ●  
 BE CY ES FI FR IE IT LT NL PT SI 
Includes loans to residents  ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Includes loans to non-residents  ●  ● ●       
To capture the evolution of credit risk, we include the share of non-performing loans to total non-
financial private sector loans (NPLs ratios). The preferred measure of bank capital rests on the Tier1 
definition, but for countries for which long enough time-series of Tier1 capital were not available, we 
rely on a broader definition of own funds. Both NPL and capital ratios are used in first quarter-on-
quarter differences, whereas capital volumes in quarter-on-quarter growth rates.  
3.3 Sample 
Country bank-level datasets are representative for the domestic banking systems, covering from 66% 
to 92% of the overall banking assets. Concerning total credit to the non-financial private sector, 
country samples cover from 77% to 86% of the overall outstanding credit volumes (Table 3.3). The 
number of banks in country samples differs more widely, with relatively few banks in the Finnish and 
Dutch samples, more than 10 banks in the Spanish and over 40 in the Italian. 
Further, the country datasets reflect the core characteristics of national banking systems. The size of 
the banking system measured as the ratio of banking assets in the sample to GDP in 2015 is largest in 
Cyprus (325% of GDP as reported in Table 3.3), followed by France and the Netherlands (around 
300% of GDP), and smallest in Lithuania (53% of GDP). The relative number of foreign subsidiaries 
in country samples, over 50% for Finland and Lithuania, and 33% in Ireland and Belgium correspond 
well with a generally high degree of penetration of these national systems by foreign-controlled 
subsidiaries branches. According to the ECB Consolidated Banking Data, at the end of 2015, foreign-
owned entities held 92% of the total banking sector assets in Lithuania, 68% in Finland, 49% in 
Belgium and 48% in Ireland.   
Not less importantly, all major types of banking systems in the euro area enter our analysis. 
Traditional (with a high relative role of traditional banking activities) and predominantly 
domestically-oriented banking systems are represented by Italy and Portugal (marked by ①). Cross-
border banking systems (that share the main features of 'traditional banking systems', though they are 
often larger and more open, i.e. with a higher share of exposures to foreign countries) are represented 
by Cyprus, Spain, France, and the Netherlands (marked by ②). Banking systems where banks’ 
business models involve a relatively high share of non-traditional banking activities and where banks 
may face fiercer competition from other financial intermediaries in the domestic market are 
represented by Belgium, Ireland and Finland (marked by ③). Last, relatively small banking systems 
(compared to GDP) with a high share of foreign-owned banks, common in the new EU member 
states, are represented by Lithuania (marked by ④). 6 
                                                          
6 Other euro area countries not included in the analysis have been classified as: traditional banking systems - Germany and 
Greece, cross-border banking systems – Austria, non-traditional banking systems – Belgium, small banking systems – 
Estonia, Latvia Slovakia. 
Country sample length differs due to the availability of bank-level data. The sample starts as early as 
mid-1998 for France and as late as the end of 2010 for Cyprus. Importantly, for most of the countries, 
the sample begins before the recent 2007 global financial crisis. For a share of countries, the sample 
also covers a period of the acceleration and following a deceleration in the growth rate of real estate 
prices. 
The bank-level data for all countries show a clear pattern of deleveraging with a marked reduction in 
the growth rate of banks’ assets and credit to non-financial private sector between 2007Q3 and 
2009Q4. After that, the growth rate of credit to NFC remains negative, whereas the growth rate of 
credit issued to households seems to stabilise in positive territory. The exception is the sustained 
positive credit growth rate to NFC in Belgium from the beginning of 2009.  
At the same time, capital as a percentage of total assets shows a sustained increase over time. There is 
an early increase in capital levels in Portugal, Lithuania and Italy in 2008-2009 matching the 
implementation of Basel II and Basel II.5 capital standards. Later, we see an increase for nearly all 
countries in 2014-2015, i.e. the implementation period of Basel III. In turn, banks’ profitability 
appears to follow the economic cycle.  Appendix B provides the full overview of time dynamics of 
the bank-level variables included in the analysis. 
4 Bank responses to macroeconomic shocks 
4.1 Benchmark country models 
The benchmark specification is tailored to assess the effects of structural shocks characterising the 
business and housing cycles. The observable variables include GDP, general price index and property 
price indices. The number of latent factors summarising the dynamics of bank-level variables is set so 
to explain possibly a high share of the contemporaneous variance in bank-level variables while 
keeping the size of the model reasonably small. In practice, we applied the rule-of-thumb criterion 
earlier advocated by Boivin and Giannoni (2007) of adding new latent factors until the point when the 
impact of adding more factors to the model on its impulse response functions (IRFs) is meagre. Table 
C.1 in Appendix C summarises the number of latent factors for each country model, indicating the 
average share of the variance of bank-level variables explained by observable variables versus latent 
factors. 
Conveniently, in each country model, we can pin down the factor that captures a general slowdown in 
credit in euro area economies starting in 2008 (which we dub a 'deleveraging factor'). The 
'deleveraging factor' is singled out as a latent factor which drives the dynamics of bank-level total 
assets and credit variables based on the analysis of factor loadings. It is the first factor in Cyprus, 
Finnish, Lithuanian, Dutch and Portuguese models while the second or third in Belgian, French and 
Irish models. Commonly the ‘deleveraging factor’ is also strongly related to banks’ capitalisation.  
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level. For Lithuania, there is no difference between solo and semi-consolidated data.  For Belgium 
and Spain, the intention of using solo data was to focus on banks’ activity in the domestic market, and 
abstract from the relatively large international operations of national banking groups.   
 
Table 3.1: Consolidation level of bank-level data 
Legend: For Dutch, French and Portuguese models original consolidation level differs by data source. E.g. consolidated data is used for such variables as own funds and total assets, while 
semi-consolidated data for the remaining variables.  
Relatedly, country datasets differ in the definition of loans to the non-financial private sector that may 
also include loans to non-residents (see Table 3.2).  
Table 3.2: Treatment of loans to non-residents 
 
 
 
3.3 Bank-level variables 
When selecting bank-level variables, we focus on the developments in the domestic non-financial 
private credit, credit risk, banks’ profitability and capitalisation. Appendix A includes the full 
overview of bank-level variables.  
We distinguish between loans to non-financial corporates (NFC) and households. If possible, we also 
separate loans for housing purposes (or loans to households backed by residential property) from 
loans for consumption and other purposes. For Belgium, the dynamics of mortgage credit is 
approximated by long-term loans to households, and consumption credit, by short-term loans to 
households. For countries, where the dynamics of long and short-term credit to NFC have been 
markedly different in a sample, we separate these two subcategories of credit. Last but not least, due 
to distinctively different dynamics of small and large volume loans to NFC in Italy, we distinguish 
between them in the Italian model. All credit variables are seasonally and outlier corrected and used in 
quarter-on-quarter growth rates.  
 BE CY ES FI FR IE IT LT NL PT SI 
Institution level (solo)     ●      ●             ●      ● 
Semi-consolidated         ●    ●    ●      ●     ●  
Consolidated      ●      ●     ●    ●       ●     ●  
 BE CY ES FI FR IE IT LT NL PT SI 
Includes loans to residents  ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Includes loans to non-residents  ●  ● ●       
To capture the evolution of credit risk, we include the share of non-performing loans to total non-
financial private sector loans (NPLs ratios). The preferred measure of bank capital rests on the Tier1 
definition, but for countries for which long enough time-series of Tier1 capital were not available, we 
rely on a broader definition of own funds. Both NPL and capital ratios are used in first quarter-on-
quarter differences, whereas capital volumes in quarter-on-quarter growth rates.  
3.3 Sample 
Country bank-level datasets are representative for the domestic banking systems, covering from 66% 
to 92% of the overall banking assets. Concerning total credit to the non-financial private sector, 
country samples cover from 77% to 86% of the overall outstanding credit volumes (Table 3.3). The 
number of banks in country samples differs more widely, with relatively few banks in the Finnish and 
Dutch samples, more than 10 banks in the Spanish and over 40 in the Italian. 
Further, the country datasets reflect the core characteristics of national banking systems. The size of 
the banking system measured as the ratio of banking assets in the sample to GDP in 2015 is largest in 
Cyprus (325% of GDP as reported in Table 3.3), followed by France and the Netherlands (around 
300% of GDP), and smallest in Lithuania (53% of GDP). The relative number of foreign subsidiaries 
in country samples, over 50% for Finland and Lithuania, and 33% in Ireland and Belgium correspond 
well with a generally high degree of penetration of these national systems by foreign-controlled 
subsidiaries branches. According to the ECB Consolidated Banking Data, at the end of 2015, foreign-
owned entities held 92% of the total banking sector assets in Lithuania, 68% in Finland, 49% in 
Belgium and 48% in Ireland.   
Not less importantly, all major types of banking systems in the euro area enter our analysis. 
Traditional (with a high relative role of traditional banking activities) and predominantly 
domestically-oriented banking systems are represented by Italy and Portugal (marked by ①). Cross-
border banking systems (that share the main features of 'traditional banking systems', though they are 
often larger and more open, i.e. with a higher share of exposures to foreign countries) are represented 
by Cyprus, Spain, France, and the Netherlands (marked by ②). Banking systems where banks’ 
business models involve a relatively high share of non-traditional banking activities and where banks 
may face fiercer competition from other financial intermediaries in the domestic market are 
represented by Belgium, Ireland and Finland (marked by ③). Last, relatively small banking systems 
(compared to GDP) with a high share of foreign-owned banks, common in the new EU member 
states, are represented by Lithuania (marked by ④). 6 
                                                          
6 Other euro area countries not included in the analysis have been classified as: traditional banking systems - Germany and 
Greece, cross-border banking systems – Austria, non-traditional banking systems – Belgium, small banking systems – 
Estonia, Latvia Slovakia. 
To capture the evolution of credit risk, we include the share of non-performing loans to total non-
financial private sector loans (NPLs ratios). The preferred measure of bank capital rests on the Tier1 
definition, but for countries for which long enough time-series of Tier1 capital were not available, we 
rely on a broader definition of own funds. Both NPL and capital ratios are used in first quarter-on-
quarter differences, whereas capital volumes in quarter-on-quarter growth rates.  
3.3 Sample 
Country bank-level datasets are representative for the domestic banking systems, covering from 66% 
to 92% of the overall banking assets. Concerning total credit to the non-financial private sector, 
country samples cover from 77% to 86% of the overall outstanding credit volumes (Table 3.3). The 
number of banks in country samples differs more widely, with relatively few banks in the Finnish and 
Dutch samples, more than 10 banks in the Spanish and over 40 in the Italian. 
Further, the country datasets reflect the core characteristics of national banking systems. The size of 
the banking system measured as the ratio of banking assets in the sample to GDP in 2015 is largest in 
Cyprus (325% of GDP as reported in Table 3.3), followed by France and the Netherlands (around 
300% of GDP), and smallest in Lithuania (53% of GDP). The relative number of foreign subsidiaries 
in country samples, over 50% for Finland and Lithuania, and 33% in Ireland and Belgium correspond 
well with a generally high degree of penetration of these national systems by foreign-controlled 
subsidiaries branches. According to the ECB Consolidated Banking Data, at the end of 2015, foreign-
owned entities held 92% of the total banking sector assets in Lithuania, 68% in Finland, 49% in 
Belgium and 48% in Ireland.   
Not less importantly, all major types of banking systems in the euro area enter our analysis. 
Traditional (with a high relative role of traditional banking activities) and predominantly 
domestically-oriented banking systems are represented by Italy and Portugal (marked by ①). Cross-
border banking systems (that share the main features of 'traditional banking systems', though they are 
often larger and more open, i.e. with a higher share of exposures to foreign countries) are represented 
by Cyprus, Spain, France, and the Netherlands (marked by ②). Banking systems where banks’ 
business models involve a relatively high share of non-traditional banking activities and where banks 
may face fiercer competition from other financial intermediaries in the domestic market are 
represented by Belgium, Ireland and Finland (marked by ③). Last, relatively small banking systems 
(compared to GDP) with a high share of foreign-owned banks, common in the new EU member 
states, are represented by Lithuania (marked by ④). 6 
                                                          
6 Other euro area countries not included in the analysis have been classified as: traditional banking systems - Germany and 
Greece, cross-border banking systems – Austria, non-traditional banking systems – Belgium, small banking systems – 
Estonia, Latvia Slovakia. 
To capture the evolution of credit risk, we include the share of non-performing loans to total non-
financial private sector loans (NPLs ratios). The preferred measure of bank capital rests on the Tier1 
definition, but for countries for which long enough time-series of Tier1 capital were not available, we 
rely on a broader definition of own funds. Both NPL and capital ratios are used in first quarter-on-
quarter differences, whereas capital volumes in quarter-on-quarter growth rates.  
3.3 Sample 
Country bank-level datasets are representative for the domestic banking systems, covering from 66% 
to 92% of the overall banking assets. Concerning total credit to the non-financial private sector, 
country samples cover from 77% to 86% of the overall outstanding credit volumes (Table 3.3). The 
number of banks in country samples differs more widely, with relatively few banks in the Finnish and 
Dutch samples, more than 10 banks in the Spanish and over 40 in the Italian. 
Further, the country datasets reflect the core characteristics of national banking systems. The size of 
the banking system measured as the ratio of banking assets in the sample to GDP in 2015 is largest in 
Cyprus (325% of GDP as reported in Table 3.3), followed by France and the Netherlands (around 
300% of GDP), and smallest in Lithuania (53% of GDP). The relative number of foreign subsidiaries 
in country samples, over 50% for Finland and Lithuania, and 33% in Ireland and Belgium correspond 
well with a generally high degree of penetration of these national systems by foreign-controlled 
subsidiaries branches. According to the ECB Consolidated Banking Data, at the end of 2015, foreign-
owned entities held 92% of the total banking sector assets in Lithuania, 68% in Finland, 49% in 
Belgium and 48% in Ireland.   
Not less importantly, all major types of banking systems in the euro area enter our analysis. 
Traditional (with a high relative role of traditional banking activities) and predominantly 
domestically-oriented bankin  systems are represented by Italy and Portugal (marked by ①). Cross-
border banking systems (that share the main features of 'traditional banking systems', though they are 
ften larger and more open, i.e. with a higher share of exposures to foreign countries) are represented 
by Cyprus, Spain, France, and the Netherlands (marked by ②). Banking systems where banks’ 
business models involve a relatively high share of non-traditional banking activities and where banks 
may face fiercer competition from other financial intermediaries in the domestic market are 
represented by Belgium, Ireland and Finland (marked by ③). Last, relatively small banking systems 
(compared to GDP) with a high share of foreign-owned banks, common in the new EU member 
states, are represented by Lithuania (marked by ④). 6 
                                                          
6 Other euro area countries not included in the analysis have been classified as: traditional banking systems - Germany and 
Greece, cross-border banking systems – Austria, non-traditional banking systems – Belgium, small banking systems – 
Estonia, Latvia Slovakia. 
Country sam le length differs du  to  availability of bank-level data. The sa ple starts s early as 
mid-1998 f r France and as late as the end of 2010 for Cyprus. Importa tly, for most of the countrie , 
the sample begins before the recent 2007 global financial cris s. For a share of ountri s, the sample 
als  covers  period of the acceleration and following a deceleration in the growth rate of real e tate 
prices. 
The bank-level data for all countries show a clear pattern of deleveraging with a marked reduction in 
the growth rate of banks’ assets and credit to non-financial private sector between 2007Q3 and 
2009Q4. After that, the growth rate of credit to NFC remains negative, whereas the growth rate of 
credit issued to hous holds seems to st bilise in positive territory. The exception is the sustained 
posit ve credit growth rate to NFC in Belgium from the beginning of 2009.  
t the same time, capital as a percentage of total assets shows a sustained increase over time. There is 
an early increase in capital levels in Portugal, Lithuania and Italy in 2008-2009 matching the 
implementation of Basel II and Basel II.5 capital standards. Later, we see an increase for nearly all 
countries in 2014-2015, i.e. the implementation period of Basel III. In turn, banks’ profitability 
appears to follow the economic cycle.  Appendix B provides the full overview of time dynamics of 
the bank-level variables included in the analysis. 
4 Bank responses to macroeconomic shocks 
4.1 Benchmark country models 
The benchmark specification is tailored to assess the effects of structural shocks characterising the 
business and housing cycles. The observable variables include GDP, general price index and property 
price indices. The number of latent factors summarising the dynamics of bank-level variables is set so 
to explain possibly a high share of the contemporaneous variance in bank-level variables while 
keeping the size of the model reasonably small. In practice, we applied the rule-of-thumb criterion 
earlier advocated by Boivin and Giannoni (2007) of adding new latent factors until the point when the 
impact of adding more factors to the model on its impulse response functions (IRFs) is meagre. Table 
C.1 in Appendix C summarises the number of latent factors for each country model, indicating the 
average share of the variance of bank-level variables explained by observable variables versus latent 
factors. 
Conveniently, in each country model, we can pin down the factor that captures a general slowdown in 
credit in euro area economies starting in 2008 (which we dub a 'deleveraging factor'). The 
'deleveraging factor' is singled out as a latent factor which drives the dynamics of bank-level total 
assets and credit variables based on the analysis of factor loadings. It is the first factor in Cyprus, 
Finnish, Lithuanian, Dutch and Portuguese models while the second or third in Belgian, French and 
Irish models. Commonly the ‘deleveraging factor’ is also strongly related to banks’ capitalisation.  
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Table 3.2: Representativeness of the sample 
Legend: * End 2014. **2014. Types of banking systems described on the basis of partitional with K-means cluster analysis. The analysis included three groups of 
indicators that capture: (i) how important banks are for an economy (bank assets as % of GDP, bank assets as % of total assets of the financial system, assets of foreign 
subsidiaries and branches as % of GDP), (ii) what types of banks dominate the national system (loans to the private sector as % of bank assets, net interest income  as % 
total operating income, foreign exposures as % of total assets, concentration as % of assets held by 5 largest banks, cost to income ratio), (iii) what are key banking 
system vulnerabilities (exposures to real estate as % total assets, market funding as % total liabilities, loan-to-deposit ratio). The reference date for all indicators is 
December 2015, the source the ECB Banking Structural Statistical Indicators, ECB Consolidated Banking Data and National Accounts (Eurostat).① ‘traditional banking 
systems’, ② ‘cross-border banking systems’, ③ ‘non-traditional banking systems’, ④ ‘small banking systems’. Luxembourg and Malta form separate clusters. 
                                                          
7 As a rule, large banks include G-SII and O-SII banks. There are single deviations from this rule: for one Italian bank which 
has been judged to be large compared to other banks in the sample, even though it has not been designated as an O-SII bank, 
and one Lithuanian O-SII bank and one Dutch bank, which have been judges as small compared to other banks in the 
sample. 
 Sample span 
Number 
of banks 
Therein: 
subsidiaries 
of foreign 
groups 
Therein: 
large 
(mostly G-
SII or O-SII)7 
% of total 
banking 
assets* 
% of total 
banking assets 
(minimum-
maximum range) 
% of 
nominal 
GDP** % of total credit 
BE ③ 2003Q3-2014Q4 6 2 6 81% [4%; 23%] 179% 80% of total credit 
82% of total credit to NFCs 
79% of total credit to HHs 
CY ② 2010Q4-2015Q4 6 0 4 75% [0.6%, 34.4%] 325% 55% of total loans and advances 
ES ② 2008Q1-2016Q2 13 0 6 80% [1.1%; 18.7%] 204% 79% of total credit 
FI ③ 2005Q1-2016Q3 3 2 3 92% [5.67%; 66.15%] 236% 86% of total credit 
FR ② 1998Q3-2015Q4 5 0 5 79% [8.0%; 23.6%] 282% 83% of total credit 
77% of total credit to NFCs 
91% of total credit to HHs 
IE ③ 2008Q1-2016Q2 6 2 4 66.1% [2.88% ; 25.12%] 161.0% 77.05% of total credit 
IT ① 2003Q1-2015Q2 41 2 4 72% [0.1%; 21.5%] 161.5% 82% of total credit 
LT ④ 2004Q4-2015Q4 6 4 3 84.3% [1.1%; 29.3%] 53% 78% of total credit 
NL② 2008Q2-2016Q2 4 0 3 79% [3%; 31%] 300% 79% of total credit 
66% of total credit to NFC 
90% of total credit to HH 
PT ① 2003Q1-2014Q4 7 1 6 82% [3.1%, 23.7%] 204% 83% of total credit 
SI ④ 2008Q3-2016Q4 16 7 6 88% [5.2%, 23.8%] 79.9% 
 
 
92% of total credit 
89% of total credit to NFC 
95% of total credit to HH 
Table 3.2: Representativeness of the sample 
Legend: * End 2014. **2014. Types of banking systems described on the basis of partitional with K-means cluster analysis. The analysis included three groups of 
indicators that capture: (i) how important banks are for an economy (bank assets as % of GDP, bank assets as % of total assets of the financial system, assets of foreign 
subsidiaries and branches as % of GDP), (ii) what types of banks dominate the national system (loans to the private sector as % of bank assets, net interest income  as % 
total operating income, foreign exposures as % of total assets, concentration as % of assets held by 5 largest banks, cost to income ratio), (iii) what are key banking 
system vulnerabilities (exposures to real estate as % total assets, market funding as % total liabilities, loan-to-deposit ratio). The reference date for all indicators is 
December 2015, the source the ECB Banking Structural Statistical Indicators, ECB Consolidated Banking Data and National Accounts (Eurostat).① ‘traditional banking 
systems’, ② ‘cross-border banking systems’, ③ ‘non-traditional banking systems’, ④ ‘small banking systems’. Luxembourg and Malta form separate clusters. 
                                                          
7 As a rule, large banks include G-SII and O-SII banks. There are single deviations from this rule: for one Italian bank which 
has been judged to be large compared to other banks in the sample, even though it has not been designated as an O-SII bank, 
and one Lithuanian O-SII bank and one Dutch bank, which have been judges as small compared to other banks in the 
sample. 
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Therein: 
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SII or O-SII)7 
% of total 
banking 
assets* 
% of total 
banking assets 
(minimum-
maximum r nge) 
% of 
nominal 
GDP** % of total credit 
BE ③ 2003Q3-2014Q4 6 2 6 81% [4%; 23%] 179% 80% of total credit 
82% of total credit to NFCs 
79% of total credit to HHs 
CY ② 2010Q4-2015Q4 6 0 4 75% [0.6%, 34.4%] 325% 55% of t tal loans and advances 
ES ② 2008Q1-2016Q2 13 0 6 80% [1.1%; 18.7%] 204% 79% of total credit 
FI ③ 2005Q1-2016Q3 3 2 3 92% [5.67%; 66.15%] 236% 86% of total credit 
FR ② 1998Q3-2015Q4 5 0 5 79% [8.0%; 23.6%] 282% 83% of total credit 
77% of total credit to NFCs 
91% of total credit to HHs 
IE ③ 2008Q1-2016Q2 6 2 4 66.1% [2.88% ; 25.12%] 161.0% 77.05% of total credit 
IT ① 2003Q1-2015Q2 41 2 4 72% [0.1%; 21.5%] 161.5% 82% of total credit 
LT ④ 2004Q4-2015Q4 6 4 3 84.3% [1.1%; 29.3%] 53% 78% of total credit 
NL② 2008Q2-2016Q2 4 0 3 79% [3%; 31%] 300% 79% of total credit 
66% of total credit to NFC 
90% of total credit to HH 
PT ① 2003Q1-2014Q4 7 1 6 82% [3.1%, 23.7%] 204% 83% of total credit 
SI ④ 2008Q3-2016Q4 16 7 6 88% [5.2%, 23.8%] 79.9% 
 
 
92% of total credit 
89% of total credit to NFC 
95% of total credit to HH 
Country sample length differs due to the availability of bank-level data. The sample starts as early as 
mid-199  for France and as late as the end of 2010 for Cyprus. Importantly, for most of the countries, 
the sample begins before the recent 2007 global financial crisis. For a share of countries, the sample 
also covers a period of the acceleration a d foll wing  deceleration i  the growth rate f real estate 
prices. 
The b k-level data f r all countries show a clear p tt rn of deleveraging with a marked reductio  in 
the growth rate of banks’ assets and credit to non-financial private sector between 2007Q3 and 
2009Q4. After that, the growth rate of credit to NFC remains negative, whereas the growth rate of 
credit issued to households seems to stabilise in positive territory. The exception is the sustained 
positive credit growth rate to NFC in Belgium from the beginning of 2009.  
At the same time, capital as a percentage of total assets shows a sustained increase over time. There is 
an early increase in capital levels in Portugal, Lithuania and Italy in 2008-2009 matching the 
implementation of Basel II and Basel II.5 capital standards. Later, we see an increase for nearly all 
countries in 2014-2015, i.e. the implementation period of Basel III. In turn, banks’ profitability 
appears to follow the economic cycle.  Appendix B provides the full overview of time dynamics of 
the bank-level variables included in the analysis. 
4 Bank responses to macroeconomic shocks 
4.1 Benchmark country models 
The benchmark specification is tailored to assess the effects of structural shocks characterising the 
business and housing cycles. The observable variables include GDP, general price index and property 
price indices. The number of latent factors summarising the dynamics of bank-level variables is set so 
to explain possibly a high share of the contemporaneous variance in bank-level variables while 
keeping the size of the model reasonably small. In practice, we applied the rule-of-thumb criterion 
earlier advocated by Boivin and Giannoni (2007) of adding new latent factors until the point when the 
impact of adding more factors to the model on its impulse response functions (IRFs) is meagre. Table 
C.1 in Appendix C summarises the number of latent factors for each country model, indicating the 
average share of the variance of bank-level variables explained by observable variables versus latent 
factors. 
Conveniently, in each country model, we can pin down the factor that captures a general slowdown in 
credit in euro area economies starting in 2008 (which we dub a 'deleveraging factor'). The 
'deleveraging factor' is singled out as a latent factor which drives the dynamics of bank-level total 
assets and credit variables based on the analysis of factor loadings. It is the first factor in Cyprus, 
Finnish, Lithuanian, Dutch and Portuguese models while the second or third in Belgian, French and 
Irish models. Commonly the ‘deleveraging factor’ is also strongly related to banks’ capitalisation.  
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Table 3.2: Representativeness of the sample 
Legend: * End 2014. **2014. Types of banking systems described on the basis of partitional with K-means cluster analysis. The analysis included three groups of 
indicators that capture: (i) how important banks are for an economy (bank assets as % of GDP, bank assets as % of total assets of the financial system, assets of foreign 
subsidiaries and branches as % of GDP), (ii) what types of banks dominate the national system (loans to the private sector as % of bank assets, net interest income  as % 
total operating income, foreign exposures as % of total assets, concentration as % of assets held by 5 largest banks, cost to income ratio), (iii) what are key banking 
system vulnerabilities (exposures to real estate as % total assets, market funding as % total liabilities, loan-to-deposit ratio). The reference date for all indicators is 
December 2015, the source the ECB Banking Structural Statistical Indicators, ECB Consolidated Banking Data and National Accounts (Eurostat).① ‘traditional banking 
systems’, ② ‘cross-border banking systems’, ③ ‘non-traditional banking systems’, ④ ‘small banking systems’. Luxembourg and Malta form separate clusters. 
                                                          
7 As a rule, large banks include G-SII and O-SII banks. There are single deviations from this rule: for one Italian bank which 
has been judged to be large compared to other banks in the sample, even though it has not been designated as an O-SII bank, 
and one Lithuanian O-SII bank and one Dutch bank, which have been judges as small compared to other banks in the 
sample. 
 Sample span 
Number 
of banks 
Therein: 
subsidiaries 
of foreign 
groups 
Therein: 
large 
(mostly G-
SII or O-SII)7 
% of total 
banking 
assets* 
% of total 
banking assets 
(minimum-
maximum range) 
% of 
nominal 
GDP** % of total credit 
BE ③ 2003Q3-2014Q4 6 2 6 81% [4%; 23%] 179% 80% of total credit 
82% of total credit to NFCs 
79% of total credit to HHs 
CY ② 2010Q4-2015Q4 6 0 4 75% [0.6%, 34.4%] 325% 55% of total loans and advances 
ES ② 2008Q1-2016Q2 13 0 6 80% [1.1%; 18.7%] 204% 79% of total credit 
FI ③ 2005Q1-2016Q3 3 2 3 92% [5.67%; 66.15%] 236% 86% of total credit 
FR ② 1998Q3-2015Q4 5 0 5 79% [8.0%; 23.6%] 282% 83% of total credit 
77% of total credit to NFCs 
91% of total credit to HHs 
IE ③ 2008Q1-2016Q2 6 2 4 66.1% [2.88% ; 25.12%] 161.0% 77.05% of total credit 
IT ① 2003Q1-2015Q2 41 2 4 72% [0.1%; 21.5%] 161.5% 82% of total credit 
LT ④ 2004Q4-2015Q4 6 4 3 84.3% [1.1%; 29.3%] 53% 78% of total credit 
NL② 2008Q2-2016Q2 4 0 3 79% [3%; 31%] 300% 79% of total credit 
66% of total credit to NFC 
90% of total credit to HH 
PT ① 2003Q1-2014Q4 7 1 6 82% [3.1%, 23.7%] 204% 83% of total credit 
SI ④ 2008Q3-2016Q4 16 7 6 88% [5.2%, 23.8%] 79.9% 
 
 
92% of total credit 
89% of total credit to NFC 
95% of total credit to HH 
Country sample length differs due to the availability of bank-level data. The sample starts as early as 
mid-1998 for France and as late as the end of 2010 for Cyprus. Importantly, for most of the countries, 
the sample begins before the recent 2007 global financial crisis. For a share of countries, the sample 
also covers a period of the acceleration and following a deceleration in the growth rate of real estate 
prices. 
The bank-level data for all countries show a clear pattern of deleveraging with a marked reduction in 
the growth rate of banks’ assets and credit to non-financial private sector between 2007Q3 and 
2009Q4. After that, the growth rate of credit to NFC remains negative, whereas the growth rate of 
credit issued to households seems to stabilise in positive territory. The exception is the sustained 
positive credit growth rate to NFC in Belgium from the beginning of 2009.  
At the same time, capital as a percentage of total assets shows a sustained increase over time. There is 
an early increase in capital levels in Portugal, Lithuania and Italy in 2008-2009 matching the 
implementation of Basel II and Basel II.5 capital standards. Later, we see an increase for nearly all 
countries in 2014-2015, i.e. the implementation period of Basel III. In turn, banks’ profitability 
appears to follow the economic cycle.  Appendix B provides the full overview of time dynamics of 
the bank-level variables included in the analysis. 
4 Bank responses to macroeconomic shocks 
4.1 Benchmark country models 
The benchmark specification is tailored to assess the effects of structural shocks characterising the 
business and housing cycles. The observable variables include GDP, general price index and property 
price indices. The number of latent factors summarising the dynamics of bank-level variables is set so 
to explain possibly a high share of the contemporaneous variance in bank-level variables while 
keeping the size of the model reasonably small. In practice, we applied the rule-of-thumb criterion 
earlier advocated by Boivin and Giannoni (2007) of adding new latent factors until the point when the 
impact of adding more factors to the model on its impulse response functions (IRFs) is meagre. Table 
C.1 in Appendix C summarises the number of latent factors for each country model, indicating the 
average share of the variance of bank-level variables explained by observable variables versus latent 
factors. 
Conveniently, in each country model, we can pin down the factor that captures a general slowdown in 
credit in euro area economies starting in 2008 (which we dub a 'deleveraging factor'). The 
'deleveraging factor' is singled out as a latent factor which drives the dynamics of bank-level total 
assets and credit variables based on the analysis of factor loadings. It is the first factor in Cyprus, 
Finnish, Lithuanian, Dutch and Portuguese models while the second or third in Belgian, French and 
Irish models. Commonly the ‘deleveraging factor’ is also strongly related to banks’ capitalisation.  
Table 3.2: Representativeness of the sample 
Legend: * End 2014. **2014. Types of banking systems described on the basis of partitional with K-means cluster analysis. The analysis included three groups of 
indicators that capture: (i) how important banks are for an economy (bank assets as % of GDP, bank assets as % of total assets of the financial system, assets of foreign 
subsidiaries and branches as % of GDP), (ii) what types of banks dominate the national system (loans to the private sector as % of bank assets, net interest income  as % 
total operating income, foreign exposures as % of total assets, concentration as % of assets held by 5 largest banks, cost to income ratio), (iii) what are key banking 
system vulnerabilities (exposures to real estate as % total assets, market funding as % total liabilities, loan-to-deposit ratio). The reference date for all indicators is 
December 2015, the source the ECB Banking Structural Statistical Indicators, ECB Consolidated Banking Data and National Accounts (Eurostat).① ‘traditional banking 
systems’, ② ‘cross-border banking systems’, ③ ‘non-traditional banking systems’, ④ ‘small banking systems’. Luxembourg and Malta form separate clusters. 
                                                          
7 As a rule, large banks include G-SII and O-SII banks. There are single deviations from this rule: for one Italian bank which 
has been judged to be large compared to other banks in the sample, even though it has not been designated as an O-SII bank, 
and one Lithuanian O-SII bank and one Dutch bank, which have been judges as small compared to other banks in the 
sample. 
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% of total 
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% of total 
banking assets 
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maximum r nge) 
% of 
nominal 
GDP** % of total credit 
BE ③ 2003Q3-2014Q4 6 2 6 81% [4%; 23%] 179% 80% of total credit 
82% of total credit to NFCs 
79% of total credit to HHs 
CY ② 2010Q4-2015Q4 6 0 4 75% [0.6%, 34.4%] 325% 55% of t tal loans and advances 
ES ② 2008Q1-2016Q2 13 0 6 80% [1.1%; 18.7%] 204% 79% of total credit 
FI ③ 2005Q1-2016Q3 3 2 3 92% [5.67%; 66.15%] 236% 86% of total credit 
FR ② 1998Q3-2015Q4 5 0 5 79% [8.0%; 23.6%] 282% 83% of total credit 
77% of total credit to NFCs 
91% of total credit to HHs 
IE ③ 2008Q1-2016Q2 6 2 4 66.1% [2.88% ; 25.12%] 161.0% 77.05% of total credit 
IT ① 2003Q1-2015Q2 41 2 4 72% [0.1%; 21.5%] 161.5% 82% of total credit 
LT ④ 2004Q4-2015Q4 6 4 3 84.3% [1.1%; 29.3%] 53% 78% of total credit 
NL② 2008Q2-2016Q2 4 0 3 79% [3%; 31%] 300% 79% of total credit 
66% of total credit to NFC 
90% of total credit to HH 
PT ① 2003Q1-2014Q4 7 1 6 82% [3.1%, 23.7%] 204% 83% of total credit 
SI ④ 2008Q3-2016Q4 16 7 6 88% [5.2%, 23.8%] 79.9% 
 
 
92% of total credit 
89% of total credit to NFC 
95% of total credit to HH 
Country sample length differs due to the availability of bank-level data. The sample starts as early as 
mid-199  for France and as late as the end of 2010 for Cyprus. Importantly, for most of the countries, 
the sample begins before the recent 2007 global financial crisis. For a share of countries, the sample 
also covers a period of the acceleration a d foll wing  deceleration i  the growth rate f real estate 
prices. 
The b k-level data f r all countries show a clear p tt rn of deleveraging with a marked reductio  in 
the growth rate of banks’ assets and credit to non-financial private sector between 2007Q3 and 
2009Q4. After that, the growth rate of credit to NFC remains negative, whereas the growth rate of 
credit issued to households seems to stabilise in positive territory. The exception is the sustained 
positive credit growth rate to NFC in Belgium from the beginning of 2009.  
At the same time, capital as a percentage of total assets shows a sustained increase over time. There is 
an early increase in capital levels in Portugal, Lithuania and Italy in 2008-2009 matching the 
implementation of Basel II and Basel II.5 capital standards. Later, we see an increase for nearly all 
countries in 2014-2015, i.e. the implementation period of Basel III. In turn, banks’ profitability 
appears to follow the economic cycle.  Appendix B provides the full overview of time dynamics of 
the bank-level variables included in the analysis. 
4 Bank responses to macroeconomic shocks 
4.1 Benchmark country models 
The benchmark specification is tailored to assess the effects of structural shocks characterising the 
business and housing cycles. The observable variables include GDP, general price index and property 
price indices. The number of latent factors summarising the dynamics of bank-level variables is set so 
to explain possibly a high share of the contemporaneous variance in bank-level variables while 
keeping the size of the model reasonably small. In practice, we applied the rule-of-thumb criterion 
earlier advocated by Boivin and Giannoni (2007) of adding new latent factors until the point when the 
impact of adding more factors to the model on its impulse response functions (IRFs) is meagre. Table 
C.1 in Appendix C summarises the number of latent factors for each country model, indicating the 
average share of the variance of bank-level variables explained by observable variables versus latent 
factors. 
Conveniently, in each country model, we can pin down the factor that captures a general slowdown in 
credit in euro area economies starting in 2008 (which we dub a 'deleveraging factor'). The 
'deleveraging factor' is singled out as a latent factor which drives the dynamics of bank-level total 
assets and credit variables based on the analysis of factor loadings. It is the first factor in Cyprus, 
Finnish, Lithuanian, Dutch and Portuguese models while the second or third in Belgian, French and 
Irish models. Commonly the ‘deleveraging factor’ is also strongly related to banks’ capitalisation.  
4.2 Identification of structural shocks 
Two types of structural shocks are particularly relevant for assessing the resilience of banks in adverse 
conditions.  A positive aggregate demand shock is a shock that leads to an immediate increase in GDP 
and GDP deflator (e.g. Canova and de Nicolo, 2003, or Peersman and Straub, 2009). A positive 
residential house price shock is a shock that leads to an immediate increase in residential house prices 
when the general price level and output in the economy remain initially unaffected. Jarocinski and 
Smets (2008) or Buch et al. (2014) proposed a similar set of sign and zero restrictions. 
Analogously, a positive commercial property price shock triggers an immediate increase in 
commercial property prices, with the general price level and output being initially unchanged. The 
proposed identification of the real estate shocks suggests that these arise on the demand side of the 
respective real estate markets, rather than on their supply side. Further, we define an aggregate supply 
shock as a shock that leads to an immediate increase in GDP and a concurrent fall in GDP deflator 
(e.g. Canova and de Nicolo, 2003, Buch et al., 2014).  
In selected country models, we separate an additional structural shock that affects credit to the non-
financial private sector, but at least contemporaneously, not economic activity (‘deleveraging shock’). 
The shock is identified by imposing positive sign restrictions on ‘deleveraging factors,’ i.e. latent 
factors capturing a significant part of the variation in bank-level assets and credit to the non-financial 
private sector, and zero restrictions on the contemporaneous response of GDP. Adding this shock to 
the shock space has at many instances improved identification of aggregate demand shocks. Table 4.1 
summarises sign and zero restrictions in country models. If not explicitly mentioned, all restrictions 
have been imposed only on horizon 0. 8 
 
Table 4.1: Identification of structural shocks via sign and zero restrictions in the benchmark model 
Shock GDP General price level 
Residential property 
prices 
Commercial property 
prices ‘Deleveraging’ factor 
Aggregate demand +(1) +(1) (2)  0 
Aggregate supply + -   0 
Housing demand 0 0 +(1) 0 0 
Commercial property demand 0 0 0 + 0 
‘Deleveraging’  (3) 0    + 
Legend: If not marked otherwise, all restrictions refer to the contemporaneous impact on a variable. (1) In Belgian model imposed in horizons 0-3. (2) In Belgian model zero restriction 
added in horizon 0. (3) A deleveraging shock has been included in models for Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Ireland, Lithuania, Portugal and Slovenia.  
 
 
 
                                                          
8 Fry and Pagan (2009) report in their review of the sign restriction approach a consensus emerging in the literature that 
imposing contemporaneous restrictions only might be preferable to imposing restrictions on longer lags. 
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4.2 Identification of structural shocks 
Two types of structural shocks are particularly relevant for assessing the resilience of banks in adverse 
conditions.  A positive aggregate demand shock is a shock that leads to an immediate increase in GDP 
and GDP deflator (e.g. Canova and de Nicolo, 2003, or Peersman and Straub, 2009). A positive 
residential house price shock is a shock that leads to an immediate increase in residential house prices 
when the general price level and output in the economy remain initially unaffected. Jarocinski and 
Smets (2008) or Buch et al. (2014) proposed a similar set of sign and zero restrictions. 
Analogously, a positive commercial property price shock triggers an immediate increase in 
commercial property prices, with the general price level and output being initially unchanged. The 
proposed identification of the real estate shocks suggests that these arise on the demand side of the 
respective real estate markets, rather than on their supply side. Further, we define an aggregate supply 
shock as a shock that leads to an immediate increase in GDP and a concurrent fall in GDP deflator 
(e.g. Canova and de Nicolo, 2003, Buch et al., 2014).  
In selected country models, we separate an additional structural shock that affects credit to the non-
financial private sector, but at least contemporaneously, not economic activity (‘deleveraging shock’). 
The shock is identified by imposing positive sign restrictions on ‘deleveraging factors,’ i.e. latent 
factors capturing a significant part of the variation in bank-level assets and credit to the non-financial 
private sector, and zero restrictions on the contemporaneous response of GDP. Adding this shock to 
the shock space has at many instances improved identification of aggregate demand shocks. Table 4.1 
summarises sign and zero restrictions in country models. If not explicitly mentioned, all restrictions 
have been imposed only on horizon 0. 8 
 
Table 4.1: Identification of structural shocks via sign and zero restrictions in the benchmark model 
Shock GDP General price level 
Residential property 
prices 
Commercial property 
prices ‘Deleveraging’ factor 
Aggregate demand +(1) +(1) (2)  0 
Aggregate supply + -   0 
Housing demand 0 0 +(1) 0 0 
Commercial property demand 0 0 0 + 0 
‘Deleveraging’  (3) 0    + 
Legend: If not marked otherwise, all restrictions refer to the contemporaneous impact on a variable. (1) In Belgian model imposed in horizons 0-3. (2) In Belgian model zero restriction 
added in horizon 0. (3) A deleveraging shock has been included in models for Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Ireland, Lithuania, Portugal and Slovenia.  
 
 
 
                                                          
8 Fry and Pagan (2009) report in their review of the sign restriction approach a consensus emerging in the literature that 
imposing contemporaneous restrictions only might be preferable to imposing restrictions on longer lags. 
4.3 Impact of structural shocks on macroeconomic variables 
Following a positive aggregate demand shock, output and general price level increase persistently 
(Figure 4.1). The effect of an aggregate demand shock on real estate prices is in most of the countries 
positive, whereas that commercial property prices, insignificant or negative.  
In absolute terms, the effect of a one standard deviation aggregate demand shock on GDP is larger for 
small open economies, such as Lithuania, Cyprus or Belgium (see Table C.2 in Appendix C). It is the 
lowest for larger and less open economies, such as France and Italy. There are also sharp differences 
in the persistence of the resulting increase in GDP. The effect of an aggregate demand shock is most 
lasting in Lithuania and Portugal, followed by the Netherlands. At the other side of the spectrum are 
Finland and Ireland (and to a lesser degree Cyprus) where output growth returns to the baseline 
relatively quickly. 
 
Figure 4.1: Median IRFs of standardised macroeconomic variables to a one standard deviation positive aggregate 
demand, residential house price and commercial house price shocks  
 
Legend: Figures are constructed on the basis of median responses of macrovariables from the country models. All IRFs correspond with the behaviour of standardised variables on a 
cumulative basis. Solid line marks the median euro area weighted average response (nominal GDP weights). Dark blue fan represents 50% and light blue 68% of the distribution of median 
responses of macrovariables on a country level. IRFs of commercial property prices and representing the response to structural shocks to commercial property prices are based on a 
narrower sample of countries: Finland, France, Ireland and the Netherlands.  
4.2 Identification of structural shocks 
Two types of structural shocks are particularly relevant for assessing the resilience of banks in adverse 
conditions.  A positive aggregate demand shock is a shock that leads to an immediate increase in GDP 
and GDP deflator (e.g. Canova and de Nicolo, 2003, or Peersman and Straub, 2009). A positive 
residential house price shock is a shock that leads to an immediate increase in residential house prices 
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Analogously, a positive commercial property price shock triggers an immediate increase in 
commercial property prices, with the general price level and output being initially unchanged. The 
proposed identification of the real estate shocks suggests that these arise on the demand side of the 
respective real estate markets, rather than on their supply side. Further, we define an aggregate supply 
shock as a shock that leads to an immediate increase in GDP and a concurrent fall in GDP deflator 
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the shock space has at many instances improved identification of aggregate demand shocks. Table 4.1 
summarises sign and zero restrictions in country models. If not explicitly mentioned, all restrictions 
have been imposed only on horizon 0. 8 
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Aggregate supply + -   0 
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Legend: If not marked otherwise, all restrictions refer to the contemporaneous impact on a variable. (1) In Belgian model imposed in horizons 0-3. (2) In Belgian model zero restriction 
added in horizon 0. (3) A deleveraging shock has been included in models for Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Ireland, Lithuania, Portugal and Slovenia.  
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imposing contemporaneous restrictions only might be preferable to imposing restrictions on longer lags. 
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Two types of structural shocks are particularly relevant for assessing the resilience of banks in adverse 
conditions.  A positive aggregate demand shock is a shock that leads to an immediate increase in GDP 
and GDP deflator (e.g. Canova and de Nicolo, 2003, or Peersman and Straub, 2009). A positive 
residential house price shock is a shock that leads to an immediate increase in residential house prices 
when the general price level and output in the economy remain initially unaffected. Jarocinski and 
Smets (2008) or Buch et al. (2014) proposed a similar set of sign and zero restrictions. 
Analogously, a positive commercial property price shock triggers an immediate increase in 
commercial property prices, with the general price level and output being initially unchanged. The 
proposed identification of the real estate shocks suggests that these arise on the demand side of the 
respective real estate markets, rather than on their supply side. Further, we define an aggregate supply 
shock as a shock that leads to an immediate increase in GDP and a concurrent fall in GDP deflator 
(e.g. Canova and de Nicolo, 2003, Buch et al., 2014).  
In selected country models, we separate an additional structural shock that affects credit to the non-
financial private sector, but at least contemporaneously, not economic activity (‘deleveraging shock’). 
The shock is identified by imposing positive sign restrictions on ‘deleveraging factors,’ i.e. latent 
factors capturing a significant part of the variation in bank-level assets and credit to the non-financial 
private sector, and zero restrictions on the contemporaneous response of GDP. Adding this shock to 
the shock space has at many instances improved identification of aggregate demand shocks. Table 4.1 
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Table 4.1: Identification of structural shocks via sign and zero restrictions in the benchmark model 
Shock GDP General price level 
Residential property 
prices 
Commercial property 
prices ‘Deleveraging’ factor 
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4.3 Impact of structural shocks on macroeconomic variables 
Following a positive aggregate demand shock, output and general price level increase persistently 
(Figure 4.1). The effect of an aggregate demand shock on real estate prices is in most of the countries 
positive, whereas that commercial property prices, insignificant or negative.  
In absolute terms, the effect of a one standard deviation aggregate demand shock on GDP is larger for 
small open economies, such as Lithuania, Cyprus or Belgium (see Table C.2 in Appendix C). It is the 
lowest for larger and less open economies, such as France and Italy. There are also sharp differences 
in the persistence of the resulting increase in GDP. The effect of an aggregate demand shock is most 
lasting in Lithuania and Portugal, followed by the Netherlands. At the other side of the spectrum are 
Finland and Ireland (and to a lesser degree Cyprus) where output growth returns to the baseline 
relatively quickly. 
 
Figure 4.1: Median IRFs of standardised macroeconomic variables to a one standard deviation positive aggregate 
demand, residential house price and commercial house price shocks  
 
Legend: Figures are constructed on the basis of median responses of macrovariables from the country models. All IRFs correspond with the behaviour of standardised variables on a 
cumulative basis. Solid line marks the median euro area weighted average response (nominal GDP weights). Dark blue fan represents 50% and light blue 68% of the distribution of median 
responses of macrovariables on a country level. IRFs of commercial property prices and representing the response to structural shocks to commercial property prices are based on a 
narrower sample of countries: Finland, France, Ireland and the Netherlands.  
4.4. Impact of structural shocks on bank-level variables 
A positive aggregate demand shock triggers credit expansion in all loan segments of the non-financial 
private sector (Figure 4.2). The share of non-performing loans drops sharply for most of the banks. 
There is also a general increase in banks’ profitability tied with a reduction in loan-loss provisioning. 
Notwithstanding, banks’ capital ratio may deteriorate.  
There is a substantial degree of heterogeneity in the magnitude and timing of banks’ responses. Figure 
4.2 suggests, for instance, that on average large banks (G-SII or O-SII) expand credit and total assets 
faster and stronger than other (medium-size and smaller) banks. They also increase the leverage more 
sharply following a positive shock.  
Figure 4.2: Median IRFs of standardised bank-level variables to a one standard deviation positive aggregate demand 
shock: large (mostly G-SII and O-SII) banks, other banks, and all banks together 
Legend: Large banks include mostly G-SII and O-SII banks. Figures are constructed on the basis of median responses of bank-level variables from the country models. All IRFs 
correspond with the behaviour of standardised variables on a cumulative basis. Red (blue) broken line marks the median response, and dark red (blue) fan represent 50% and light red 
(blue)  68% of the distribution of median responses of bank-level variables of G-SII and O-SII (other) banks. Solid black line marks the median response for the full sample of banks. 
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profitability measures improve. Last, banks’ capitalisation and liquidity position measured by loan-to-
deposit ratio worsen for large banks. 
Interestingly, banks’ responses to a positive commercial property price shock are far weaker than 
those to residential house price shocks (Figure C.2 in Appendix C). Following the shock, a share of 
large banks expands credit to NFCs and households, while medium-sized and smaller banks cut 
credit. Both types of banks experience an increase in profitability. 
 
5. Impact of bank capitalisation on the transmission of macroeconomic shocks 
 
This section investigates how bank capitalisation affects bank lending following macroeconomic 
shocks. The earlier section has shown that banks react differently to similar macroeconomic shocks, 
and here we relate this heterogeneity to banks’ capitalisation. We attempt to answer a more general 
question on the ability of capital buffers to insulate bank lending from business cycle and house price 
fluctuations. To this end, we run a series of cross-sectional regressions relating the lending reaction of 
banks to selected shocks with their solvency condition. At the end of the section, we quantify the 
benefits of capital regulation in terms of banks’ ability to withstand crisis and continue to provide 
credit to the non-financial private sector. 
Bank capitalisation can affect bank lending and financial stability at least via two channels. First, 
capital buffers reduce banks’ incentives to take on excessive risks. They play a role of a ‘skin in the 
game’ and reduce the moral hazard problem related to the existence of fixed-rate deposit insurance 
schemes, shareholder limited liability (e.g. Kareken and Wallace, 1978), Benston et al., 1986, and 
Kane, 1989), explicit or implicit public guarantees (Furlong and Keeley, 1989). As such, they also 
contribute to the reduction of systemic risk-taking (Martinez-Miera and Suarez, 2014).  Second, bank 
capital buffers increase banks’ capacity to absorb losses ex post (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994).  
Selected empirical studies test for the impact of higher capital on bank risk-taking. De Haan and 
Klomp (2012) develop a factor model for 200 OECB banks and find that capital requirements reduce 
bank risk-taking. 9 Baker and Wurgler (2013) use the CAPM model and see that higher capitalised 
banks have a lower systematic and idiosyncratic risk. 
Other studies recognise that both channels imply the smoothening of credit supply within the business 
or financial cycles. The risk-taking channel suggests that higher bank capitalisation limits the 
fluctuations in credit supply in both booms and busts, whereas the loss-absorption channel implies 
weaker credit contractions in economic busts. Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) show that well-
                                                          
9 De Haan and Klomp (2014) report similar results for a sample of 70 non-industrial countries in 2002-2008. 
capitalised Italian banks were less affected by economic downturns between 1992 and 2001. 
Bernanke and Lown (1991) find a significant relationship between bank lending shortage and falling 
capital ratios during the 1990 recession in the United States.  Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010) detect a 
similar relation in 2007-2009 for Italian banks. Based on Spanish supervisory data on loan 
applications, Jimenez et al. (2012) provide empirical evidence that lower capitalised banks reduce 
loans during an economic recession to a greater extent than higher capitalised banks. Finally, Berger 
and Bouwman (2013) show, based on US data, that higher capital of large- and medium-sized banks 
increases their probability of survival, allowing them to maintain their market share during a crisis.  
5.1 Bank-level regressions 
We run a series of cross-sectional regressions relating the reaction of bank-level variables to 
macroeconomic shocks to banks’ capitalisation. We focus on bank-level variables that are the best 
comparable across country models: credit to the non-financial private sector, to NFCs, to households 
and credit to households for housing purposes. We evaluate the reaction of these variables to a 
(positive one standard deviation10) aggregate demand and residential house price shocks11  against 
banks’ initial capitalisation levels (at the beginning of the sample used for the FAVAR estimation) 
measured by Tier1 ratio. 12 
On the left-hand side of the cross-sectional regression, we use the cumulated IRFs of standardised 
bank-level variables and on the right-hand side banks’ Tier1 ratios and Tier1 ratios squared.  We also 
consider specifications where we add a set of control variables such as country and bank-type 
(commercial, corporate or saving) dummies. Regressions are run for all banks and then, separately, 
for large and other banks. 
Regarding the estimation, we apply the weighted OLS estimator with robust standard errors to explain 
a subset of 100 draws from the posterior distribution of relevant IRFs. Observation weights are set 
proportional to the percentage of variable variance explained by a country model. Observation 
weighting addresses the heteroscedasticity of regression residuals and reflects a various degree of 
precision with which FAVAR models capture the variance of bank-level variables. We focus on a 
larger subset of draws from the posterior distribution acknowledging that different structural models 
may fulfil the same set of zero and sign restrictions (Budnik and Bochmann, 2018). Tables D.1 – D.2. 
in Appendix D present detailed regression results for a horizon of one year following a shock. 
Non-linear regression specifications perform better than linear specifications in explaining the cross-
sectional variance in bank-level IRFs of credit to aggregate demand shocks. Squared Tier1 ratios are 
                                                          
10 The standardisation of IRF and structural shocks (one standard deviation shocks) ensures the comparability of results from 
different country and allow the estimation based on the pooled IRFs sample. 
11 Due the smaller sample size the regression analysis was not carried out for the commercial real estate shock. 
12 By relating banks’ reaction to their initial rather than the sample average level of capitalisation we mitigate endogeneity 
concerns. 
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9 De Haan and Klomp (2014) report similar results for a sample of 70 non-industrial countries in 2002-2008. 
4.4. Impact of structural shocks on bank-level variables 
A positive aggregate demand shock triggers credit expansion in all loan segments of the non-financial 
private sector (Figure 4.2). The share of non-performing loans drops sharply for most of the banks. 
There is also a general increase in banks’ profitability tied with a reduction in loan-loss provisioning. 
Notwithstanding, banks’ capital ratio may deteriorate.  
There is a substantial degree of heterogeneity in the magnitude and timing of banks’ responses. Figure 
4.2 suggests, for instance, that on average large banks (G-SII or O-SII) expand credit and total assets 
faster and stronger than other (medium-size and smaller) banks. They also increase the leverage more 
sharply following a positive shock.  
Figure 4.2: Median IRFs of standardised bank-level variables to a one standard deviation positive aggregate demand 
shock: large (mostly G-SII and O-SII) banks, other banks, and all banks together 
Legend: Large banks include mostly G-SII and O-SII banks. Figures are constructed on the basis of median responses of bank-level variables from the country models. All IRFs 
correspond with the behaviour of standardised variables on a cumulative basis. Red (blue) broken line marks the median response, and dark red (blue) fan represent 50% and light red 
(blue)  68% of the distribution of median responses of bank-level variables of G-SII and O-SII (other) banks. Solid black line marks the median response for the full sample of banks. 
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capitalised Italian banks were less affected by economic downturns between 1992 and 2001. 
Bernanke and Lown (1991) find a significant relationship between bank lending shortage and falling 
capital ratios during the 1990 recession in the United States.  Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010) detect a 
similar relation in 2007-2009 for Italian banks. Based on Spanish supervisory data on loan 
applications, Jimenez et al. (2012) provide empirical evidence that lower capitalised banks reduce 
loans during an economic recession to a greater extent than higher capitalised banks. Finally, Berger 
and Bouw an (2013) show, based on US data, t at higher c pital of la ge- and medium-sized banks 
increases their probability of survival, allowing them to maintain their market share during a c isis.  
5.1 Bank-level regressions 
We run a series of cross-sectional regressions relating the reaction of bank-level variables to 
macroeconomic shocks o banks’ apitali ation. We focus on bank-level variables that are the best 
comp rable acros  country models: credit to the non-financial private sector, to NFCs, to households 
and credit to households for housing purposes. We evaluate the r action of these vari bles to a 
(positive one sta dard deviation10) aggregate demand and resi ential house price shocks11  against 
banks’ initial capitalisation levels (at the beginning of the sample used for the FAVAR estimation) 
measured by Tier1 ratio. 12 
On the left-hand side of the cross-sectional regression, we use the cumulated IRFs of standardised 
bank-level variables and on the right-hand side banks’ Tier1 ratios and Tier1 ratios squared.  We also 
consider specifications where we add a set of control variables such as country and bank-type 
(commercial, corporate or saving) dummies. Regressions are run for all banks and then, separately, 
for large and other banks. 
Regarding the estimation, we apply the weighted OLS estimator with robust standard errors to explain 
a subset of 100 draws from the posterior distribution of relevant IRFs. Observation weights are set 
proportional to the percentage of variable variance explained by a country model. Observation 
weighting addresses the heteroscedasticity of regression residuals and reflects a various degree of 
precision with which FAVAR models capture the variance of bank-level variables. We focus on a 
larger subset of draws from the posterior distribution acknowledging that different structural models 
may fulfil the same set of zero and sign restrictions (Budnik and Bochmann, 2018). Tables D.1 – D.2. 
in Appendix D present detailed regression results for a horizon of one year following a shock. 
Non-linear regression specifications perform better than linear specifications in explaining the cross-
sectional variance in bank-level IRFs of credit to aggregate demand shocks. Squared Tier1 ratios are 
                                                          
10 The standardisation of IRF and structural shocks (one standard deviation shocks) ensures the comparability of results from 
different country and allow the estimation based on the pooled IRFs sample. 
11 Due the smaller sample size the regression analysis was not carried out for the commercial real estate shock. 
12 By relating banks’ reaction to their initial rather than the sample average level of capitalisation we mitigate endogeneity 
concerns. 
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proportional to the percentage of variable variance explained by a country model. Observation 
weighting addresses the heteroscedasticity of regression residuals and reflects a various degree of 
precision with which FAVAR models capture the variance of bank-level variables. We focus on a 
larger subset of draws from the posterior distribution acknowledging that different structural models 
may fulfil the same set of zero and sign restrictions (Budnik and Bochmann, 2018). Tables D.1 – D.2. 
in Appendix D present detailed regression results for a horizon of one year following a shock. 
Non-linear regression specifications perform better than linear specifications in explaining the cross-
sectional variance in bank-level IRFs of credit to aggregate demand shocks. Squared Tier1 ratios are 
                                                          
10 The standardisation of IRF and structural shocks (one standard deviation shocks) ensures the comparability of results from 
different country and allow the estimation based on the pooled IRFs sample. 
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statistically significant in most of the regressions.13 The relationship between bank-level credit and 
capitalisation appears convex at least for the overall non-financial private sector and household credit. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the convexity of the estimated relationship by plotting the predicted responses of 
bank-level credit to the non-financial private sector. The X-axis marks the levels of capital ratios of all 
banks in the estimation samples. The series of dots represent the predicted values of accumulated 
bank responses a year, two and three years after the shock. 
For moderate levels of bank capitalisation (below 20%), the relationship between Tier1 capital ratio 
and the expansion of credit following a positive aggregate demand shock is negative. Better 
capitalised banks expand credit less following a favourable shock than their lower capitalised peers. It 
holds for credit to the non-financial private sector and its subcomponents alike. The symmetric nature 
of our identification warrants that following an adverse aggregate demand shock, higher capitalised 
banks will contract credit by less. Ultimately, higher capitalised banks are better suited to absorb 
shocks originating in the real economy, without major disruptions in their credit supply. 
 
 
At very high bank capitalisation levels the negative relationship between credit sensitivity and bank 
solvency breaks. Capital ratios above a 20-25% th eshold do not br ng in add tional gains of 
moderating the ontraction of credit to the non-financial private sector in economic downtu ns. This 
finding corroborates the hypothesis that there exists a level of capital which maximises the resilience 
of banks to selected types of macro-financial shocks. This level will generally differ not only by the 
shock type but also credit compone t (in our e timates it is lower for NFC than househ ld credit).   
                                                          
13 The results for the linear specifications are not presented but are available upon request from the authors. 
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Legend: Estimates based on regressions of bank-level IRFs on the initial linear and squared Tier1 
capital ratios. Dots mark the predicted values for the observations in the regression sample.  
 
 
Legend:   Large banks: G-SII and O-SII banks.  Estimates based on regressions of bank-
level IRFs on the initial linear and squared Tier1 capital ratios. Dots mark the predicted 
values for the observations in the regression sample.  
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capitalised Italian banks were less affected by economic downturns between 1992 and 2001. 
Bernanke and Lown (1991) find a significant relationship between bank lending shortage and falling 
capital ratios during the 1990 recession in the United States.  Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010) detect a 
similar relation in 2007-2009 for Italian banks. Based on Spanish supervisory data on loan 
applications, Jimenez et al. (2012) provide empirical evidence that lower capitalised banks reduce 
loans during an economic recession to a greater extent than higher capitalised banks. Finally, Berger 
and Bouwman (2013) show, based on US data, that higher capital of large- and medium-sized banks 
increases their probability of survival, allowing them to maintain their market share during a crisis.  
5.1 Bank-level regressions 
We run a series of cross-sectional regressions relating the reaction of bank-level variables to 
macroeconomic shocks to banks’ capitalisation. We focus on bank-level variables that are the best 
comparable across country models: credit to the non-financial private sector, to NFCs, to households 
and credit to households for housing purposes. We evaluate the reaction of these variables to a 
(positive one standard deviation10) aggregate demand and residential house price shocks11  against 
banks’ initial capitalisation levels (at the beginning of the sample used for the FAVAR estimation) 
mea ured by Tier1 ratio. 12 
On the left-hand side of the cross-sectional regression, we use the cumulated IRFs of standardised 
bank-level variables and on the right-hand side banks’ Tier1 ratios and Tier1 ratios squared.  We also 
consider specifications where we add a set of control variables such as country and bank-type 
(commercial, corporate or saving) dummies. Regressions are run for all banks and then, separately, 
for large and other banks. 
Regarding the estimation, we apply the weighted OLS estimator with robust standard errors to explain 
a subset of 100 draws from the posterior distribution of relevant IRFs. Observation weights are set 
proportional to the percentage of variable variance explained by a country model. Observation 
weighting addresses the heteroscedasticity of regression residuals and reflects a various degree of 
precision with which FAVAR models capture the variance of bank-level variables. We focus on a 
larger subset of draws from the posterior distribution acknowledging that different structural models 
may fulfil the same set of zero and sign restrictions (Budnik and Bochmann, 2018). Tables D.1 – D.2. 
in Appendix D present detailed regression results for a horizon of one year following a shock. 
Non-linear regression specifications perform better than linear specifications in explaining the cross-
sectional variance in ban -level IRFs of credit to aggregate demand shocks. Squared Tier1 ratios are 
                                                          
10 The standardisation of IRF and structural shocks (one standard deviation shocks) ensures the comparability of results from 
different country and allow the estimation based on the pooled IRFs sample. 
11 Due the smaller sample size the regression analysis was not carried out for the commercial real estate shock. 
12 By relating banks’ reaction to their initial rather than the sample average level of capitalisation we mitigate endogeneity 
concerns. 
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banks’ initial capitalisation levels (at the beginning of the sample used for the FAVAR estimation) 
measured by Tier1 rati . 12 
On the left-hand side of the cross-sectional regression, we use the cumulated IRFs of standardised 
bank-level variables and on the right-hand side banks’ Tier1 ratios and Tier1 ratios squared.  We also 
consider specifications wher  we add a set of control v riabl s such as coun ry and bank-type 
(commercial, corporate or saving) dummies. Regressions are run for all banks and then, separately, 
for large and other banks. 
Regarding the estimation, we apply the weighted OLS estimator with robust standard errors to explain 
a subset of 100 draws from the posterior distribution of relevant IRFs. Observation weights are set 
proportional to the percentage of variable variance explained by a country model. Observation 
weighting addresses the heteroscedasticity of regression residuals and reflects a various degree of 
precision with which FAVAR models capture the variance of bank-level variables. We focus on a 
larger subset of draws from the posterior distribution acknowledging that different structural models 
may fulfil the same set of zero and sign restrictions (Budnik and Bochmann, 2018). Tables D.1 – D.2. 
in Appendix D present detailed regression results for a horizon of one year following a shock. 
Non-linear regression specifications perform better than linear specifications in explaining the cross-
sectional variance in bank-level IRFs of credit to aggregate demand shocks. Squared Tier1 ratios are 
                                                        
10 The standardisation of IRF and structural shocks (one standard deviation shocks) ensures the comparability of results from 
different country and allow the estimation based on the pooled IRFs sample. 
1 Du  the smaller sample size the regression analysi  was not c ried out for the commercial real sta e shock. 
12 By relating banks’ reaction to their initial rather than the sample average level of capitalisation we mitigate endogeneity 
concerns. 
statistically significant in most of the regressions.13 The relationship between bank-level credit and 
capitalisation appears convex at least for the overall non-financial private sector and household credit. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the convexity of the estimated relationship by plotting the predicted responses of 
bank-level credit to the non-financial private sector. The X-axis marks the levels of capital ratios of all 
banks in the estimation samples. The series of dots represent the predicted values of accumulated 
bank responses a year, two and three years after the shock. 
For moderate levels of bank capitalisation (below 20%), the relationship between Tier1 capital ratio 
and the expansion of credit following a positive aggregate demand shock is negative. Better 
capitalised banks expand credit less following a favourable shock than their lower capitalised peers. It 
holds for credit to the non-financial private sector and its subcomponents alike. The symmetric nature 
of our identification warrants that following an adverse aggregate demand shock, higher capitalised 
banks will contract credit by less. Ultimately, higher capitalised banks are better suited to absorb 
shocks originating in the real economy, without major disruptions in their credit supply. 
 
 
At very high bank capitalisation levels the negative relationship between credit sensitivity and bank 
solvency breaks. Capital ratios above a 20-25% threshold do not bring in additional gains of 
moderating the contraction of credit to the non-financial private sector in economic downturns. This 
finding corroborates the hypothesis that there exists a level of capital which maximises the resilience 
of banks to selected types of macro-financial shocks. This level will generally differ not only by the 
shock type but also credit component (in our estimates it is lower for NFC than household credit).   
                                                          
13 The results for the linear specifications are not presented but are available upon request from the authors. 
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Legend: Estimates based on regressions of bank-level IRFs on the initial linear and squared Tier1 
capital ratios. Dots mark the predicted values for the observations in the regression sample.  
 
 
Legend:   Large banks: G-SII and O-SII banks.  Estimates based on regressions of bank-
level IRFs on the initial linear and squared Tier1 capital ratios. Dots mark the predicted 
values for the observations in the regression sample.  
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statistically significant in most of the regressions.13 The relationship between bank-level credit and 
capitalisation appears convex at least for the overall non-financial private sector and household credit. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the convexity of the estimated relationship by plotting the predicted responses of 
bank-level credit to the non-financial private sector. The X-axis marks the levels of capital ratios of all 
banks in the estimation samples. The series of dots represent the predicted values of accumulated 
bank responses a year, two and three years after the shock. 
For moderate levels of bank capitalisation (below 20%), the relationship between Tier1 capital ratio 
and the expansion of credit following a positive aggregate demand shock is negative. Better 
capitalised banks expand credit less following a favourable shock than their lower capitalised peers. It 
holds for credit to the non-financial private sector and its subcomponents alike. The symmetric nature 
of our identification warrants that following an adverse aggregate demand shock, higher capitalised 
banks will contract credit by less. Ultimately, higher capitalised banks are better suited to absorb 
shocks originating in the real economy, without major disruptions in their credit supply. 
 
 
At very high bank capitalisation levels the negative relationship between credit sensitivity and bank 
solvency breaks. Capital ratios above a 20-25% threshold do not bring in additional gains of 
moderating the contraction of credit to the non-financial private sector in economic downturns. This 
finding corroborates the hypothesis that there exists a level of capital which maximises the resilience 
of banks to selected types of macro-financial shocks. This level will generally differ not only by the 
shock type but also credit component (in our estimates it is lower for NFC than household credit).   
                                                          
13 The results for the linear specifications are not presented but are available upon request from the authors. 
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Figure 5.2: Empirical relationship between the change in  
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Legend: Estimates based on regressions of bank-level IRFs on the initial linear and squared Tier1 
capital ratios. Dots mark the predicted values for the observations in the regression sample.  
 
 
Legend:   Large banks: G-SII and O-SII banks.  Estimates based on regressions of bank-
level IRFs on the initial linear and squared Tier1 capital ratios. Dots mark the predicted 
values for the observations in the regression sample.  
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statistically significant in most of the regressions.13 The relationship between bank-level credit and 
capitalisation appears convex at least for the overall non-financial private sector and household credit. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the convexity of the estimated relationship by plotting the predicted responses of 
bank-level credit to the non-financial private sector. The X-axis marks the levels of capital ratios of all 
banks in the estimation samples. The series of dots represent the predicted values of accumulated 
bank responses a year, two and three years after the shock. 
For moderate levels of bank capitalisation (below 20%), the relationship between Tier1 capital ratio 
and the expansion of credit following a positive aggregate demand shock is negative. Better 
capitalised banks expand credit less following a favourable shock than their lower capitalised peers. It 
holds for credit to the non-financial private sector and its subcomponents alike. The symmetric nature 
of our identification warrants that following an adverse aggregate demand shock, higher capitalised 
banks will contract credit by less. Ultimately, higher capitalised banks are better suited to absorb 
shocks originating in the real economy, without major disruptions in their credit supply. 
 
 
At very high bank capitalisation levels the negative relationship between credit sensitivity and bank 
solvency breaks. Capital ratios above a 20-25% h eshold do not br ng in add tional gains of 
mod rating the ontraction of credit to the non-fin ncial private sector in econo ic downtu ns. This 
finding corroborates the hypothesis that there exists a level of capital which maximises the resilience 
of banks to selected types of macro-financial shocks. This level will generally differ not only by the 
shock type but also credit compone t (in our e timates it is lower for NFC than ho seh ld credit).   
                                                          
13 The results for the linear specifications are not presented but are available upon request from the authors. 
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Legend: Estimates based on regressions of bank-level IRFs on the initial linear and squared Tier1 
capital r tios. Dots mark the predicted values for the observations in the regression sample.  
 
 
Legend:   Large banks: G-SII and O-SII banks.  Estimates based on regressions of bank-
level IRFs on the initial li ear and squared Tier1 capital ratios. D ts mark the predicted 
values for the observations in the regression sample.  
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Different patterns of the relationship between banks’ capitalisation and their response to aggregate 
demand shocks emerge for large versus other banks. The relationship between banks’ capitalisation 
and the reaction of credit is convex for large banks, while concave for other banks (Figure 5.2). For 
large banks, the nick point at which increasing banks capital brings no additional gains regarding 
moderating the volatility of credit is lower than for the full sample of banks, 15% Tier1 ratio.  
Figure 5.3 shows the relationship between banks’ capitalisation and their reaction to aggregate 
demand shock over a five-year horizon. It plots the marginal effect on a change in credit to the non-
financial private sector resulting from an increase in Tier1 capital ratio by one p.p. from the level of 
8.5%. The choice of Tier1 capital ratio of 8.5% is arbitrary, and it corresponds with the minimum 
capital requirement under CRDIV including capital conservation buffer. Focusing on marginal effects 
rather than regression coefficients accommodates the non-linearity of the relationship between banks’ 
capitalisation and their responses. A negative marginal effect of Tier1 capital suggests that a further 
increase in the capital ratio would result in lower credit expansion of credit by a bank, following a 
positive aggregate demand shock, or milder credit contraction following a negative aggregate demand 
shock.  
The adverse effect of an increase in Tier1 capital ratio on credit expansion following a positive 
aggregate demand shock is strongest a year after the shock and slowly fades after that.  Assessed 
based on the full sample of banks, the marginal effect of an increase in Tier1 capital ratio above 8.5% 
is negative and highly persistent, lasting up to five years for the overall credit to the non-financial 
private sector, somewhat shorter (three years) for NFC credit, and even longer (over five years) for 
credit to households (see Figures D.1 – D.2 in Appendix D). 
 
Figure 5.3 The marginal effect of an increase in Tier1 ratio from the level of 8.5% on the cumulated 
change in credit to non-financial private sector following a positive aggregate demand shock: all, 
large (G-SII and O-SII) and other banks 
Legend: Large banks: G-SII and O-SII banks. Estimates based on regressions of bank-level IRFs on the initial linear and squared Tier1 capital ratios. The 
confidence banks calculated with delta method.  
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capitalised Italian banks were less affected by economic downturns between 1992 and 2001. 
Bernanke and Lown (1991) find a significant relationship between bank lending shortage and falling 
capital ratios during the 1990 recession in the United States.  Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010) detect a 
similar relation in 2007-2009 for Italian banks. Based on Spanish supervisory data on loan 
applications, Jimenez et al. (2012) provide empirical evidence that lower capitalised banks reduce 
loans during an economic recession to a greater extent than higher capitalised banks. Finally, Berger 
and Bouwman (2013) show, based on US data, that higher capital of large- and medium-sized banks 
increases their probability of survival, allowing them to maintain their market share during a crisis.  
5.1 Bank-level regressions 
We run a series of cross-sectional regressions relating the reaction of bank-level variables to 
macroeconomic shocks to banks’ capitalisation. We focus on bank-level variables that are the best 
comparable across country models: credit to the non-financial private sector, to NFCs, to households 
and credit to households for housing purposes. We evaluate the reaction of these variables to a 
(positive one standard deviation10) aggregate demand and residential house price shocks11  against 
banks’ initial capitalisation levels (at the beginning of the sample used for the FAVAR estimation) 
measured by Tier1 ratio. 12 
On the left-hand side of the cross-sectional regression, we use the cumulated IRFs of standardised 
bank-level variables and on the right-hand side banks’ Tier1 ratios and Tier1 ratios squared.  We also 
consider specifications where we add a set of control variables such as country and bank-type 
(commercial, corporate or saving) dummies. Regressions are run for all banks and then, separately, 
for large and other banks. 
Regarding the estimation, we apply the weighted OLS estimator with robust standard errors to explain 
a subset of 100 draws from the posterior distribution of relevant IRFs. Observation weights are set 
proportional to the percentage of variable variance explained by a country model. Observation 
weighting addresses the heteroscedasticity of regression residuals and reflects a various degree of 
precision with which FAVAR models capture the variance of bank-level variables. We focus on a 
larger subset of draws from the posterior distribution acknowledging that different structural models 
may fulfil the same set of zero and sign restrictions (Budnik and Bochmann, 2018). Tables D.1 – D.2. 
in Appendix D present detailed regression results for a horizon of one year following a shock. 
Non-linear regression specifications perform better than linear specifications in explaining the cross-
sectional variance in bank-level IRFs of credit to aggregate demand shocks. Squared Tier1 ratios are 
                                                          
10 The standardisation of IRF and structural shocks (one standard deviation shocks) ensures the comparability of results from 
different country and allow the estimation based on the pooled IRFs sample. 
11 Due the smaller sample size the regression analysis was not carried out for the commercial real estate shock. 
12 By relating banks’ reaction to their initial rather than the sample average level of capitalisation we mitigate endogeneity 
concerns. 
statistically significant in most of the regressions.13 The relationship between bank-level credit and 
capitalisation appears convex at least for the overall non-financial private sector and household credit. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the convexity of the estimated relationship by plotting the predicted responses of 
bank-level credit to the non-financial private sector. The X-axis marks the levels of capital ratios of all 
banks in the estimation samples. The series of dots represent the predicted values of accumulated 
bank responses a year, two and three years after the shock. 
For moderate levels of bank capitalisation (below 20%), the relationship between Tier1 capital ratio 
and the expansion of credit following a positive aggregate demand shock is negative. Better 
capitalised banks expand credit less following a favourable shock than their lower capitalised peers. It 
holds for credit to the non-financial private sector and its subcomponents alike. The symmetric nature 
of our identification warrants that following an adverse aggregate demand shock, higher capitalised 
banks will contract credit by less. Ultimately, higher capitalised banks are better suited to absorb 
shocks originating in the real economy, without major disruptions in their credit supply. 
 
 
At very high bank capitalisation levels the negative relationship between credit sensitivity and bank 
solvency breaks. Capital ratios above a 20-25% th eshold do not br ng in add tional gains of 
moderating the ontraction of credit to the non-financial private sector in economic downtu ns. This 
finding corroborates the hypothesis that there exists a level of capital which maximises the resilience 
of banks to selected types of macro-financial shocks. This level will generally differ not only by the 
shock type but also credit compone t (in our e timates it is lower for NFC than househ ld credit).   
                                                          
13 The results for the linear specifications are not presented but are available upon request from the authors. 
Figure 5.1: Empirical relationship between the change in 
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Figure 5.2: Empirical relationship between the change in  
credit to non-financial private sector a year following a 
positive aggregate demand shocks and the initial level of 
banks’ capitali ation: large and other banks 
 
Legend: Estimates based on regressions of bank-level IRFs on the initial linear and squared Tier1 
capital ratios. Dots mark the predicted values for the observations in the regression sample.  
 
 
Legend:   Large banks: G-SII and O-SII banks.  Estimates based on regressions of bank-
level IRFs on the initial linear and squared Tier1 capital ratios. Dots mark the predicted 
values for the observations in the regression sample.  
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capitalised Italian banks were less affected by economic downturns between 1992 and 2001. 
Bernanke and Lown (1991) find a significant relationship between bank lending shortage and falling 
capital ratios during the 1990 recession in the United States.  Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010) detect a 
similar relation in 2007-2009 for Italian banks. Based on Spanish supervisory data on loan 
applications, Jimenez et al. (2012) provide empirical evidence that lower capitalised banks reduce 
loans during an economic recession to a greater extent than higher capitalised banks. Finally, Berger 
and Bouwman (2013) show, based on US data, that higher capital of large- and medium-sized banks 
increases their probability of survival, allowing them to maintain their market share during a crisis.  
5.1 Bank-level regressions 
We run a series of cross-sectional regressions relating the reaction of bank-level variables to 
macroeconomic shocks to banks’ capitalisation. We focus on bank-level variables that are the best 
comparable across country models: credit to the non-financial private sector, to NFCs, to households 
and credit to households for housing purposes. We evaluate the reaction of these variables to a 
(positive one standard deviation10) aggregate demand and residential house price shocks11  against 
banks’ initial capitalisation levels (at the beginning of the sample used for the FAVAR estimation) 
mea ured by Tier1 ratio. 12 
On the left-hand side of the cross-sectional regression, we use the cumulated IRFs of standardised 
bank-level variables and on the right-hand side banks’ Tier1 ratios and Tier1 ratios squared.  We also 
consider specifications where we add a set of control variables such as country and bank-type 
(commercial, corporate or saving) dummies. Regressions are run for all banks and then, separately, 
for large and other banks. 
Regarding the estimation, we apply the weighted OLS estimator with robust standard errors to explain 
a subset of 100 draws from the posterior distribution of relevant IRFs. Observation weights are set 
proportional to the percentage of variable variance explained by a country model. Observation 
weighting addresses the heteroscedasticity of regression residuals and reflects a various degree of 
precision with which FAVAR models capture the variance of bank-level variables. We focus on a 
larger subset of draws from the posterior distribution acknowledging that different structural models 
may fulfil the same set of zero and sign restrictions (Budnik and Bochmann, 2018). Tables D.1 – D.2. 
in Appendix D present detailed regression results for a horizon of one year following a shock. 
Non-linear regression specifications perform better than linear specifications in explaining the cross-
sectional variance in ban -level IRFs of credit to aggregate demand shocks. Squared Tier1 ratios are 
                                                          
10 The standardisation of IRF and structural shocks (one standard deviation shocks) ensures the comparability of results from 
different country and allow the estimation based on the pooled IRFs sample. 
11 Due the smaller sample size the regression analysis was not carried out for the commercial real estate shock. 
12 By relating banks’ reaction to their initial rather than the sample average level of capitalisation we mitigate endogeneity 
concerns. 
it lised Italian banks were less ffected by economic dow turns between 1992 and 2001. 
Bernanke and Lown (1991) find a significant relationship between bank lending shortage and falling 
c pital ratios during the 1990 recession in the United States.  Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010) detect a 
similar relation in 2007-2009 for Italian banks. Based on Spanish supervisory data on loan 
applications, Jimenez et al. (2012) provide empirical evidence that lower capitalised banks reduce 
loans during an economic recession to a greater extent than higher capitalised banks. Finally, Berger 
and Bouwman (2013) sho , b sed on US data, that higher c pital of large- and medium-sized banks 
increases their probability of survival, allowing them to maintain their market share during a cri is.  
5.1 Bank-level regressions 
We run a series of cross-section l regressions relating the reaction of b k-level variables to 
macroeconomic shocks to banks’ capitalisation. W  focus on bank-level variable  that are the best 
comparable across country models: credit to the non-financial private s ctor, to NFCs, to households 
and credit to households for housing purposes. We evaluate the reaction of these variables to a 
(positive one standard deviation10) aggregate demand and residential house price shocks11  against 
banks’ initial capitalisation levels (at the beginning of the sample used for the FAVAR estimation) 
measured by Tier1 rati . 12 
On the left-hand side of the cross-sectional regression, we use the cumulated IRFs of standardised 
bank-level variables and on the right-hand side banks’ Tier1 ratios and Tier1 ratios squared.  We also 
consider specifications wher  we add a set of control v riabl s such as coun ry and bank-type 
(commercial, corporate or saving) dummies. Regressions are run for all banks and then, separately, 
for large and other banks. 
Regarding the estimation, we apply the weighted OLS estimator with robust standard errors to explain 
a subset of 100 draws from the posterior distribution of relevant IRFs. Observation weights are set 
proportional to the percentage of variable variance explained by a country model. Observation 
weighting addresses the heteroscedasticity of regression residuals and reflects a various degree of 
precision with which FAVAR models capture the variance of bank-level variables. We focus on a 
larger subset of draws from the posterior distribution acknowledging that different structural models 
may fulfil the same set of zero and sign restrictions (Budnik and Bochmann, 2018). Tables D.1 – D.2. 
in Appendix D present detailed regression results for a horizon of one year following a shock. 
Non-linear regression specifications perform better than linear specifications in explaining the cross-
sectional variance in bank-level IRFs of credit to aggregate demand shocks. Squared Tier1 ratios are 
                                                        
10 The standardisation of IRF and structural shocks (one standard deviation shocks) ensures the comparability of results from 
different country and allow the estimation based on the pooled IRFs sample. 
1 Du  the smaller sample size the regression analysi  was not c ried out for the commercial real sta e shock. 
12 By relating banks’ reaction to their initial rather than the sample average level of capitalisation we mitigate endogeneity 
concerns. 
statistically significant in most of the regressions.13 The relationship between bank-level credit and 
capitalisation appears convex at least for the overall non-financial private sector and household credit. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the convexity of the estimated relationship by plotting the predicted responses of 
bank-level credit to the non-financial private sector. The X-axis marks the levels of capital ratios of all 
banks in the estimation samples. The series of dots represent the predicted values of accumulated 
bank responses a year, two and three years after the shock. 
For moderate levels of bank capitalisation (below 20%), the relationship between Tier1 capital ratio 
and the expansion of credit following a positive aggregate demand shock is negative. Better 
capitalised banks expand credit less following a favourable shock than their lower capitalised peers. It 
holds for credit to the non-financial private sector and its subcomponents alike. The symmetric nature 
of our identification warrants that following an adverse aggregate demand shock, higher capitalised 
banks will contract credit by less. Ultimately, higher capitalised banks are better suited to absorb 
shocks originating in the real economy, without major disruptions in their credit supply. 
 
 
At very high bank capitalisation levels the negative relationship between credit sensitivity and bank 
solvency breaks. Capital ratios above a 20-25% threshold do not bring in additional gains of 
moderating the contraction of credit to the non-financial private sector in economic downturns. This 
finding corroborates the hypothesis that there exists a level of capital which maximises the resilience 
of banks to selected types of macro-financial shocks. This level will generally differ not only by the 
shock type but also credit component (in our estimates it is lower for NFC than household credit).   
                                                          
13 The results for the linear specifications are not presented but are available upon request from the authors. 
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Legend: Estimates based on regressions of bank-level IRFs on the initial linear and squared Tier1 
capital ratios. Dots mark the predicted values for the observations in the regression sample.  
 
 
Legend:   Large banks: G-SII and O-SII banks.  Estimates based on regressions of bank-
level IRFs on the initial linear and squared Tier1 capital ratios. Dots mark the predicted 
values for the observations in the regression sample.  
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statistically significant in most of the regressions.13 The relationship between bank-level credit and 
capitalisation appears convex at least for the overall non-financial private sector and household credit. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the convexity of the estimated relationship by plotting the predicted responses of 
bank-level credit to the non-financial private sector. The X-axis marks the levels of capital ratios of all 
banks in the estimation samples. The series of dots represent the predicted values of accumulated 
bank responses a year, two and three years after the shock. 
For moderate levels of bank capitalisation (below 20%), the relationship between Tier1 capital ratio 
and the expansion of credit following a positive aggregate demand shock is negative. Better 
capitalised banks expand credit less following a favourable shock than their lower capitalised peers. It 
holds for credit to the non-financial private sector and its subcomponents alike. The symmetric nature 
of our identification warrants that following an adverse aggregate demand shock, higher capitalised 
banks will contract credit by less. Ultimately, higher capitalised banks are better suited to absorb 
shocks originating in the real economy, without major disruptions in their credit supply. 
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solvency breaks. Capital ratios above a 20-25% threshold do not bring in additional gains of 
moderating the contraction of credit to the non-financial private sector in economic downturns. This 
finding corroborates the hypothesis that there exists a level of capital which maximises the resilience 
of banks to selected types of macro-financial shocks. This level will generally differ not only by the 
shock type but also credit component (in our estimates it is lower for NFC than household credit).   
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Legend: Estimates based on regressions of bank-level IRFs on the initial linear and squared Tier1 
capital ratios. Dots mark the predicted values for the observations in the regression sample.  
 
 
Legend:   Large banks: G-SII and O-SII banks.  Estimates based on regressions of bank-
level IRFs on the initial linear and squared Tier1 capital ratios. Dots mark the predicted 
values for the observations in the regression sample.  
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of our identification warrants that following an adverse aggregate demand shock, higher capitalised 
banks will contract credit by less. Ultimately, higher capitalised banks are better suited to absorb 
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Figure 5.2: Empirical relationship between the change in  
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banks’ capitalisation: large and other banks 
 
Legend: Estimates based on regressions of bank-level IRFs on the initial linear and squared Tier1 
capital ratios. Dots mark the predicted values for the observations in the regression sample.  
 
 
Legend:   Large banks: G-SII and O-SII banks.  Estimates based on regressions of bank-
level IRFs on the initial linear and squared Tier1 capital ratios. Dots mark the predicted 
values for the observations in the regression sample.  
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 
re
sp
on
se
0 .1 .2 .3 .4
T1/RWA
Cum. 1 year Cum. 2 years Cum. 3 years
Credit to non-financial private sector
Aggregate demand shock
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 
re
sp
on
se
0 .1 .2 .3 .4
T1/RWA
Cum. 1Y Large Cum. 2Y Large Cum. 1Y Other
Cum. 2Y Other
Credit to non-financial private sector
Aggregate demand shock
statistically significant in most of the regressions.13 The relationship between bank-level credit and 
capitalisation appears convex at least for the overall non-financial private sector and household credit. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the convexity of the estimated relationship by plotting the predicted responses of 
bank-level credit to the non-financial private sector. The X-axis marks the levels of capital ratios of all 
banks in the estimation samples. The series of dots represent the predicted values of accumulated 
bank responses a year, two and three years after the shock. 
For moderate levels of bank capitalisation (below 20%), the relationship between Tier1 capital ratio 
and the expansion of credit following a positive aggregate demand shock is negative. Better 
capitalised banks expand credit less following a favourable shock than their lower capitalised peers. It 
holds for credit to the non-financial private sector and its subcomponents alike. The symmetric nature 
of our identification warrants that following an adverse aggregate demand shock, higher capitalised 
banks will contract credit by less. Ultimately, higher capitalised banks are better suited to absorb 
shocks originating in the real economy, without major disruptions in their credit supply. 
 
 
At very high bank capitalisation levels the negative relationship between credit sensitivity and bank 
solvency breaks. Capital ratios above a 20-25% th eshold do not br ng in add tional gains of 
mod rating the ontraction of credit to the non-fin ncial private sector in economic downtu ns. This 
finding corroborates the hypothesis that there exists a level of capital which maximises the resilience 
of banks to selected types of macro-financial shocks. This level will generally differ not only by the 
shock type but also credit compone t (in our e timates it is lower for NFC than ho seh ld credit).   
                                                          
13 The results for the linear specifications are not presented but are available upon request from the authors. 
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Legend: Estimates based on regressions of bank-level IRFs on the initial linear and squared Tier1 
capital r tios. Dots mark the predicted values for the observations in the regression sample.  
 
 
Legend:   Large banks: G-SII and O-SII banks.  Estimates based on regressions of bank-
level IRFs on the initial li ear and squared Tier1 capital ratios. D ts mark the predicted 
values for the observations in the regression sample.  
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Different patterns of the relationship between banks’ capitalisation and their response to aggregate 
demand shocks emerge for large versus other banks. The relationship between banks’ capitalisation 
and the reaction of credit is convex for large banks, while concave for other banks (Figure 5.2). For 
large banks, the nick point at which increasing banks capital brings no additional gains regarding 
moderating the volatility of credit is lower than for the full sample of banks, 15% Tier1 ratio.  
Figure 5.3 shows the relationship between banks’ capitalisation and their reaction to aggregate 
demand shock over a five-year horizon. It plots the marginal effect on a change in credit to the non-
financial private sector resulting from an increase in Tier1 capital ratio by one p.p. from the level of 
8.5%. The choice of Tier1 capital ratio of 8.5% is arbitrary, and it corresponds with the minimum 
capital requirement under CRDIV including capital conservation buffer. Focusing on marginal effects 
rather than regression coefficients accommodates the non-linearity of the relationship between banks’ 
capitalisation and their responses. A negative marginal effect of Tier1 capital suggests that a further 
increase in the capital ratio would result in lower credit expansion of credit by a bank, following a 
positive aggregate demand shock, or milder credit contraction following a negative aggregate demand 
shock.  
The adverse effect of an increase in Tier1 capital ratio on credit expansion following a positive 
aggregate demand shock is strongest a year after the shock and slowly fades after that.  Assessed 
based on the full sample of banks, the marginal effect of an increase in Tier1 capital ratio above 8.5% 
is negative and highly persistent, lasting up to five years for the overall credit to the non-financial 
private sector, somewhat shorter (three years) for NFC credit, and even longer (over five years) for 
credit to households (see Figures D.1 – D.2 in Appendix D). 
 
Figure 5.3 The marginal effect of an increase in Tier1 ratio from the level of 8.5% on the cumulated 
change in credit to non-financial private sector following a positive aggregate demand shock: all, 
large (G-SII and O-SII) and other banks 
Legend: Large banks: G-SII and O-SII banks. Estimates based on regressions of bank-level IRFs on the initial linear and squared Tier1 capital ratios. The 
confidence banks calculated with delta method.  
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The effect of bank capitalisation on moderating credit growth is more pronounced and longer lasting 
for large banks compared to all banks in the sample. In contrast, the impact of capitalisation on the 
credit growth of medium-sized and smaller banks is initially not statistically different than zero and 
turns positive after one and a half year following the shock. Hence, for other banks higher 
capitalisation exacerbates credit expansions and contractions. A possible interpretation of this 
discrepancy is the different access of large versus medium-size and smaller banks to wholesale debt 
markets. Large banks, having good access to wholesale debt financing, may adjust credit supply 
relatively fast by increasing their leverage. Bank capitalisation still affects the incentives of large 
banks to take on risk, and the dominant role of own funds is that of a ‘skin in the game’. In this set-up 
higher bank capitalisation moderates their credit expansion in good times. Medium-sized and small 
banks have limited access to wholesale financing, and their credit supply depends on the availability 
of own funds. As a result, they are more likely to resort to capital accumulation to finance additional 
credit supply. It could explain both the lagged response of medium-sized and smaller banks and the 
fact that the better capitalised of them adjust credit faster in response to aggregate demand shocks. 
Our regression results suggest that an increase in capital buffers of large banks can have a significant 
and positive impact on system-wide resilience. Improvements in the capitalisation of large banks will 
more likely pass-through into a smoothening of credit supply across the business cycle than increases 
in the capitalisation of medium-sized and small banks. These findings add up to arguments for 
maintaining high capitalisation of G-SII and O-SII banks.    
The evidence on the relationship between bank capitalisation and their response to a positive 
residential house price shocks is generally weaker. The relationship between bank capitalisation and 
credit to the private non-financial sector is concave for all and large banks, while it is convex for 
medium-sized and smaller banks and statistically significant only for the first few quarters following a 
shock (see Figure D.3 in Appendix D). The effect on credit to households (and credit to households 
for housing purposes) is close to linear and positive for all and large banks and negative for medium-
sized and smaller banks. For the latter, it turns not statistically significant already a year following a 
shock (see Figure D.4 in Appendix D). 
5.2. Benefits from high bank capitalisation: counterfactual simulations  
To illustrate the quantitative implications of our regression results we run a series of counterfactual 
exercises. Our assessment focuses on the role of capital buffers in building banks’ resilience to 
negative macroeconomic shocks and corresponds with our notion of benefits from higher banks’ 
capital. 
We attempt to measure a reduction in credit to the non-financial private sector that does not 
materialise under an adverse scenario owing to higher capital buffers. To this end, we choose an 
adverse scenario that has a similar probability of realisation across countries, in line with the 
assumptions commonly taken in EU-wide stress-test scenarios, and involves a six-quarter series of 
The effect of bank capitalisation on moderating credit growth is more pronounced and longer lasting 
for large banks compared to all banks in the sample. In contrast, the impact of capitalisation on the 
credit growth of medium-sized and smaller banks is initially not statistically different than zero and 
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based on the full sample of banks, the marginal effect of an increase in Tier1 capital ratio above 8.5% 
is negative and highly persistent, lasting up to five years for the overall credit to the non-financial 
private sector, somewhat shorter (three years) for NFC credit, and even longer (over five years) for 
credit to households (see Figures D.1 – D.2 in Appendix D). 
 
Figure 5.3 The marginal effect of an increase in Tier1 ratio from the level of 8.5% on the cumulated 
change in credit to non-financial private sector following a positive aggregate demand shock: all, 
large (G-SII and O-SII) and other banks 
Legend: Large banks: G-SII and O-SII banks. Estimates based on regressions of bank-level IRFs on the initial linear and squared Tier1 capital ratios. The 
confidence banks calculated with delta method.  
 
 
  
-.
1
0
.1
.2
0 5 10 15 20
Horizon
Large banks (with 95% conf. band)
Other banks (with 95% conf. bands)
All banks (with 95% conf. bands)
Credit to non-financial private sector
Aggregate demand shock
The effect of bank capitalisation on moderating credit growth is more pronounced and longer lasting 
for large banks compared to all banks in the sample. In contrast, the impact of capitalisation on the 
credit growth of medium-sized and smaller banks is initially not statistically different than zero and 
turns positive after one and a half year following the shock. Hence, for other banks higher 
capitalisation exacerbates credit expansions and contractions. A possible interpretation of this 
discrepancy is the different access of large versus medium-size and smaller banks to wholesale debt 
markets. Large banks, having good access to wholesale debt financing, may adjust credit supply 
relatively fast by increasing their leverage. Bank capitalisation still affects the incentives of large 
banks to take on risk, and the dominant role of own funds is that of a ‘skin in the game’. In this set-up 
higher bank capitalisation moderates their credit expansion in good times. Medium-sized and small 
banks have limited access to wholesale financing, and their credit supply depends on the availability 
of own funds. As a result, they are more likely to resort to capital accumulation to finance additional 
credit supply. It could explain both the lagged response of medium-sized and smaller banks and the 
fact that the better capitalised of them adjust credit faster in response to aggregate demand shocks. 
Our regression results suggest that an increase in capital buffers of large banks can have a significant 
and positive impact on system-wide resilience. Improvements in the capitalisation of large banks will 
more likely pass-through into a smoothening of credit supply across the business cycle than increases 
in the capitalisation of medium-sized and small banks. These findings add up to arguments for 
maintaining high capitalisation of G-SII and O-SII banks.    
The evidence on the relationship between bank capitalisation and their response to a positive 
residential house price shocks is generally weaker. The relationship between bank capitalisation and 
credit to the private non-financial sector is concave for all and large banks, while it is convex for 
medium-sized and smaller banks and statistically significant only for the first few quarters following a 
shock (see Figure D.3 in Appendix D). The effect on credit to households (and credit to households 
for housing purposes) is close to linear and positive for all and large banks and negative for medium-
sized and smaller banks. For the latter, it turns not statistically significant already a year following a 
shock (see Figure D.4 in Appendix D). 
5.2. Benefits from high bank capitalisation: counterfactual simulations  
To illustrate the quantitative implications of our regression results we run a series of counterfactual 
exercises. Our assessment focuses on the role of capital buffers in building banks’ resilience to 
negative macroeconomic shocks and corresponds with our notion of benefits from higher banks’ 
capital. 
We attempt to measure a reduction in credit to the non-financial private sector that does not 
materialise under an adverse scenario owing to higher capital buffers. To this end, we choose an 
adverse scenario that has a similar probability of realisation across countries, in line with the 
assumptions commonly taken in EU-wide stress-test scenarios, and involves a six-quarter series of 
The effect of bank capitalisation on moderating credit growth is more pronounced and longer lasting 
for large banks compared to all banks in the sample. In contrast, the impact of capitalisation on the 
credit growth of medium-sized and smaller banks is initially not statistically different than zero and 
turns positive after one and a half year following the shock. Hence, for other banks higher 
capitalisation exacerbates credit expansions and contractions. A possible interpretation of this 
discrepancy is the different access of large versus medium-size and smaller banks to wholesale debt 
markets. Large banks, having good access to wholesale debt financing, may adjust credit supply 
relatively fast by increasing their leverage. Bank capitalisation still affects the incentives of large 
banks to take on risk, and the dominant role of own funds is that of a ‘skin in the game’. In this set-up 
higher bank capitalisation moderates their credit expansion in good times. Medium-sized and small 
banks have limited access to wholesale financing, and their credit supply depends on the availability 
of own funds. As a result, they are more likely to resort to capital accumulation to finance additional 
credit supply. It could explain both the lagged response of medium-sized and smaller banks and the 
fact that the better capitalised of them adjust credit faster in response to aggregate demand shocks. 
Our regression results suggest that an increase in capital buffers of large banks can have a significant 
and positive impact on system-wide resilience. Improvements in the capitalisation of large banks will 
more likely pass-through into a smoothening of credit supply across the business cycle than increases 
in the capitalisation of medium-sized and small banks. These findings add up to arguments for 
maintaining high capitalisation of G-SII and O-SII banks.    
The evidence on the relationship between bank capitalisation and their response to a positive 
residential house price shocks is generally weaker. The relationship between bank capitalisation and 
credit to the private non-financial sector is concave for all and large banks, while it is convex for 
medium-sized and smaller banks and statistically significant only for the first few quarters following a 
shock (see Figure D.3 in Appendix D). The effect on credit to households (and credit to households 
for housing purposes) is close to linear and positive for all and large banks and negative for medium-
sized and smaller banks. For the latter, it turns not statistically significant already a year following a 
shock (see Figure D.4 in Appendix D). 
5.2. Benefits from high bank capitalisation: counterfactual simulations  
To illustrate the quantitative implications of our regression results we run a series of counterfactual 
exercises. Our assessment focuses on the role of capital buffers in building banks’ resilience to 
negative macroeconomic shocks and corresponds with our notion of benefits from higher banks’ 
capital. 
We attempt to measure a reduction in credit to the non-financial private sector that does not 
materialise under an adverse scenario owing to higher capital buffers. To this end, we choose an 
adverse scenario that has a similar probability of realisation across countries, in line with the 
assumptions commonly taken in EU-wide stress-test scenarios, and involves a six-quarter series of 
adverse aggregate demand shocks. In the scenario, the GDP falls sharply in the first two years, 
reaching 3.5% below the initial level on the euro area level at the end of the second year, and slowly 
rebounds after that. Credit to the non-financial private sector reacts with a lag and continues falling in 
the third and fourth year, reaching -4% below its initial level on the euro area level. 14 The scenario is 
relatively benign when benchmarked to the estimates of costs of a financial crisis by Laeven and 
Valencia (2012) or the experience of European countries during the recent crisis.15 
For a start, we look at the impact of banks Tier1 capital ratios above 8.5% at the end of 2015. This 
way, we pin down the joint effect of Pillar 1 capital buffers (other than conservation buffer), Pillar 2 
decisions and voluntary buffers. Figure 5.6 shows the current Tier1 capital buffers of euro area banks 
limit the reduction in credit to the private non-financial sector under the adverse scenario. The effects 
of higher bank capitalisation are most pronounced at the end of the second year, fading after that in 
line with the rebound in the economic activity. For Ireland, gains in credit to the non-financial private 
sector amount to 6 - 7% over a three-year horizon. For Slovenia, Lithuania and Cyprus benefits from 
the existing capital buffers are moderately lower (credit gains of 4.9%, 3.4% and 3.5% in the second 
year under an adverse scenario). For other countries, the benefits from having capital buffers above 
8.5% are between 1-2% of the credit to the non-financial private sector at the end of the second year. 
All these effects are substantial in relative terms, amounting to (at minimum) around 10% of the 
overall reduction in credit reported under the adverse scenario for Lithuania and Portugal, around 20% 
for Belgium and Finland, close to 40% for Spain, and over 50% for remaining countries. Figures D.5 
and D.6 in Appendix D present the impact of capital buffers on credit by sector. 
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For a start, we look at the impact of banks Tier1 capital ratios above 8.5% at the end of 2015. This 
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The assessment of the effect of changes in Tier1 capital compared to the levels 
prevailing in 2010 provides yet another perspective. Benchmarking against 
capitalisation levels in 2010 allows us to assess an actual increase in banks’ resilience in 
recent years. Altogether, the phasing in of Basel III, supervisory interventions and 
accumulation of voluntary capital buffers resulted in the average increase in banks’ 
capital buffers in our sample by 2.4pp. This increase has been unequal across banks and 
jurisdictions though. The variance coefficient of Tier1 ratio decreased from 42%, in 
2010, to 36%, 2015 reflecting the fact that the least capitalised banks experienced the 
most significant increases in their capitalisation levels.  
 
Figure 5.7. The effect of an increase in Tier1 capital buffers from the levels that prevailed in 2010 to 
the levels at the end of 2015 on the outstanding credit to non-financial private sector under the 
adverse scenario (at the end of a year)   
Legend: Estimates based on regressions of bank-level IRFs on the initial linear and squared Tier1 capital ratios for the full sample of banks.  
 
There was a pronounced increase in banks resilience especially in Ireland, Slovenia and Cyprus 
(Figure 5.7). Lower gains in resilience for the Lithuanian banking sectors correspond with an increase 
of capital buffers from relatively high 2010 levels, whereas similar results for Italy reflect limited 
increases in relatively low 2010 capitalisation levels. 
Would further increase in capital buffers from the levels prevailing at the end of 2015 be warranted? 
The effects of an increase in Tier1 capital buffers of all banks by 1pp compared to 2015 levels are 
shown in Figure 5.8. A system-wide increase in capital buffer would result in a median gain in credit 
of 0.6pp at the end of the second year of the adverse scenario, therein 4.1pp gain for 10% of banks. 
On a country level, a further increase in capital buffers would contribute to the resilience of national 
banking systems in most of the countries, with (on average) relatively lowest gains in Ireland, 
Finland, Belgium, and relatively highest in Slovenia, Spain and Italy.   
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6. Costs of capital-based macroprudential regulation: aggregate identification 
 
In this section, we move to the assessment of the short-term costs of raising capital buffers in a 
FAVAR set-up. We quantify those as a reduction in credit growth and in economic activity occurring 
when the average level of capital in an economy is unexpectedly and exogenously increased. To this 
end, we modify the country FAVAR models to identify the effects of an aggregate bank capital shock 
similar to Meeks (2017). Then, we derive impulse response functions of the identified shocks and 
assess the impact of bank capital shocks via counterfactual simulations, assuming that bank capital 
increase is phased in over a 3-year horizon in same quarterly steps.  
We differentiate between two types of shocks affecting the supply of credit: credit supply shocks and 
bank capital increases. It is aimed to provide a fair assessment of the likely impact of capital increases 
and better separate such shocks from shocks related to, e.g. funding during the crisis. The expected 
effects of raising capital requirements on lending margins and credit are similar to those of a negative 
credit supply shock. Banks subject to an increase of capital requirements are expected to raise their 
lending rates compared to the risk-free rate and contract credit to the private non-financial sector. 
Further, the reduction in book leverage related to an increase in capital requirements results in a 
reduction in the stock price valuation of banks compared to the rest of the market (Fornari and 
Stracca, 2012). 
At the same time, better-capitalised banks should experience lower funding cost than other banks. 
When banks hold more capital, their creditors are better shielded from losses. It should in principle 
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Legend: Estimates based on regressions of bank-level IRFs on the initial linear and squared Tier1 capital ratios for the full sample of banks. X-axis – percentage change in credit to the 
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drive down their compensation, partially offsetting the costs of own capital based financing (Admati 
et al., 2010, Elliott, 2009, Hanson et al., 2010, and Osborne et al., 2010).  Admati et al. (2010) and on 
the empirical side Gambacorta and Shin (2016) and Schmitz et al. (2016) provide supportive evidence 
that higher capitalised banks indeed enjoy a lower cost of funding due to reduced credit risk. In the 
case of supply disruption, when, e.g. banks experience losses, banks will be perceived as less safe, 
and markets would require a higher premium to lend to them. The response of banks’ funding costs 
following a positive bank capital shock should be the opposite of the reaction following a negative 
credit supply shock. We use this feature to disentangle credit supply disruptions from a regulatory or 
voluntary capital built up. 
 
6.1. Specification of country-level FAVARs with a capital shock 
The country FAVAR models used in this section include five aggregate variables describing the 
dynamics of the banking system: total banking sector credit, lending margins, capital ratio, an equity 
ratio and a proxy for banks’ funding costs. Following Schmitz et al. (2016) as well as Gambacorta and 
Shin (2016) we use banks’ CDS, precisely the average banks’ CDS (senior 5-year CDS), to 
approximate the credit risk associated with the overall banking system. However, for a group of 
countries in our sample banks do not have market evaluations and the coverage of the CDS 
information is limited: in such cases, we replace CDS with the spread between retail deposit rates and 
risk-free rates to proxy for higher confidence of depositors induced by stronger solvency positions.16 
We disentangle three structural shocks utilising sign restrictions: credit demand, credit supply and 
bank capital (Table 6.1). A negative credit demand shock is associated with a decrease in both the 
quantity and the price of credit. A negative credit supply shock (e.g. associated with deleveraging 
pressures) shifts the credit supply curve upwards, making prices and volumes go in the opposite 
direction. At the same time, the different impact on banks’ financing costs is what allows us to 
disentangle increasing capital requirement shocks from supply disruptions. 17 Finally, as in the case of 
previous analysis restrictions might be imposed at different horizons to accommodate country-specific 
issues better. The negative sign on the beta is imposed for both shocks, mainly because it allows 
disentangling both credit supply shocks and bank capital increases from the effects of non-
conventional monetary policy. 18 
                                                          
16 From a theoretical perspective there are pros and cons of both using deposits and CDS. In some countries deposits are the 
main source of financing for banks. Yet, considering the sheer size of the funding base (i.e. retail depositors versus markets) 
might still mask the fact that banks receive their marginal source of funding from markets rather than retail investors. The 
latter are in fact supposed to be a more stable source of funding, see for example discussion in Shin (2009).  
17 We relax this restriction only for the case of Netherlands for which we are able to find no sensible impulse response 
functions using the restrictions. In terms of the conditional projection exercise results seem in line with expectations 
notwithstanding the relaxation of the restriction.  
18 Non-conventional monetary policy in fact can act as a ‘stealth’ recapitalisation of financial intermediaries (Brunnermeier 
and Sannikov, 2016) in so far as it increases the value of some assets held in banks’ balance sheets. However, non-
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Table 6.1: Zero and sign restrictions for a model with identification of short-run costs of capital buffers 
Shock Capital Ratio Financing costs Lending spreads 
Beta (Ratio equity 
of banks 
compared to total 
market) Total Credit 
Credit demand   -  - 
Credit supply  + + - - 
Bank capital + - + - - 
 
6.2. Banks’ responses to a capital shock 
 
Figure 6.1 reports the aggregate responses of capital ratios, total credit to the non-financial private 
sector, lending spreads, financing costs, and market risk following a non-anticipated increase of 1pp 
in the system-wide bank capital ratio. A positive capital shock increases banks’ solvency, pushes us 
their lending spreads and depress credit volumes. In contrast, a credit supply shock is associated with 
an increase in banks’ funding costs and has on average more negative effects on credit and lending 
rates. Following the latter, capital ratios barely move. 
 
On impact, a 1pp increase in capital ratios corresponds to a contraction in total credit which ranges 
between 1 and 3pp depending on the country. The results are even more diverse regarding the 
response of lending spreads and GDP growth. In Table 6.2 we present the median and selected 
percentiles of the distribution of country-level impulse response function to bank capital shocks. 
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and Sannikov, 2016) in so far as it increases the value of some assets held in banks’ balance sheets. However, non-
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Table 6.1: Zero and sign restrictions for a model with identification of short-run costs of capital buffers 
Shock Capital Ratio Financing costs Lending spreads 
Beta (Ratio equity 
of banks 
compared to total 
market) Total Credit 
Credit demand   -  - 
Credit supply  + + - - 
Bank capital + - + - - 
 
6.2. Banks’ responses to a capital shock 
 
Figure 6.1 reports the aggregate responses of capital ratios, total credit to the non-financial private 
sector, lending spreads, financing costs, and market risk following a non- nticipated increase of 1pp 
in the sy tem-wide ba k capital ratio. A positive apital shock increases ba ks’ solvency, pushes us 
their lending spreads and depress credit volumes. I  contrast, a credit supply hock i  associ ted with 
an i crease in banks’ funding costs and has on r  more negative effects on credit and lending 
rates. Following th  latter, capital ratios barely move. 
 
On i pact, a 1pp increase in capital ratios corr sponds to a contraction in total credit which ranges 
betwe n 1 and 3pp dependin  on the country. The results are even more diverse regarding the 
response of lending spreads and GDP growth. In Table 6.2 we present the median and selected 
percentiles of the distribution of country-level impulse response function to bank capital shocks. 
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conventional monetary policy would likely imply an increase of the stock market evaluation of banks (i.e. the sign of the 
shock on the beta would be positive on impact) rather than a reduction. 
These are mostly large banks experience an increase in Tier1 capital ratio (Figure 6.2). Composition 
effects may explain why the aggregate capital ratio moves consistently with the developments for 
largest banks in the sample, irrespectively of trends followed by other banks.  A positive bank capital 
shock leads to a reduction in assets and credit to the non-financial private sector for most banks. A 
substantial share of banks also reports an increase in capital.  In comparison to a bank capital shock, a 
negative credit supply shock tends to erode banks’ equity (see Appendix E). Also the mortgage credit 
is differently affected by the two shocks.  
 
Figure 6.2: IRFs of bank-level micro variables to a one standard deviation increase in aggregate bank capital  
 
Legend: Large banks include mostly G-SII and O-SII banks. Figures are constructed on the basis of median responses of bank-level variables from the country models. All IRFs 
correspond with the behaviour of standardised variables on a cumulative basis. Red (blue) broken line marks the median response, and dark red (blue) fan represent 50% and light red 
(blue)  68% of the distribution of median responses of bank-level variables of G-SII and O-SII (other) banks. Solid black line marks the median response for the full sample of banks. 
 
 
6.3. Conditional simulations for the costs of bank capital 
Using the estimates reported above, we ask how much credit and GDP are negatively affected by a 
1pp gradual increase in bank capital over a continuous phasing-in period of 12 quarters. The capital 
increase of 1 pp is assumed to be permanent and phased in gradually and by an equal amount each 
quarter over a 3-year schedule. We apply the algorithm of Waggoner and Zha (1998) for conditional 
simulations and present the results as deviations from the baseline which would have prevailed 
without shocks. 19 
 
                                                          
19 In the case of Belgium we renormalized the shock to take into account that the target capital ratio is expressed by capital 
over total (unweighted) assets by applying a renormalisation factor of 35%, which corresponds to the average ratio of risk 
weighted assets over assets in the sample. 
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Figure 6.1: Median IRFs of standardised macrovariables to a one standard deviation increase of aggregate bank 
capital versus a one standard deviation negative shock to credit supply 
 
 
Legend: Figures are constructed on the basis of median responses of macrovariables from the country models. All IRFs correspond with the behaviour of standardised variables on a 
cumulative basis. Solid line marks the median euro area weighted average response (nominal GDP weights). Dark blue fan represents 50% and light blue 68% of the distribution of median 
responses of macrovariables on a country level. The capital ratio represents changes in the Tier1 ratio, financing costs are represented by log-changes of average CDS in an economy or 
spread between deposit rate and euribor3m; Lending spreads are measured by the difference between lending rates and deposit rates, except for France where the weighted spread between 
the MIR rate for new NFC loans and the swap rate with a maturity corresponding to the loan category initial period of rate fixation, and Spain where the difference between lending rates 
and a composite risk free rate, are used. Market risk is the ratio between the country-specific banking stock index and the overall stock index. Total credit stands for total credit to the 
private sector, sum of households’ credit and credit to NFCs 
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increase of 1 pp is assumed to be permanent and phased in gradually and by an equal amount each 
quarter over a 3-year schedule. We apply the algorithm of Waggoner and Zha (1998) for conditional 
simulations and present the results as deviations from the baseline which would have prevailed 
without shocks. 19 
 
                                                          
19 In the case of Belgium we renormalized the shock to take into account that the target capital ratio is expressed by capital 
over total (unweighted) assets by applying a renormalisation factor of 35%, which corresponds to the average ratio of risk 
weighted assets over assets in the sample. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 33 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1923
These are mostly large banks experience an increase in Tier1 capital ratio (Figure 6.2). Composition 
effects may explain why the aggregate capital ratio moves consistently with the developments for 
largest banks in the sample, irrespectively of trends followed by other banks.  A positive bank capital 
shock leads to a reduction in assets and credit to the non-financial private sector for most banks. A 
substantial share of banks also reports an increase in capital.  In comparison to a bank capital shock, a 
negative credit supply shock tends to erode banks’ equity (see Appendix E). Also the mortgage credit 
is differently affected by the two shocks.  
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Figure 6.4: Conditional projection of credit to the non-financial private sector, lending spreads, GDP, and the 
system-wide Tier1 capital ratio for a 100-basis point gradual increase in the Tier1 capital ratio over a 12 quarter 
horizon. 
 Legend: Cumulated deviations from the baseline, pp and basis points. Solid line marks the median euro area weighted average response (nominal GDP weights). Dark blue fan 
represents 50% and light blue 68% of the distribution of median responses of macrovariables on a country level.  
 
The simulation results reveal substantial cross-country heterogeneity (Figure 6.4). Banks in Belgium, 
France and Portugal show a limited reduction in credit, standing between 1 and 3pp below baseline at 
the end of the three-year horizon. Banks in Italy reduce their credit volumes more sharply by over 4pp 
at the end of the horizon.  
When looking at GDP results, the ordering of countries differs. In Portugal, the relationship between 
credit and GDP is less than one (i.e. for a 1% reduction in total credit the corresponding fall of GDP is 
about 1.5%), while in other countries credit contracts sharper than GDP. Taking all estimates together, 
Italy and Portugal show the most profound fall in economic activity, while countries such as France 
and Spain are intermediary cases. In the case of Belgium, the persistence of the effect of capital 
shocks on GDP is so limited that the fall of economic activity is almost negligible at the end of the 
horizon. In Ireland and Lithuania GDP actually increases. For Lithuania, this reflects the recent 
deleveraging process: a reduction of credit amid economic activity increases; for Ireland the effect 
may relate to the recent recapitalisation of the banking system. 
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7. Costs of capital-based macroprudential regulation: bank-level identification 
 
In this section, we identify capital shocks by a set of sign restrictions imposed directly on bank-level 
variables. Bank-level identification scheme allows us to pin down a capital shock to an individual 
bank or a selected subset of banks. As we next show, this allows not only replicating system-wide 
(‘carpet’) regulation which applies to all banks in the sample but also evaluating the costs of capital 
buffers imposed on individual banks (i.e. O-SII or G-SII buffers). 
Identification of a capital shock as an increase in the aggregate capital ratio can hide relevant 
information on the capitalisation of individual banks in the system. This problem will be the more 
pronounced, the less co-movement in bank-level capitalisation measures we observed in the sample. It 
may also pose interpretational challenges in policy exercises where we assume that capital buffers 
increase for all banks in the system (such as in the case of countercyclical capital buffer, CCyB).  
In the section, we also identify two types of bank adjustments leading to an increase in their solvency 
rates: deleveraging and ‘beefing-up’ capital. By doing so, we can describe the differences between the 
two modes of adjustments regarding the impact of an increase in bank capitalisation on bank lending 
activity, and macroeconomic outcomes. 
In reaction to an increase in capital requirements banks can raise their equity either by retaining 
earnings or by issuing new equity instead of deleveraging. Such a shift from debt to equity financing 
may increase the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) for banks. First, deposit insurance makes 
deposit financing cheaper by lowering the risk borne by deposit holders. Second, as interest payments 
on debt are tax-deductible, whereas return on equity is not, an implicit wedge arises between the costs 
of financing through debt versus equity.  In imperfectly competitive markets, banks may make up for 
higher financing costs by increasing their lending spreads (the spread between the rate at which they 
lend and the average cost at which they finance themselves). Thus, higher financing costs can pass 
through into an increase in interest rates for firms and consumers and reduced demand for loans. 
Between 2009 and 2013 banks used a mix of deleveraging and equity financing to meet higher capital 
requirements. The evidence collected by Cohen and Scatigna (2014) shows that euro area based banks 
not only adjusted their risk-weighted and total assets downwards but also increased equity. Banks 
based in the US and other European countries increased assets (which lowered capital ratios) and 
achieved higher capital ratios by raising capital holdings. Two-thirds of increases in equity holdings 
relate to earnings retention, the remaining third to issuing new equity. 
 
7.1. A FAVAR model with a bank-level identification of structural shocks 
We extend the benchmark model from Section 3 to allow the identification of two types of structural 
shocks involving an increase in bank-level capital ratios (Table 7.1). Structural shocks to aggregate 
demand, supply and real estate prices are likely to capture credit demand developments (i.e. play a 
similar role as a credit demand shock in the previous section). A structural shock to a capital ratio 
accommodated via a reduction of assets is assumed to lead to an increase in bank-level capital ratios 
and a decrease in bank-level total assets. In contrast, a ‘beefing up capital’ shock is assumed to trigger 
an increase in both bank-level capital ratios and bank-level capital volumes. Both types of capital 
shocks reduce funding costs of banks, which is captured by a series of negative sign restrictions on 
bank-level deposit margins and bank-level CDS. Last, both types of shocks are expected to increase 
the costs of credit to the non-financial private sector (lending margins) and reduce banks’ value (stock 
prices). 
 
Table 7.1: Identification of structural shocks via sign and zero restrictions 
Legend: If not marked otherwise all restrictions refer to the contemporaneous impact on a variable. A funding shock has been specified only in the Dutch model. Sign restrictions on bank-
level CDS have been imposed in the Dutch and French models, whereas the restrictions on beta have been imposed only in the Dutch model.  
We allow a certain degree of flexibility while specifying country models. In cases where we 
expect that bank funding distortions played an essential role in the sample period, we add a 
bank-level funding shock to the model (which links to a credit supply shock in the previous 
section). Following a positive bank funding shock, the costs of bank funding increase (CDS 
and deposit rates), bank assets are reduced, lending rates increase, and the price of banks’ 
equity (and banks’ profits) falls.  
To illustrate the effects of system-wide capital regulation we identify the two capital shocks 
under the assumption that each of them contemporaneously affects at least 80% of banks in 
the sample. This assumption corresponds with the effects of any ‘carpet’ regulation such as 
Shock GDP 
General 
price 
level 
Residenti
al 
property 
prices 
Commerc
ial 
property 
prices 
Bank-
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Tier1 
capital 
Bank-
level total 
assets 
Bank-
level 
deposit 
margins 
Bank-
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lending 
margins 
Bank-
level CDS 
Bank-
level beta 
Aggregate demand + +          
Aggregate supply + -          
Housing demand 0 0 + 0        
Commercial real estate 
demand 
0 0 0 +        
Bank-level capital 
shock (adjusting 
assets) 
0    +  - - + - - 
Bank-level capital 
shock (‘beefing-up’) 
0    + + + - + - - 
Bank-level funding 
shock 
0      - + + + - 
 
CCyB or system-wide Structural Risk Buffer (SRB). Permitting 20% banks not to adjust 
capital buffers immediately after the shock reflects that even in the past system-wide 
regulatory capital increases may have failed to triggered adjustment of some banks, e.g. 
because of their substantial voluntary buffers at the onset.  
Figure 7.1 builds an intuition about the relative role of two types of capital shocks in the 
sample period. It supports the notion that two kinds of shocks played a significant role in the 
sample period, often acting in the same direction.     
 Figure 7.1: Median standardised capital shocks in the sample 
Legend: For each period, charts illustrate the median size of structural shocks to bank capital resulting in deleveraging versus capital increases. Blue bars in positive area stand for an 
increase in capital ratio which causes banks to deleverage. Red bars in positive area mean an increase in capital ratio which are coupled with the accumulation of capital. Units on Y-axis 
are the multiples of the standard deviation of each shock.  
 
7.2. Banks’ responses to a capital shock involving an adjustments in bank assets versus beefing-
up of capital 
Figures 7.2 and 7.3 report the impact of the two capital shocks affecting at least 80% of banks in the 
sample on bank-level variables. Banks that increase their capitalisation by deleveraging experience a 
substantial and prolonged reduction in total assets and credit to the non-financial private sector. In 
Spain, Italy and Portugal, there is also an apparent increase in non-performing loan ratio, possibly 
reflecting adverse second-round effects or reflecting the fact that the recent reduction in banks’ assets 
in these countries occurred during periods of economic recession. 
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CCyB or system-wide Structural Risk Buffer (SRB). Permitting 20% banks not to adjust 
capital buffers immediately after the shock reflects that even in the past system-wide 
regulatory capital increases may have failed to triggered adjustment of some banks, e.g. 
because of their substantial voluntary buffers at the onset.  
Figure 7.1 builds an intuition about the relative role of two types of capital shocks in the 
sample period. It supports the notion that two kinds of shocks played a significant role in the 
sample period, often acting in the same direction.     
 Figure 7.1: Median standardised capital shocks in the sample 
Legend: For each period, charts illustrate the median size of structural shocks to bank capital resulting in deleveraging versus capital increases. Blue bars in positive area stand for an 
increase in capital ratio which causes banks to deleverage. Red bars in positive area mean an increase in capital ratio which are coupled with the accumulation of capital. Units on Y-axis 
are the multiples of the standard deviation of each shock.  
 
7.2. Banks’ responses to a capital shock involving an adjustments in bank assets versus beefing-
up of capital 
Figures 7.2 and 7.3 report the impact of the two capital shocks affecting at least 80% of banks in the 
sample on bank-level variables. Banks that increase their capitalisation by deleveraging experience a 
substantial and prolonged reduction in total assets and credit to the non-financial private sector. In 
Spain, Italy and Portugal, there is also an apparent increase in non-performing loan ratio, possibly 
reflecting adverse second-round effects or reflecting the fact that the recent reduction in banks’ assets 
in these countries occurred during periods of economic recession. 
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(blue)  68% of the distribution of median responses of bank-level variables of G-SII and O-SII (other) banks. Solid black line marks the median response for the full sample of banks. 
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Instead, if banks adjust by beefing up capital, they also persistently increase total assets and credit to 
non-financial private sector. An increase in credit is broad-based, with credit to NFC and households 
growing simultaneously. If banks adjust via issuing equity or retaining profits, we also do not observe 
an increase in the NPLs in the medium-run.  
Otherwise, deleveraging and beefing up of capital trigger similar adjustments in lending margins and 
financing costs of banks. For the majority of banks, profitability improves, lending margins increase, 
while the costs of financing (deposit margins, or in France and Portugal also CDS), go down. 
From a policy perspective, a capital shock that triggers a reduction of assets will deliver an upper 
estimate of economic costs of stricter capital regulation. A capital shock absorbed by retaining profits 
or issuing equity by banks (and at least initially no reduction in assets) provides, in turn, a bottom 
estimate of the economic costs. Disentangling the two shocks provides the estimate of a full range of 
possible economic outcomes. 
 
7.3. Aggregate responses to a capital shock involving an adjustment in bank assets versus 
beefing-up of capital 
The principal way along which banks choose to increase their capital ratios shapes the 
macroeconomic outcomes. Figure 7.4 shows that if banks adjust to higher capital requirements by 
beefing up of capital, the effect on output is more benign (the lower band for the impact on GDP 
following a beefing-up shock is above the one following a deleveraging shock). The results for 
Belgium, Italy and Portugal drive this pattern. There, if banks reduce their assets, output drops 
sharply, whereas if they beef up their capital volume, output increases (or contracts only very 
moderately in Belgium). Interestingly, for France and Lithuania, output increases under both 
circumstances. 
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CCyB or system-wide Structural Risk Buffer (SRB). Permitting 20% banks not to adjust 
capital buffers immediately after the shock reflects that even in the past system-wide 
regulatory capital increases may have failed to triggered adjustment of some banks, e.g. 
because of their substantial voluntary buffers at the onset.  
Figure 7.1 builds an intuition about the relative role of two types of capital shocks in the 
sample period. It supports the notion that two kinds of shocks played a significant role in the 
sample period, often acting in the same direction.     
 Figure 7.1: Median standardised capital shocks in the sample 
Legend: For each period, charts illustrate the median size of structural shocks to bank capital resulting in deleveraging versus capital increases. Blue bars in positive area stand for an 
increase in capital ratio which causes banks to deleverage. Red bars in positive area mean an increase in capital ratio which are coupled with the accumulation of capital. Units on Y-axis 
are the multiples of the standard deviation of each shock.  
 
7.2. Banks’ responses to a capital shock involving an adjustments in bank assets versus beefing-
up of capital 
Figures 7.2 and 7.3 report the impact of the two capital shocks affecting at least 80% of banks in the 
sample on bank-level variables. Banks that increase their capitalisation by deleveraging experience a 
substantial and prolonged reduction in total assets and credit to the non-financial private sector. In 
Spain, Italy and Portugal, there is also an apparent increase in non-performing loan ratio, possibly 
reflecting adverse second-round effects or reflecting the fact that the recent reduction in banks’ assets 
in these countries occurred during periods of economic recession. 
 
Figure 7.2: IRFs of standardised bank-level variables to an increase in bank-level capital ratios accommodated via 
adjustment of assets  
Legend: Large banks include mostly G-SII and O-SII banks. Figures are constructed on the basis of median responses of bank-level variables from the country models. All IRFs 
correspond with the behaviour of standardised variables on a cumulative basis. Red (blue) broken line marks the median response, and dark red (blue) fan represent 50% and light red 
(blue)  68% of the distribution of median responses of bank-level variables of G-SII and O-SII (other) banks. Solid black line marks the median response for the full sample of banks. 
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Instead, if banks adjust by beefing up capital, they also persistently increase total assets and credit to 
non-financial private sector. An increase in credit is broad-based, with credit to NFC and households 
growing simultaneously. If banks adjust via issuing equity or retaining profits, we also do not observe 
an increase in the NPLs in the medium-run.  
Otherwise, deleveraging and beefing up of capital trigger similar adjustments in lending margins and 
financing costs of banks. For the majority of banks, profitability improves, lending margins increase, 
while the costs of financing (deposit margins, or in France and Portugal also CDS), go down. 
From a policy perspective, a capital shock that triggers a reduction of assets will deliver an upper 
estimate of economic costs of stricter capital regulation. A capital shock absorbed by retaining profits 
or issuing equity by banks (and at least initially no reduction in assets) provides, in turn, a bottom 
estimate of the economic costs. Disentangling the two shocks provides the estimate of a full range of 
possible economic outcomes. 
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Figure 7.3: IRFs of standardised bank-level variables to an increase in bank-level capital ratios accommodated via 
beefing-up of capital 
 
Legend: Large banks include mostly G-SII and O-SII banks. Figures are constructed on the basis of median responses of bank-level variables from the country models. All IRFs 
correspond with the behaviour of standardised variables on a cumulative basis. Red (blue) broken line marks the median response, and dark red (blue) fan represent 50% and light red 
(blue)  68% of the distribution of median responses of bank-level variables of G-SII and O-SII (other) banks. Solid black line marks the median response for the full sample of banks. 
 
 
Instead, if banks adjust by beefing up capital, they also persistently increase total assets and credit to 
non-financial private sector. An increase in credit is broad-based, with credit to NFC and households 
growing simultaneously. If banks adjust via issuing equity or retaining profits, we also do not observe 
an increase in the NPLs in the medium-run.  
Otherwise, deleveraging and beefing up of capital trigger similar adjustments in lending margins and 
financing costs of banks. For the majority of banks, profitability improves, lending margins increase, 
while the costs of financing (deposit margins, or in France and Portugal also CDS), go down. 
From a policy perspective, a capital shock that triggers a reduction of assets will deliver an upper 
estimate of economic costs of stricter capital regulation. A capital shock absorbed by retaining profits 
or issuing equity by banks (and at least initially no reduction in assets) provides, in turn, a bottom 
estimate of the economic costs. Disentangling the two shocks provides the estimate of a full range of 
possible economic outcomes. 
 
7.3. Aggregate responses to a capital shock involving an adjustment in bank assets versus 
beefing-up of capital 
The principal way along which banks choose to increase their capital ratios shapes the 
macroeconomic outcomes. Figure 7.4 shows that if banks adjust to higher capital requirements by 
beefing up of capital, the effect on output is more benign (the lower band for the impact on GDP 
following a beefing-up shock is above the one following a deleveraging shock). The results for 
Belgium, Italy and Portugal drive this pattern. There, if banks reduce their assets, output drops 
sharply, whereas if they beef up their capital volume, output increases (or contracts only very 
moderately in Belgium). Interestingly, for France and Lithuania, output increases under both 
circumstances. 
 
Figure 7.4: IRFs of standardised bank-level assets to an increase in bank-level capital ratios accommodated via 
beefing-up of capital 
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responses of macrovariables on a country level. 
7.4. The effects of an increase in capital buffers of systematically important institutions (G-SII 
and O-SII) 
To illustrate the merits of bank-level identification of capital shocks, we consider structural shocks 
that result in a selective increase in capital ratios of G-SII and O-SII banks.20 Figure 7.5 illustrates the 
effects of an increase in capital ratios of G-SII and O-SII banks (affecting 80%-100% of G-SII and O-
SII banks included in the sample) accommodated by a reduction in their assets. The capital ratios 
increase and assets decline persistently for most of the systematically important banks. The decline in 
assets is shallower and shorter lasting for Irish and Dutch G-SII and O-SII banks. 
Interestingly, though the capital shock is assumed to affect G-SII and O-SII banks, a share of less 
systematically important banks is also found to increase their capital ratios and reduce assets. It 
reflects the co-movement of bank variables in the sample and corroborates the hypothesis that the 
stronger capital position of larger banks forces smaller banks to improve their capitalisation levels too, 
e.g. out the fear of loss of competitiveness against larger players in the wholesale funding and deposit 
markets.  
                                                          
20 O-SII / G-SII buffers are typically proportional to the size/systemically importance of an institution, which is not reflected 
in our exercise. Furthermore, this exercise does not take into account bank-specific phasing-in periods which are tailored to 
allow banks accommodate increases in regulatory requirements. 
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estimate of the economic costs. Disentangling the two shocks provides the estimate of a full range of 
possible economic outcomes. 
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Figure 7.5: IRFs of standardised bank-level capital volumes to an increase in a capital ratio accommodated via 
adjustment of assets large banks only  
Legend: Large banks include mostly G-SII and O-SII banks. Figures are constructed on the basis of median responses of bank-level variables from the country models. All IRFs 
correspond with the behaviour of standardised variables on a cumulative basis. Red (blue) broken line marks the median response, and dark red (blue) fan represent 50% and light red 
(blue)  68% of the distribution of median responses of bank-level variables of G-SII and O-SII (other) banks. Solid black line marks the median response for the full sample of banks. 
 
8 Conclusions and policy implications 
 
This paper explores the structural FAVAR methodology for modelling the joint behaviour of 
macroeconomic and bank-level variables. The advantage that structural FAVAR models share with 
many other macroeconomic approaches is that they allow for endogenous feedback effects between 
the real economy and banking variables. At the same time, and in contrast to most macroeconomic 
approaches, FAVAR models offer a much richer picture of bank heterogeneity and distributional 
effects of structural shocks. 
 
 
We compared eleven country-level structural FAVAR models, covering a sample of more than a 
hundred banks in the euro area. These country models cover four main types of banking systems 
represented in the euro area. The Italian and Portuguese banking systems are characterised by the 
predominance of ‘traditional’ banks which specialise in the provision of credit to the domestic non-
financial private sector. The Cypriot, Spanish, French and Dutch banking systems have a significant 
share of internationally active banks. The Belgian, Finnish and Irish systems are characterised by a 
non-negligible share of ‘non-traditional’ bank activities, whereas the Lithuanian and Slovenian 
banking system, with their relatively small size compared to country GDP, are representative of 
banking systems in the new EU member states. 
The estimation of FAVAR models involved the construction of eleven comprehensive bank-level 
datasets with different time-series dimensions, going as far back as 1998 for France and, on the other 
side of the spectrum, back to 2010 for Cyprus. The underlying supervisory and monetary data are 
confidential and were often affected by changes in reporting standards. These two factors discouraged 
earlier efforts to build analogous datasets and had to be overcome to complete the present study. The 
scope of the resulting national datasets is largely comparable across countries, though the full 
harmonisation of variable definitions and coverage has not been possible.  
Combining the results from the FAVAR model and the bank-level regressions allows us to validate a 
moderating impact of higher capital buffers on the propagation of business cycle fluctuations into 
banks’ lending. Our empirical results support that high bank capitalisation contributes to building 
banks’ resilience - preventing cuts in credit and the kicking-in of adverse second-round effects.  
We then show that the resilience of euro area banking systems increased over the last decade. Under a 
stylised adverse scenario consisting of a series of negative aggregate demand shocks, banks in 2015 
would reduce their credit to the non-financial private sector 10% less than in 2010, and 20% less than 
if they had maintained 8.5% Tier1 ratio only. It is worth a mention that though statistically intuitive, 
the scenario is not tailored to individual country vulnerabilities. For actual policy exercises, a more 
fine-tuned approach to the design of country-specific scenarios can be warranted. 
The short-term costs of a permanent 1pp increase in banks’ Tier1 capital ratios amount to 1-3% 
reduction in credit to the non-financial private sector. The corresponding output losses amount to 0-
2%. However, we also show that these estimates are likely to be very conservative. An increase in 
capital ratios can have a sharply different impact on credit supply, depending on the way banks adjust 
their assets versus capital. An increase in capital ratios can have an expansionary effect on credit as 
long as most of the banks in the system fit their balance sheets by beefing up capital buffers rather 
than reducing assets. Furthermore, banks are shown to use both ways of adjusting their capital ratios, 
rather than only deleveraging. 
 
The rich set of policy conclusions derived in the paper shows the broad scope of application of 
FAVAR models for financial stability purposes. FAVAR models are flexible and easily extendable. 
Aggregate and bank-level variables can be added to existing specifications, as well as new structural 
shocks, depending on a policy question. For instance, our methodology of cost-benefit assessment is 
also applicable to liquidity-based or real estate policies. The FAVAR accounts for the heterogeneity 
of banks and makes it possible to observe the propagation of common shocks into a cross-section of 
banks. Exploring micro-level dimension of a FAVAR, we also show how structural shocks can be 
defined via a set of bank-level sign restrictions and apply such an identification scheme to delineate 
the effects of an increase in capital buffers of G-SII and O-SII banks. Small and compact, but not 
compromising the endogeneity of macroeconomic and bank-level variables, FAVAR models may also 
complement existing and generally complex top-down stress-test infrastructures, providing a 
relatively detailed picture of the effects of adverse scenarios on bank level outcomes. 
The main caveats of structural FAVAR models for policy applications are concerned with their data 
and sample dependency. First, structural FAVAR models require the construction of a sufficiently 
long and consistent time-series of bank-level variables. Second, rare events or structural breaks in the 
sample period or omitted variables will hinder the correct identification of structural shocks. 
Moreover, the results derived from FAVAR models can project the future only to the extent to which 
past trends are likely to continue. 
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Figure 7.5: IRFs of standardised bank-level capital volumes to an increase in a capital ratio accommodated via 
adjustment of assets large banks only  
Legend: Large banks include mostly G-SII and O-SII banks. Figures are constructed on the basis of median responses of bank-level variables from the country models. All IRFs 
correspond with the behaviour of standardised variables on a cumulative basis. Red (blue) broken line marks the median response, and dark red (blue) fan represent 50% and light red 
(blue)  68% of the distribution of median responses of bank-level variables of G-SII and O-SII (other) banks. Solid black line marks the median response for the full sample of banks. 
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We compared eleven country-level structural FAVAR models, covering a sample of more than a 
hundred banks in the euro area. These country models cover four main types of banking systems 
represented in the euro area. The Italian and Portuguese banking systems are characterised by the 
predominance of ‘traditional’ banks which specialise in the provision of credit to the domestic non-
financial private sector. The Cypriot, Spanish, French and Dutch banking systems have a significant 
share of internationally active banks. The Belgian, Finnish and Irish systems are characterised by a 
non-negligible share of ‘non-traditional’ bank activities, whereas the Lithuanian and Slovenian 
banking system, with their relatively small size compared to country GDP, are representative of 
banking systems in the new EU member states. 
The estimation of FAVAR models involved the construction of eleven comprehensive bank-level 
datasets with different time-series dimensions, going as far back as 1998 for France and, on the other 
side of the spectrum, back to 2010 for Cyprus. The underlying supervisory and monetary data are 
confidential and were often affected by changes in reporting standards. These two factors discouraged 
earlier efforts to build analogous datasets and had to be overcome to complete the present study. The 
scope of the resulting national datasets is largely comparable across countries, though the full 
harmonisation of variable definitions and coverage has not been possible.  
Combining the results from the FAVAR model and the bank-level regressions allows us to validate a 
moderating impact of higher capital buffers on the propagation of business cycle fluctuations into 
banks’ lending. Our empirical results support that high bank capitalisation contributes to building 
banks’ resilience - preventing cuts in credit and the kicking-in of adverse second-round effects.  
We then show that the resilience of euro area banking systems increased over the last decade. Under a 
stylised adverse scenario consisting of a series of negative aggregate demand shocks, banks in 2015 
would reduce their credit to the non-financial private sector 10% less than in 2010, and 20% less than 
if they had maintained 8.5% Tier1 ratio only. It is worth a mention that though statistically intuitive, 
the scenario is not tailored to individual country vulnerabilities. For actual policy exercises, a more 
fine-tuned approach to the design of country-specific scenarios can be warranted. 
The short-term costs of a permanent 1pp increase in banks’ Tier1 capital ratios amount to 1-3% 
reduction in credit to the non-financial private sector. The corresponding output losses amount to 0-
2%. However, we also show that these estimates are likely to be very conservative. An increase in 
capital ratios can have a sharply different impact on credit supply, depending on the way banks adjust 
their assets versus capital. An increase in capital ratios can have an expansionary effect on credit as 
long as most of the banks in the system fit their balance sheets by beefing up capital buffers rather 
than reducing assets. Furthermore, banks are shown to use both ways of adjusting their capital ratios, 
rather than only deleveraging. 
We compared eleven country-level structural FAVAR models, covering a sample of more than a 
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stylised adverse scenario consisting of a series of negative aggregate demand shocks, banks in 2015 
would reduce their credit to the non-financial private sector 10% less than in 2010, and 20% less than 
if they had maintained 8.5% Tier1 ratio only. It is worth a mention that though statistically intuitive, 
the scenario is not tailored to individual country vulnerabilities. For actual policy exercises, a more 
fine-tuned approach to the design of country-specific scenarios can be warranted. 
The short-term costs of a permanent 1pp increase in banks’ Tier1 capital ratios amount to 1-3% 
reduction in credit to the non-financial private sector. The corresponding output losses amount to 0-
2%. However, we also show that these estimates are likely to be very conservative. An increase in 
capital ratios can have a sharply different impact on credit supply, depending on the way banks adjust 
their assets versus capital. An increase in capital ratios can have an expansionary effect on credit as 
long as most of the banks in the system fit their balance sheets by beefing up capital buffers rather 
than reducing assets. Furthermore, banks are shown to use both ways of adjusting their capital ratios, 
rather than only deleveraging. 
 
The rich set of policy conclusions derived in the paper shows the broad scope of application of 
FAVAR models for financial stability purposes. FAVAR models are flexible and easily extendable. 
Aggregate and bank-level variables can be added to existing specifications, as well as new structural 
shocks, depending on a policy question. For instance, our methodology of cost-benefit assessment is 
also applicable to liquidity-based or real estate policies. The FAVAR accounts for the heterogeneity 
of banks and makes it possible to observe the propagation of common shocks into a cross-section of 
banks. Exploring micro-level dimension of a FAVAR, we also show how structural shocks can be 
defined via a set of bank-level sign restrictions and apply such an identification scheme to delineate 
the effects of an increase in capital buffers of G-SII and O-SII banks. Small and compact, but not 
compromising the endogeneity of macroeconomic and bank-level variables, FAVAR models may also 
complement existing and generally complex top-down stress-test infrastructures, providing a 
relatively detailed picture of the effects of adverse scenarios on bank level outcomes. 
The main caveats of structural FAVAR models for policy applications are concerned with their data 
and sample dependency. First, structural FAVAR models require the construction of a sufficiently 
long and consistent time-series of bank-level variables. Second, rare events or structural breaks in the 
sample period or omitted variables will hinder the correct identification of structural shocks. 
Moreover, the results derived from FAVAR models can project the future only to the extent to which 
past trends are likely to continue. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Comparison of bank-level datasets 
The supervisory reporting was developed to monitor risk to which a bank is exposed and to assess the 
adequacy of its capital given these risks. It has been initially developed independently in each 
jurisdiction leading to datasets heterogeneity in terms of: (i) timespan (some countries have been 
using supervisory reporting since the 1980s while others started in the early 2000s), (ii) frequency 
(which can differ across countries for the same type of information, and across variables for the same 
country), (iii) consolidation level, and (iv) type of reporting institutions (some focus only on credit 
institutions, while others include a broader scope of entities). The granularity of the information 
collected could also vary across countries, as well as in time. Finally, the accounting standards used 
for the different templates could exhibit some country specificities.   
In parallel to the country-specific reporting, a harmonised reporting system has been established at the 
EU level.  Different types of reporting have emerged, and among them, two have been extensively 
used in this study: the reporting requirements relating to financial information compliant with 
international accounting standards (FINREP), and the one on own funds and requirements (COREP), 
both starting in 2007. Credit institutions subject to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
are required to use FINREP templates to submit consolidated financial information in a harmonised 
format. Moreover, all credit institutions and investment firms (according to the CRR definition) are 
required to report COREP templates. Both reporting standards, in particular, COREP, have been 
evolving since their establishment and are currently being reported on a quarterly basis.  
The Balance Sheet Statistics (BSI) type datasets were developed to monitor monetary liabilities and 
credit extended by monetary financial institutions. The emphasis is put on the counterparties (on who 
borrows the money) of credit institutions rather than on the institutions themselves because it is their 
spending and saving decisions which influence economic developments. The data are commonly 
reported on a monthly basis and cover all resident monetary financial institutions.  
Although statistical and supervisory reporting has much in common, different objectives limit their 
comparability. One of the main differences concerns the consolidation level of the reported data. 
Under monetary policy oriented reporting, institutions report their activity in the reference country 
and exclude the operation of their foreign subsidiaries and branches; under supervisory reporting, 
institutions may include their cross-border and cross-sector activities. Cross-border means that data on 
branches and subsidiaries located outside the domestic market are included in the data reported by the 
parent institution. Cross-sector means that branches and subsidiaries of banks that can be classified as 
non-bank financial institutions are also included (except insurance corporations).  
Another critical difference is the scope of the reported information. While information on loans to the 
private sector, deposits, and other major balance sheet items are available under both types of 
reporting schemes, variables related to concepts such as asset quality, prudential and solvency 
indicators are included only in supervisory reporting. Finally, rules concerning the valuation of assets 
and liabilities, the timing of recording of transactions, and whether or not certain items are recorded 
on the balance sheet, may differ between supervisory and statistical standards, and across supervisory 
reports. 
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Table A.1: Comparison of bank-level datasets 
 
 Supervisory dataset 
Individual BSI type of datasets 
(monetary policy purposes) Individual MIR (interest rates) Other 
BE The Common Reporting (COREP) framework is 
used to collect data on Tier1 capital from 2008 
onwards.  
Individual banks' balance sheet items (also 
called "Scheme A" in Belgium) are used to 
collect data on bank credit to non-financial 
corporations (NFCs) and households, 
non-performing loans, profits, provisions, 
and total assets. Historical capital data are 
drawn from Scheme A. 
Individual MFI Interest Rate (iMIR) 
data for bank-level lending rates. 
- 
CY FINREP (2010-2015) - Individual MFI Interest Rate (iMIR) 
data for bank-level lending and 
deposit rates. 
- 
ES Balance sheets and income statements, as well 
as complementary files, that individual banks 
(non-consolidated) report to the Banco de 
España.  
- - - 
FI FIN-FSA supervisory database based on the 
COREP/FINREP framework. 
- - - 
FR BAFI (1998-2010), SURFI (2010-onwards) for 
solo data; 
BAFI (1998-2007) and FINREP (2007-onwards) 
for consolidated accounting data; 
BAFI (1998-2007) and COREP (2007-onwards) 
for consolidated prudential data. 
- Individual MFI Interest Rate (iMIR) 
data for bank-level lending and 
deposit rates. 
GEA and REGAFI databases for 
changes and mergers and 
acquisitions. Public data from the 
annual reports were used for 
additional corrections (mainly to 
correct few large securitization 
events, and changes in accounting 
norms). 
IE The banking data are taken from the Central 
Bank of Ireland’s Macro Prudential monitoring 
return including loan, borrower and collateral 
data. 
The banking data are taken from the 
Central Bank of Ireland’s Macro Prudential 
monitoring return including loan, borrower 
and collateral data. 
Individual MFI Interest Rate (iMIR) 
data for bank-level lending rates. 
Non-Performing loan data is taken 
from the Quarterly Summary 
Financial Return database (QSFR) 
IT The bank data are taken from Bank of Italy 
supervisory database, which includes data on 
prudential, financial and accounting information. 
The bank data are taken from Bank of Italy 
supervisory database, which includes 
together both data collected basically for 
monetary policy purposes i.e. BSI . 
The bank data are taken from Bank 
of Italy supervisory database, which 
includes together both data collected 
basically for monetary policy 
purposes i.e. MIR statistics.  
N/A 
LT Other bank-level variables (Total assets, 
operating profit, Impairments on loans, 
provisions, CAR) are taken from individual bank 
financial reports (FINREP/COREP). 
N/A Information on bank-level new loan 
levels and new loan interest rates are 
taken from Monetary Financial 
Institutions (MFI) Interest Rates on 
Loans and Deposits Statistics. 
N/A 
NL Supervisory reports equivalent to 
FINREP/COREP reports are used to collect 
bank-level data on total assets, capital, 
regulatory capital, net operating income, 
impairments. 
The Monetary and Financial Statistics 
covers credit to non-financial privat sector. 
Individual MFI Interest Rate (iMIR) 
data for bank-level lending and 
deposit rates. 
 
PT Supervisory reports equivalent to the new 
FINREP/COREP reports are used to collect 
bank-level data on total assets, capital, 
regulatory capital, net operating income, 
impairments and loan to deposits ratio between 
2000 and 2013. 
 
FINREP/COREP reports are used to collect the 
same information from 2014 onwards. 
The Monetary and Financial Statistics 
database compiled by Banco de Portugal 
covers balance-sheet items. 
The Monetary and Financial 
Statistics database compiled by 
Banco de Portugal covers interest 
rates relating loans and deposits of 
monetary financial institutions. 
N/A 
SI Data are collected from a Bank of Slovenia 
database that draws aggragated, solo (non-
consolidated) bank level variables from Bank of 
Slovenia supervisory databases. 
- Individual MFI Interest Rate (iMIR) 
data for bank-level lending and 
deposit rates. 
- 
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Table A
.1: Com
parison of bank-level datasets 
  
Supervisory dataset 
Individual B
SI type of datasets 
(m
onetary policy purposes) 
Individual M
IR
 (interest rates) 
O
ther 
B
E 
The C
om
m
on R
eporting (C
O
R
EP) fram
ew
ork is 
used to collect data on Tier1 capital from
 2008 
onw
ards.  
Individual banks' balance sheet item
s (also 
called "Schem
e A" in Belgium
) are used to 
collect data on bank credit to non-financial 
corporations (N
FC
s) and households, 
non-perform
ing loans, profits, provisions, 
and total assets. H
istorical capital data are 
draw
n from
 Schem
e A. 
Individual M
FI Interest R
ate (iM
IR
) 
data for bank-level lending rates. 
- 
C
Y 
FIN
R
EP (2010-2015) 
- 
Individual M
FI Interest R
ate (iM
IR
) 
data for bank-level lending and 
deposit rates. 
- 
ES 
Balance sheets and incom
e statem
ents, as w
ell 
as com
plem
entary files, that individual banks 
(non-consolidated) report to the Banco de 
España.  
- 
- 
- 
FI 
FIN
-FSA supervisory database based on the 
C
O
R
EP/FIN
R
EP fram
ew
ork. 
- 
- 
- 
FR
 
BAFI (1998-2010), SU
R
FI (2010-onw
ards) for 
solo data; 
BAFI (1998-2007) and FIN
R
EP (2007-onw
ards) 
for consolidated accounting data; 
BAFI (1998-2007) and C
O
R
EP (2007-onw
ards) 
for consolidated prudential data. 
- 
Individual M
FI Interest R
ate (iM
IR
) 
data for bank-level lending and 
deposit rates. 
G
EA and R
EG
AFI databases for 
changes and m
ergers and 
acquisitions. Public data from
 the 
annual reports w
ere used for 
additional corrections (m
ainly to 
correct few
 large securitization 
events, and changes in accounting 
norm
s). 
IE 
The banking data are taken from
 the C
entral 
Bank of Ireland’s M
acro Prudential m
onitoring 
return including loan, borrow
er and collateral 
data. 
The banking data are taken from
 the 
C
entral Bank of Ireland’s M
acro Prudential 
m
onitoring return including loan, borrow
er 
and collateral data. 
Individual M
FI Interest R
ate (iM
IR
) 
data for bank-level lending rates. 
N
on-Perform
ing loan data is taken 
from
 the Q
uarterly Sum
m
ary 
Financial R
eturn database (Q
SFR
) 
IT 
The bank data are taken from
 Bank of Italy 
supervisory database, w
hich includes data on 
prudential, financial and accounting inform
ation. 
The bank data are taken from
 Bank of Italy 
supervisory database, w
hich includes 
together both data collected basically for 
m
onetary policy purposes i.e. BSI . 
The bank data are taken from
 Bank 
of Italy supervisory database, w
hich 
includes together both data collected 
basically for m
onetary policy 
purposes i.e. M
IR
 statistics.  
N
/A 
LT 
O
ther bank-level variables (Total assets, 
operating profit, Im
pairm
ents on loans, 
provisions, C
AR
) are taken from
 individual bank 
financial reports (FIN
R
EP/C
O
R
EP). 
N
/A 
Inform
ation on bank-level new
 loan 
levels and new
 loan interest rates are 
taken from
 M
onetary Financial 
Institutions (M
FI) Interest R
ates on 
Loans and D
eposits Statistics. 
N
/A 
N
L 
Supervisory reports equivalent to 
FIN
R
EP/C
O
R
EP reports are used to collect 
bank-level data on total assets, capital, 
regulatory capital, net operating incom
e, 
im
pairm
ents. 
The M
onetary and Financial Statistics 
covers credit to non-financial privat sector. 
Individual M
FI Interest R
ate (iM
IR
) 
data for bank-level lending and 
deposit rates. 
 
PT 
Supervisory reports equivalent to the new
 
FIN
R
EP/C
O
R
EP reports are used to collect 
bank-level data on total assets, capital, 
regulatory capital, net operating incom
e, 
im
pairm
ents and loan to deposits ratio betw
een 
2000 and 2013. 
 
FIN
R
EP/C
O
R
EP reports are used to collect the 
sam
e inform
ation from
 2014 onw
ards. 
The M
onetary and Financial Statistics 
database com
piled by Banco de Portugal 
covers balance-sheet item
s. 
The M
onetary and Financial 
Statistics database com
piled by 
Banco de Portugal covers interest 
rates relating loans and deposits of 
m
onetary financial institutions. 
N
/A 
SI 
D
ata are collected from
 a Bank of Slovenia 
database that draw
s aggragated, solo (non-
consolidated) bank level variables from
 Bank of 
Slovenia supervisory databases. 
- 
Individual M
FI Interest R
ate (iM
IR
) 
data for bank-level lending and 
deposit rates. 
- 
Table A.2: Selection and transformations of bank-level balance sheet variables 
 Measures of credit to NFC 
Measures of credit to 
households Bank capital ratio Bank capital volume Banks’ profitability Asset impairments Provisions Banks’ liquidity Assets (and other) 
Transform
ation 
q-o-q growth rate q-o-q growth rate % of total assets/RWA 
q-o-q difference 
q-o-q growth rate % of total assets % of loans 
q-o-q difference 
% of total assets % of deposits q-o-q growth rate 
BE Total outstanding loans to 
NFCs(1) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Long-term outstanding  loans 
to NFCs (initial maturity > 1 
year) (1) (3) (4) (5) 
Total outstanding loans 
to households(1) (3) (4) 
(5) 
 
Long-term outstanding 
loans to households 
(initial maturity > 1 year) 
(1) (3) (4) (5) 
Before 2008: Tier1 type 
of total own funds. After 
2008: Tier1 own funds 
(COREP 1.1) including 
eligible capital, eligible 
reserves, funds for 
general banking risks, 
other country-specific 
original own funds, and 
other deductions from 
original own funds. 
 
Tier1 capital / Total 
assets  
 (Gross profits - 
corrections for ordinary 
banking activities + 
extraordinary profits – 
taxes) / Total assets(6) 
Non-performing loans to 
NFCs / Outstanding 
loans to NFCs 
Non-performing loans to 
households  / 
Outstanding loans to 
households 
Provisions: Net value 
adjustments on loans / 
Total assets(6) 
 Total assets (4) (5) 
 
 
CY Total outstanding loans to 
NFC. Over the period 2013 
Q3 - 2014 Q3 the templates 
change and the data is 
composed of credit facilities 
to corporate legal entities & 
credit facilities to retail legal 
entities. (3) (4) 
 
Outstanding loans to 
households for house 
purchase (3) (4) 
 
Outstanding loans to 
households for 
consumption. During the 
period 2013 Q3 - 2014 
Q3 consist of consumer 
loans, credit cards, 
current accounts and 
credit facilities to sole 
traders (3) (4) 
 
Tier1 capital / RWA: 
total original own funds 
for general solvency 
purposes / (capital 
requirements * 12,5) 
 
Tier1 capital / Total 
assets (excluding 
intangible assets).  
 
Tier1 capital volume: 
total original own funds 
for general solvency 
purposes 
 
Total profit (loss) before 
tax from continuing 
operations / Total assets  
(3) (4) (5) 
 
Non-performing loans to 
NFCs / Outstanding 
loans to NFC. Non- 
performing loans are 
defined according to the 
applicable CBC 
directive at the time until 
December 2014. (3) (4) 
(5) 
 
Non-performing loans to 
households / 
Outstanding loans to 
households. Non- 
performing loans are 
defined according to the 
applicable CBC 
directive at the time until 
December 2014. (3) (4) 
(5)  
 
The net value 
adjustment of loans /  
Total assets (3) (4) (5) 
 
 
 Total assets (3) (4) (5) 
 
ES Outstanding loans to NFCs 
incl. outstanding loans to 
individual entrepreneurs (5) 
 
Outstanding housing 
loans to households(5) 
 
Outstanding other 
purpose loans to 
households(5) 
Own funds / Total assets 
(7)  
 
Tier1 capital/RWA 
(consolidated) 
Tier1 capital volume 
(consolidated) 
Profit before taxes / 
Average Total assets 
Non-performing loans to 
NFCs / Outstanding 
loans to NFCs 
 
Non-performing housing 
loans to households / 
Outstanding housing 
loans to households 
Provisions / Total Assets Total loans / Total 
deposits (6) 
Total assets 
FI Total outstanding loans to 
NFCs 
Total outstanding loans 
to households 
Tier1 capital / RWA  
Tier1 capital / Total 
T1 capital volume 
 
Net operating profit / 
Total assets 
Non-performing loans to 
NFCs / Outstanding 
loans to NFCs 
 Total loans / Total 
deposits 
Risk-weighted assets 
volume 
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assets    
Non-performing loans to 
households / 
Outstanding loans to 
households 
 Total assets volume 
Total credit volume 
 
 
FR Short-term outstanding loans 
to NFCs (initial maturity < 1 
year) (4) 
 
Long-term outstanding loans 
to NFCs (initial maturity > 1 
year) (1) (4) 
Outstanding mortgage 
loans to households 
 
Outstanding 
consumption loans to 
households  
Own funds / Total assets 
(2) (5) (8)  
Tier1 capital  / Risk 
weighted assets ) 
Tier1 Capital Volumes Profit net of exceptional 
profit and taxes / Total 
assets (2) 
 
Non-performing loans to 
NFCs / Outstanding 
loans to NFCs 
 
Non-performing loans to 
households / 
Outstanding loans to 
households 
 
Total aggregated solo 
provisions / Total 
consolidated assets 
  
 
 
Total assets, 
consolidated (2) (4) (7) 
 
 
IE Short-term outstanding loans 
to NFCs (initial maturity < 1 
year) (4) 
Long-term outstanding loans 
to NFCs (initial maturity > 1 
year) (4) 
Outstanding mortgage 
loans to households(4) 
 
Outstanding 
consumption loans to 
households(4) 
Tier1 capital / RWA (4)  
 
Tier1 Capital 
Volumes(4) (6) 
 Non-performing loans to 
NFCs / Outstanding 
loans to NFCs(3) (4) 
 
Non-performing loans to 
households / 
Outstanding loans to 
households(3) (4) 
 
 Total Loans / Total 
Deposits(4) (6) 
Total Assets(4) 
IT Outstanding loans to NFCs 
up to EUR 1 mln (8) (9)  
 
Outstanding loans  to NFCs 
over an amount of EUR 1 
mln  
 
Outstanding loans to  
households (8) (9) 
 
 
Own funds/Total assets  
 
CET1 / RWA 
 
Tier1 capital / RWA 
 RoE = Net profits / 
(Capital and reserves) 
(9) 
 
RoA = Net profits / Total 
assets (9) 
Non-performing loans to 
private sector / 
Outstanding loans to 
private sector (9) 
 Total loans to the 
domestic private sector / 
Total deposits and retail 
bonds (Funding gap) (9) 
Log of Total assets (9) 
 
 
LT Total outstanding loans 
(stock) to NFCs (4) (5) 
Outstanding mortgage 
loans to households (4) 
(5) 
 
Outstanding 
consumption and other 
loans to households  (4) 
(5) 
 
Total regulatory capital /  
Risk weighted assets  
Total regulatory capital Operating profit/Total 
assets (4) (6) 
Non-performing loans / 
Total loans to private 
sector (3) (4) 
 
 
 
 
Provisions for loans/ 
Total assets (4)   
 
Loan-to-deposit (6) Total assets  
NL Short-term outstanding loans 
to NFCs (initial maturity < 1 
year) (1) (4) 
 
Long-term outstanding loans 
to NFCs (initial maturity > 1 
year) (1) (4) 
Outstanding mortgage 
loans to households (1) 
(4) 
 
Outstanding 
consumption and other 
loans to households  (1) 
(4) 
 
Tier1 capital / RWA 
 
Tier1 capital / Total 
assets 
 Net operating 
income/Total assets 
Non-performing loans to 
non-financial private 
sector/ Total loans to 
non-financial private 
sector 
 Loan-to-deposit Total assets 
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PT Total outstanding loans to 
NFC (index of notional 
stocks) (1) (3) (4) (5) 
Housing loans to 
households (index of 
notional stocks) (1) (3) 
(4) (5) 
 
Loans to households for 
consumption and other 
purposes incl. loans to 
individual entrepreneurs 
(index of notional 
stocks) (1) (3) (4) (5) 
Tier1 capital /  RWA (3) 
(4) (5)  
 
Regulatory Tier1 capital  
(3) (4) (5) 
Net operating income 
/Total assets (3) (4) (5) 
(6) 
 
Flow of impairments / 
Total assets (3) (4) (5) 
(6) 
 
Non-performing loans to 
NFCs* / Outstanding 
loans to NFCs (4) (5) (6) 
 
Non-performing loans to 
households for housing 
purposes* / Outstanding 
loans to households for 
housing purposes (4) 
(5) (6) 
 
Non-performing loans to 
households for 
consumption and other 
purposes * / 
Outstanding loans to 
households for 
consumption and other 
purposes (4) (5) (6) 
 
*Statistical concept of 
overdue and other 
doubtful loans 
 
 Loans net of 
impairments and 
including securitisations 
over deposits (3) (4) (5) 
(6) 
Total assets (3) (4) (5) 
SI Short-term outstanding loans 
to NFCs (initial maturity < 1 
year) (4) (5) 
 
Long-term outstanding loans 
to NFCs (initial maturity > 1 
year) (4) (5) 
Total outstanding loans 
to households (4) (5) 
 
Tier1 capital /  RWA (3) 
(4) 
Tier1 capital  volume (4) RoA = Net profits / Total 
assets 
 Provisions for loans/ 
Total assets (6) 
Total loans / Total 
deposits (6) 
Total assets (4) (5) 
Legend: If not marked otherwise, all credit volumes are measured by loans outstanding at the end of a quarter, and are included in a model on quarter-on-quarter basis.  (1) Adjusted for write-offs, securitisation and reclassifications, (2) Corrected for changes in accounting 
standards.  (3) Intrapolated for missing observations. (4) Outlier correction. (5) Seasonally adjusted (e.g. X-12 ARIMA) (6) Quarter-on-quarter difference.  (7) Ratio level. (8) Before 2008: Tier1 type of total own funds. After 2008: Tier1 own funds (COREP 1.1) including eligible 
capital, eligible reserves, funds for general banking risks, other country specific original own funds, and other deductions from original own funds.  
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Table A.3: SELECTION AND TRANSFORMATIONS OF OTHER BANK-LEVEL VARIABLES 
Legend: (1) Interest rate on new loans to non-financial private sector are weighted across different initial interest fixation periods. Deposit rate on new deposits to non-financial private 
sector are weighted across different maturities. They cover overnight deposits, deposits redeemable at notice and deposits with agreed maturity; does not include repurchase agreements). 
(2) Deposit rate on new deposits to non-financial private sector are weighted across different maturities, covering overnight deposits, deposits redeemable at notice and deposits with 
agreed maturity; does not include repurchase agreements. EONIA (EMMI EURO OverNight Index Average).  (3) Quarter-on-quarter difference.   
 Lending margin Deposit spreads CDS or similar Beta (stock prices) 
Transformation Level Level Level Level 
BE Interest rate on new loans – Deposit 
rate on new deposits (both to the non-
financial private sector) (1) 
Deposit rate on new deposits to 
non-financial private sector – 
EONIA (2) 
  
CY Interest rate on new loans – Deposit 
rate on new deposits (both to the non-
financial private sector) (1) 
Deposit rate on new deposits to 
non-financial private sector – 
EONIA (2) 
- Bank level Stock Prices /Stock market 
index (Cyprus General Price index) 
 
ES Interest rate on new loans – Deposit 
rate on new deposits (both to the non-
financial private sector) (1) 
Deposit rate on new deposits to 
non-financial private sector – 
EONIA (2) 
- - 
FI Interest rate on new loans – Deposit 
rate on new deposits (both to the non-
financial private sector) (1) 
Deposit rate on new deposits to 
non-financial private sector – 
EONIA (2) 
- - 
FR Interest rate on new loans – Deposit 
rate on new deposits (both to the non-
financial private sector) (1) 
Deposit rate on new deposits to 
non-financial private sector – 
EONIA (2) 
CDS EUR Senior Debt 5-year  
 
Bank Equity Index / Market Equity 
Index 
IE Interest rate on new loans – Deposit 
rate on new deposits (both to the non-
financial private sector) (1) 
Deposit rate on new deposits to 
non-financial private sector – 
EONIA (2) 
- - 
IT Interest rate on new loans – Deposit 
rate on new deposits (both to the non-
financial private sector) (1) 
Deposit rate on new deposits to 
non-financial private sector – 
EONIA (2) 
  
LT Loans interest rate – deposit  interest 
rate 
Deposit interest rate – EONIA (3) 
 
- - 
NL Interest rate on new loans – Deposit 
rate on new deposits (both to the non-
financial private sector) (1) 
Deposit rate on new deposits to 
non-financial private sector – 
EONIA (2) 
- - 
PT Difference between the interest rate on 
new loans (to non-financial private 
sector) and the interest rate on new 
deposits (from non-financial private 
sector) (3) 
Difference between the interest 
rate on new deposits (from non-
financial private sector) and the 
3-month euribor (3) 
CDS EUR Senior Debt 5-year (3) 
 
Bank level Stock Prices /Stock market 
index (3) 
 
SI Interest rate on stock of loans – Deposit 
rate on stock of deposits (both to the 
non-financial private sector) (1) (3) 
Deposit rate on stock of deposits 
to non-financial private sector – 
EONIA (2) (3) 
- - 
 
Table A.4 : OVERVIEW OF BANK-LEVEL VARIABLES IN COUNTRY MODELS  
 
 
BE CY ES FI FR IE IT LT NL PT SI 
Total assets  ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Total lending  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ● ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Measures of credit 
to non-financial 
corporations 
Total outstanding loans ● ● ● ● ○ ○ ○ ● ○ ●* ○ 
         Therein: initial maturity > 1 year ●    ● ●   ●  ● 
          Therein:  Initial maturity < 1 year     ● ●   ●  ● 
         Therein: large       ●     
          Therein:  small       ●     
Measures of credit 
to households 
Total outstanding loans ● ○ ○ ● ○ ○ ● ○ ○ ○ ● 
         Therein: initial maturity > 1 year ●           
          Therein:  Initial maturity < 1 year            
Mortgage loans/loans for housing 
purposes outstanding  
 ● ●  ● ●  ● ● ●*  
Consumption and other loans 
outstanding  
 ● ●  ● ●  ● ● ●*  
Non performing 
loans 
 
Total NPLs / Total outstanding loans  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ● ● ● ○ ● 
NPLs to NFCs / Outstanding loans to 
NFCs 
● ● ● ● ● ●    ●  
NPLs to HHs / Outstanding loans to 
HHs 
● ● ● ● ● ●    ○  
NPLs to HHs (housing) / Outstanding 
loans to HHs (housing) 
         ●  
NPLs to HHs (consumption and other 
purposes) / Outstanding loans to HHs 
(consumption and other purposes) 
         ●  
Impairments on 
loans and 
provisions 
Impairment on loans / Total assets         ● ●  
Provisions / Total assets ● ● ●  ●   ●   ● 
Bank capitalisation Tier1 capital ● ● ●˟ ● ● ● ●  ● ● ● 
Own funds      ●  ●    
Tier1/ Total assets ● ●  ●   ●  ●   
Own funds / Total assets   ●˟˟ ● ● ●      
Tier1/ Total RWAs  ● ●˟ ● ● ●   ● ● ● 
Own funds / RWAs        ●    
Bank liquidity Loan to deposits ratio ●  ● ●  ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Bank profitability Profit net of extr. profit and taxes / Total 
assets 
   ● ●       
Profit before taxes / Total assets  ● ●         
Operating profit / Total assets        ● ● ●  
ROA ●      ●   ●˟ ● 
Interest rates˟  Lending margins to non-financial private 
sector 
● ●  ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Deposit margins for non-financial private 
sector 
 ●  ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Market prices˟ CDS     ● ●    ● (●) ● 
Stock prices (betas)  ●    ●    ● (●)  
Legend: ˟ bank-level variables used only in the estimation of models reported in chapter 10. ˟˟ bank-level variables used only in the estimation of models reported in chapters 7-8. ● 
Variable used in the estimation. ○ An auxiliary variable derived after the estimation. * Index of notional stocks. ** OAS. ** Lending margins on loans to NFC. (●) Variable used in the 
estimation but available only for a subset of banks in a sample.  
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Table A.3: SELECTION AND TRANSFORMATIONS OF OTHER BANK-LEVEL VARIABLES 
Legend: (1) Interest rate on new loans to non-financial private sector are weighted across different initial interest fixation periods. Deposit rate on new deposits to non-financial private 
sector are weighted across different maturities. They cover overnight deposits, deposits redeemable at notice and deposits with agreed maturity; does not include repurchase agreements). 
(2) Deposit rate on new deposits to non-financial private sector are weighted across different maturities, covering overnight deposits, deposits redeemable at notice and deposits with 
agreed maturity; does not include repurchase agreements. EONIA (EMMI EURO OverNight Index Average).  (3) Quarter-on-quarter difference.   
 Lending margin Deposit spreads CDS or similar Beta (stock prices) 
Transformation Level Level Level Level 
BE Interest rate on new loans – Deposit 
rate on new deposits (both to the non-
financial private sector) (1) 
Deposit rate on new deposits to 
non-financial private sector – 
EONIA (2) 
  
CY Interest rate on new loans – Deposit 
rate on new deposits (both to the non-
financial private sector) (1) 
Deposit rate on new deposits to 
non-financial private sector – 
EONIA (2) 
- Bank level Stock Prices /Stock market 
index (Cyprus General Price index) 
 
ES Interest rate on new loans – Deposit 
rate on new deposits (both to the non-
financial private sector) (1) 
Deposit rate on new deposits to 
non-financial private sector – 
EONIA (2) 
- - 
FI Interest rate on new loans – Deposit 
rate on new deposits (both to the non-
financial private sector) (1) 
Deposit rate on new deposits to 
non-financial private sector – 
EONIA (2) 
- - 
FR Interest rate on new loans – Deposit 
rate on new deposits (both to the non-
financial private sector) (1) 
Deposit rate on new deposits to 
non-financial private sector – 
EONIA (2) 
CDS EUR Senior Debt 5-year  
 
Bank Equity Index / Market Equity 
Index 
IE Interest rate on new loans – Deposit 
rate on new deposits (both to the non-
financial private sector) (1) 
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non-financial private sector – 
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LT Loans interest rate – deposit  interest 
rate 
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- - 
PT Difference between the interest rate on 
new loans (to non-financial private 
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sector) (3) 
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rate on stock of deposits (both to the 
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Deposit rate on stock of deposits 
to non-financial private sector – 
EONIA (2) (3) 
- - 
 
Table A.4 : OVERVIEW OF BANK-LEVEL VARIABLES IN COUNTRY MODELS  
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Total lending  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ● ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Measures of credit 
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corporations 
Total outstanding loans ● ● ● ● ○ ○ ○ ● ○ ●* ○ 
         Therein: initial maturity > 1 year ●    ● ●   ●  ● 
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Measures of credit 
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Total outstanding loans ● ○ ○ ● ○ ○ ● ○ ○ ○ ● 
         Therein: initial maturity > 1 year ●           
          Therein:  Initial maturity < 1 year            
Mortgage loans/loans for housing 
purposes outstanding  
 ● ●  ● ●  ● ● ●*  
Consumption and other loans 
outstanding  
 ● ●  ● ●  ● ● ●*  
Non performing 
loans 
 
Total NPLs / Total outstanding loans  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ● ● ● ○ ● 
NPLs to NFCs / Outstanding loans to 
NFCs 
● ● ● ● ● ●    ●  
NPLs to HHs / Outstanding loans to 
HHs 
● ● ● ● ● ●    ○  
NPLs to HHs (housing) / Outstanding 
loans to HHs (housing) 
         ●  
NPLs to HHs (consumption and other 
purposes) / Outstanding loans to HHs 
(consumption and other purposes) 
         ●  
Impairments on 
loans and 
provisions 
Impairment on loans / Total assets         ● ●  
Provisions / Total assets ● ● ●  ●   ●   ● 
Bank capitalisation Tier1 capital ● ● ●˟ ● ● ● ●  ● ● ● 
Own funds      ●  ●    
Tier1/ Total assets ● ●  ●   ●  ●   
Own funds / Total assets   ●˟˟ ● ● ●      
Tier1/ Total RWAs  ● ●˟ ● ● ●   ● ● ● 
Own funds / RWAs        ●    
Bank liquidity Loan to deposits ratio ●  ● ●  ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Bank profitability Profit net of extr. profit and taxes / Total 
assets 
   ● ●       
Profit before taxes / Total assets  ● ●         
Operating profit / Total assets        ● ● ●  
ROA ●      ●   ●˟ ● 
Interest rates˟  Lending margins to non-financial private 
sector 
● ●  ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Deposit margins for non-financial private 
sector 
 ●  ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Market prices˟ CDS     ● ●    ● (●) ● 
Stock prices (betas)  ●    ●    ● (●)  
Legend: ˟ bank-level variables used only in the estimation of models reported in chapter 10. ˟˟ bank-level variables used only in the estimation of models reported in chapters 7-8. ● 
Variable used in the estimation. ○ An auxiliary variable derived after the estimation. * Index of notional stocks. ** OAS. ** Lending margins on loans to NFC. (●) Variable used in the 
estimation but available only for a subset of banks in a sample.  
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Appendix B: Trends in the data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.1: GDP growth rate (year-on-year) Figure B.2: GDP deflator growth rate (year-on-year) 
 
Legend: Real GDP series, chained-linked volumes, or indices.   
 
 
Figure B.3: Nominal growth rate in residential house price 
indices (year-on-year) 
Figure B.4: Nominal growth rate in commercial property price 
indices (year-on-year) 
  
Figure B.5:  Total outstanding assets growth rate (year-on-
year) 
 
Legend: Total assets at the end of a quarter. 
 
 
 
Figure B.9: Provisions as a percentage of total assets 
 
        
 
 
 
Figure B.11: Tier1 (own funds) over total assets: non-RWA 
based concepts 
 
Legend: For France, Ireland and Spain own funds over TA. For the remaining countries T1 
capital over TA.  
  
 
 
Figure B.6: Total outstanding credit issued to NFCs growth 
rate (year-on-year) 
Figure B.7: Mortgage (or for housing purposes) outstanding 
credit issued to households (year-on-year) 
  
Legend: Credit outstanding at the end of a quarter. For Portugal, notional stocks.  
 
Legend: Left hand axis: all countries except Lithuania, right hand side: Lithuania. Credit 
outstanding at the end of a quarter. For Belgium long-term (initial duration above a year) 
household credit. For Portugal notional stocks. 
Figure B.8: Non-performing loans as a percentage of total loans 
to the private sector  
   
 
Legend: For France NPLs net of provisions. 
Figure B.10: Tier1 (own funds) over RWA 
 
 
Legend: For Lithuania own funds over RWA. For the remaining countries T1 capital over RWA.  
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Appendix C: Additional information on the benchmark country models 
Table C.1: Overview of variables in benchmark country models  
Legend: (1) Real GDP, chain-linked volume, seasonally adjusted, log q-o-q. (2) Seasonally adjusted q-o-q. (3)  Belgium: nominal house price index (all dwellings, end of quarter), Italy: 
residential property prices index compiled internally at the Bank of Italy, Portugal: nominal house price index based on sales of newly-built and existing dwellings; all types of dwellings 
(2010=100). All: seasonally adjusted log q-o-q. 
 
Figure C.1. Median IRFs of standardised bank-level variables to a one standard deviation positive residential house 
price shock: large (mostly G-SII and O-SII) banks, other banks, and all banks together 
Legend: Large banks include mostly G-SII and O-SII banks. Figures are constructed on the basis of median responses of bank-level variables from the country models. All IRFs 
correspond with the behaviour of standardised variables on a cumulative basis. Red (blue) broken line marks the median response, and dark red (blue) fan represent 50% and light red 
(blue)  68% of the distribution of median responses of bank-level variables of G-SII and O-SII (other) banks. Solid black line marks the median response for the full sample of banks. 
 
 
 GDP(1) GDP 
deflator(2)  
Property prices Number of 
unobserved 
factors 
Avg. % of 
explained 
variance by 
observed 
variables 
Avg. % of 
explained 
variance by 
unobserved 
factors 
Number of 
lags of 
endogenous 
variables 
Exogeno
us 
variables RRE price 
index(3) 
CRE price 
index(2) 
BE ● ● ●  4 13.0% 28.5% 1 None 
CY ● ● ●  3 33.6% 49.1% 1 None 
ES ● ● ●  2 25.5% 40.4% 1 None 
FI ● ● ● ● 3 12.6% 37.9% 1 None 
FR ● ● ● ● 4 21.7% 35.3% 1 None 
IE ● ● ● ● 5 35.5% 48.6% 1 None 
IT ● ● ●  3 39.3% 13.5% 1 None 
LT ● ● ●  3 34.5% 26.0% 1 Dummy 
2009Q1 
NL ● ● ● ● 4 35.5% 41.7% 1 None 
PT ● ● ●  6 16.4% 41.1% 1 None 
SI ● ● ●  2 20.2% 21.5% 1 None 
 
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 57 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1923
 
Figure C.2. Median IRFs of standardised bank-level variables to a one standard deviation positive commercial 
property price shock: large (mostly G-SII and O-SII) banks, other banks, and all banks together 
Legend: Large banks include mostly G-SII and O-SII banks. Based on the data for Ireland, Finland, France, the Netherlands. Figures are constructed on the basis of median responses of 
bank-level variables from the country models. All IRFs correspond with the behaviour of standardised variables on a cumulative basis. Red (blue) broken line marks the median response, 
and dark red (blue) fan represent 50% and light red (blue)  68% of the distribution of median responses of bank-level variables of G-SII and O-SII (other) banks. Solid black line marks the 
median response for the full sample of banks. Based on the results for four countries: Finland, France, Ireland and the Netherlands. 
Table C.2: The median cumulated effects of a one standard deviation positive aggregate demand shock on GDP, real 
estate prices and credit aggregates a year and two years after the shock 
Legend: ‘EA average’ is the weighted average of country-level outcomes, with weights proportional to nominal country GDP in 2015 for GDP, RRE prices and CRE prices, and nominal 
value of outstanding credit volumes along with BIS statistics at the end of 2015 for credit variables.  
 
 GDP RRE prices CRE prices 
Credit to the non-
financial private 
sector Credit to NFC 
Credit to 
households  
Credit to households 
for housing 
 After a 
year 
After 2 
years 
After a 
year 
After 2 
years 
After a 
year 
After 2 
years 
After a 
year 
After 2 
years 
After a 
year 
After 2 
years 
After a 
year 
After 2 
years 
After a 
year 
After 2 
years 
BE 0.67% 0.64% 1.02% 1.12%   0.35% 0.42% 0.40% 0.52% 0.40% 0.47% 0.36% 0.40% 
CY 0.67% 0.53% 0.51% 0.53%   -0.29% -0.18% -0.42% -0.12% -0.16% -0.15% 0.10% 0.12% 
ES 0.35% 0.40% 0.54% 0.69%   0.17% 0.22% 0.28% 0.36% 0.11% 0.15% 0.15% 0.19% 
FI 0.11% -0.02% -0.23% -0.20% -1.02% -1.30% 0.64% 0.79% 0.89% 1.05% 0.55% 0.69%   
FR 0.11% 0.07% -0.20% -0.34% 0.55% 0.35% 0.12% 0.10% 0.28% 0.33% 0.04% 0.01% 0.02% -0.02% 
IE 0.44% 0.36% -0.73% -1.25% -0.27% -0.62% 0.33% 0.34% 1.10% 1.21% 0.19% 0.18% 0.20% 0.21% 
IT 0.30% 0.37% 0.46% 0.70%   0.21% 0.42% 0.21% 0.40% 0.29% 0.48%   
LT 0.82% 0.92% 1.84% 2.45%   1.53% 2.43% 1.26% 1.98% 1.90% 3.07% 1.91% 3.12% 
NL 0.24% 0.23% 0.08% 0.05% 0.04% 0.08% 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 0.04% 0.00% -0.01% 0.00% -0.01% 
PT 0.38% 0.46% 0.31% 0.30%   0.73% 1.16% 0.68% 1.10% 0.90% 1.41% 0.96% 1.50% 
SI 0.64% 0.59% 0.62% 0.68%   0.42% 0.51% 0.20% 0.39% 0.33% 0.36%   
EA avg. 0.27% 0.27% 0.19% 0.22% 0.14% 0.06% 0.19% 0.26% 0.28% 0.39% 0.17% 0.23% 0.10% 0.12% 
 
Figure C.2. Median IRFs of standardised bank-level variables to a one standard deviation positive commercial 
property price shock: large (mostly G-SII and O-SII) banks, other banks, and all banks together 
Legend: Large banks include mostly G-SII and O-SII banks. Based on the data for Ireland, Finland, France, the Netherlands. Figures are constructed on the basis of median responses of 
bank-level variables from the country models. All IRFs correspond with the behaviour of standardised variables on a cumulative basis. Red (blue) broken line marks the median response, 
and dark red (blue) fan represent 50% and light red (blue)  68% of the distribution of median responses of bank-level variables of G-SII and O-SII (other) banks. Solid black line marks the 
median response for the full sample of banks. Based on the results for four countries: Finland, France, Ireland and the Netherlands. 
Table C.2: The median cumulated ffects of a one standard deviation positive aggregate demand shock on GDP, real 
estate prices and credit aggregates a year and two years after the shock 
Legend: ‘EA average’ is the weighted average of country-level outcomes, with weights proportional to nominal country GDP in 2015 for GDP, RRE prices and CRE prices, and nominal 
value of outstanding credit volumes along with BIS statistics at the end of 2015 for credit variables.  
 
 GDP RRE prices CRE prices 
Credit to the non-
financial private 
sector Credit to NFC 
Credit to 
households  
Credit to households 
for housing 
 After a 
year 
After 2 
years 
After a 
year 
After 2 
years 
After a 
year 
After 2 
years 
After a 
ye r 
After 2 
ye rs 
After a 
year 
After 2 
years 
After a 
year 
After 2 
years 
After a 
y ar 
After 2 
y ars 
BE 0.67% 0.64% 1.02% 1.12%   0.35% 0.42% 0.40% 0.52% 0.40% 0.47% 0.36% 0.40% 
CY 0.67% 0.53% 0.51% 0.53%   -0.29% -0.18% -0.42% -0.12% -0.16% -0.15% 0.10% 0.12% 
ES 0.35% 0.40% 0.54% 0.69%   0.17% 0.22% 0.28% 0.36% 0.11% 0.15% 0.15% 0.19% 
FI 0.11% -0.02% -0.23% -0.20% -1.02% -1.30% 0.64% 0.79% 0.89% 1.05% 0.55% 0.69%   
FR 0.11% 0.07% -0.20% -0.34% 0.55% 0.35% 0.12% 0.10% 0.28% 0.33% 0.04% 0.01% 0.02% -0.02% 
IE 0.44% 0.36% -0.73% -1.25% -0.27% -0.62% 0.33% 0.34% 1.10% 1.21% 0.19% 0.18% 0.20% 0.21% 
IT 0.30% 0.37% 0.46% 0.70%   0.21% 0.42% 0.21% 0.40% 0.29% 0.48%   
LT 0.82% 0.92% 1.84% 2.45%   1.53% 2.43% 1.26% 1.98% 1.90% 3.07% 1.91% 3.12% 
NL 0.24% 0.23% 0.08% 0.05% 0.04% 0.08% 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 0.04% 0.00% -0.01% 0.00% -0.01% 
PT 0.38% 0.46% 0.31% 0.30%   0.73% 1.16% 0.68% 1.10% 0.90% 1.41% 0.96% 1.50% 
SI 0.64% 0.59% 0.62% 0.68%   0.42% 0.51% 0.20% 0.39% 0.33% 0.36%   
EA avg. 0.27% 0.27% 0.19% 0.22% 0.14% 0.06% 0.19% 0.26% 0.28% 0.39% 0.17% 0.23% 0.10% 0.12% 
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Table C.3 The median cumulated effects of a one standard deviation positive shock to residential real estate prices on 
GDP, real estate prices and credit aggregates a year and two years after the shock 
Legend: : ‘EA average’ is the weighted average of country-level outcomes, with weights proportional to nominal country GDP in 2015 for GDP, RRE prices and CRE prices, and nominal 
value of outstanding credit volumes along with BIS statistics at the end of 2015 for credit variables 
Table C.4 Median cumulated effects of a positive shock to commercial real estate prices leading to a cumulated 
increase in country commercial real estate price index by 1% a year after the shock 
Legend: ‘EA average’ is the weighted average of country-level outcomes, with weights proportional to nominal country GDP in 2015 for GDP, RRE prices and CRE prices, and nominal 
value of outstanding credit volumes along with BIS statistics at the end of 2015 for credit variables. 
 
 
 
  
 GDP RRE prices CRE prices 
Credit to the non-
financial private 
sector Credit to NFC 
Credit to 
households  
Credit to households 
for housing 
 After a 
year 
After 2 
years 
After a 
year 
After 2 
years 
After a 
year 
After 2 
years 
After a 
year 
After 2 
years 
After a 
year 
After 2 
years 
After a 
year 
After 2 
years 
After a 
year 
After 2 
years 
BE 0.10% 0.12% 1.36% 1.60%   0.20% 0.23% 0.13% 0.17% 0.27% 0.32% 0.23% 0.26% 
CY -0.45% -0.47% 0.43% 0.27%   0.47% 0.48% 1.32% 1.11% -0.11% -0.04% -0.02% 0.00% 
ES 0.16% 0.21% 1.05% 1.25%   0.08% 0.13% 0.11% 0.19% 0.06% 0.10% 0.06% 0.10% 
FI 0.43% 0.45% 0.86% 0.86% 0.32% 0.21% 0.44% 0.67% 0.34% 0.64% 0.45% 0.67%   
FR 0.10% 0.11% 0.89% 1.16% 0.46% 0.74% 0.31% 0.47% 0.20% 0.41% 0.36% 0.52% 0.43% 0.61% 
IE 0.30% 0.37% 1.82% 1.95% 0.31% 0.71% -0.37% -0.27% -0.80% -0.74% -0.23% -0.15% -0.23% -0.17% 
IT 0.11% 0.19% 0.35% 0.52%   0.03% 0.21% 0.04% 0.18% 0.11% 0.30%   
LT 0.19% 0.37% 2.63% 3.74%   3.07% 4.69% 2.45% 3.74% 3.83% 5.86% 3.92% 5.99% 
NL -0.02% -0.03% 0.72% 0.84% 0.05% 0.10% 0.11% 0.17% 0.07% 0.08% 0.11% 0.15% 0.11% 0.16% 
PT 0.21% 0.25% 0.58% 0.59%   0.03% 0.12% -0.09% 0.00% 0.12% 0.29% 0.15% 0.30% 
SI 0.29% 0.24% 2.30% 2.47%   0.96% 1.09% 1.61% 1.83% 0.45% 0.51%   
EA avg. 0.11% 0.15% 0.80% 1.02% 0.17% 0.28% 0.17% 0.29% 0.13% 0.25% 0.20% 0.32% 0.20% 0.29% 
 GDP RRE prices CRE prices 
Credit to the non-
financial private 
sector Credit to NFC 
Credit to 
households  
Credit to households 
for housing 
 After a 
year 
After 2 
years 
After a 
year 
After 2 
years 
After a 
year 
After 2 
years 
After a 
year 
After 2 
years 
After a 
year 
After 2 
years 
After a 
year 
After 2 
years 
After a 
year 
After 2 
years 
FI 0.85% 0.85% 0.37% 0.32% 2.54% 2.49% 0.10% 0.26% -0.15% 0.20% 0.17% 0.33% 0.15% 0.30% 
FR 0.02% 0.00% -0.20% -0.29% 0.84% 0.80% -0.01% -0.03% 0.03% 0.00% -0.01% -0.06% 0.00% -0.07% 
IE 0.16% 0.33% 0.58% 1.04% 2.27% 2.94% -0.09% -0.05% -0.21% -0.03% -0.07% -0.07% -0.07% 0.00% 
NL -0.08% -0.13% -0.20% -0.40% 0.41% 0.33% 0.13% 0.18% 0.14% 0.19% 0.12% 0.15% 0.11% 0.14% 
EA avg. 0.09% 0.07% -0.15% -0.24% 0.98% 0.95% 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 0.02% 0.01% -0.02% 0.01% -0.03% 
 
Appendix D: Regression results and additional information on benefit assessment  
 
Table D.1.a: Effects of a positive one standard deviation aggregate demand shock (4Q following the shock) 
Legend: t-statistics under parameter estimates. Weighted Leas Square estimates with robust standard errors and observation weights proportional to the percentage of contemporaneous 
variance of variables explained by country models. LARGE – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for large banks (mainly G-SII and O-SII). COOP – a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 for cooperative banks. SAVING – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for savings banks. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.  
Table D.1.b: Effects of a positive one standard deviation aggregate demand shock (4Q following the shock) 
Legend: t-statistics under parameter estimates. Weighted Leas Square estimates with robust standard errors and observation weights proportional to the percentage of contemporaneous 
variance of variables explained by country models. LARGE – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for large banks (mainly G-SII and O-SII). COOP – a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 for cooperative banks. COOP – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for cooperative banks. SAVING – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for savings banks. * p<0.05; 
** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.  
 Credit Credit to NFCs 
 ALL ALL LARGE LARGE OTHER OTHER ALL ALL LARGE LARGE OTHER OTHER 
T1RWA -0.41 -0.50 -3.07 -4.10*** 1.025231 -1.46*** -0.14 2.037*** -3.99 -0.49 1.95* 0.01 
 (-0.49) (-1.74) (-1.53) (-4.50) 1.35) (-4.79) (-0.16) (6.70) (-1.69) -0.51 (2.57) (0.05 
T1RWA^2 1.20 2.21*** 12.10* 18.54*** -1.69 2.88*** -0.42 -2.69*** 14.57*** 11.76*** -3.87* -0.19 
 (0.64) (3.87) (2.20) (6.27) (-1.06 (5.08) (0.20) (5.85) (2.25) (3.75) (-2.36) (-0.40) 
LARGE  0.18***  -  -  0.16***  -  - 
  (12.47)  -  -  (9.52)  -  - 
COOP  -0.02  0.07*  -  -0.30***  -0.22***  - 
  (-0.60)  (2.07)  -  (-7.04)  (-4.58)  - 
SAVING  0.01  -0.02  0.033  -0.07**  -0.01  -0.18*** 
  (0.28)  (0.55)  (1.51)  (-2.34)  (-0.19)  (-7.20) 
COUNTRY 
DUMMIES 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N 116 116 53 53 63 63 112 112 50 50 62 62 
R^2 0.002 0.134 0.061 0.151 0.058 0.078 0.000 0.108 0.069 0.155 0.137 0.023 
 Credit to households Credit to households for mortgage purposes 
 ALL ALL LARGE LARGE OTHER OTHER ALL ALL LARGE LARGE OTHER OTHER 
T1RWA -1.06 -2.28*** -1.60 -3.26** -2.29*** -2.23*** -4.97 -7.42*** -6.29*** -8.18*** 8.12** 8.125** 
 (-1.06) (-7.16) (-1.54) (-3.07) (-7.00) (-6.82) (-1.35) (-6.40) (-4.95) (-6.27) (2.69) 2.69) 
T1RWA^2 2.08 4.72*** 2.13 6.82* 4.80*** 4.69*** 12.53*** 16.42*** 17.17*** 22.87*** -44.17*** - 44.17*** 
 (0.87) (7.31) (0.66) (2.04) (7.35) (7.17) (1.26) (4.86) (4.75) (6.13) (-4.59) (-4.59) 
LARGE  0.08***  -  -  0.11***  -  - 
  (5.19)  -  -  (4.89)  -  - 
COOP  0.10***  0.21***  -  0.16***  0.29***  - 
  (3.35)  (5.69)  -  (4.20)  (5.92)  - 
SAVING  -0.06  -0.03  -0.16***  -0.04  -0.06  - 
  (-1.66)  (-0.48)  (-5.58)  (-0.52)  (-0.93)  - 
COUNTRY 
DUMMIES 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N 113 113 50 50 63 63 53 53 37 37 16 16 
R^2 .01213981 0.143 0.162 0.169 0.084 0.086 0.044 0.128 0.128 0.139 0.150 0.150 
 
Appendix D: Regression results and additional information on benefit assessment  
 
Table D.1.a: Effects of a positive one standard deviation aggregate demand shock (4Q following the shock) 
Legend: t-statistics under parameter estimates. Weighted Leas Square estimates with robust standard errors and observation weights proportional to the percentage of contemporaneous 
variance of variables explained by country models. LARGE – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for large banks (mainly G-SII and O-SII). COOP – a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 for cooperative banks. SAVING – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for savings banks. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.  
Table D.1.b: Effects of a positive one standard deviati n aggregate demand shock (4Q following the shock) 
Legend: t-statistics under parameter estimates. Weighted Leas Square estimates with robust standard errors and observation weights proportional to the percentage of contemporaneous 
variance of variables explained by country models. LARGE – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for large banks (mainly G-SII and O-SII). COOP – a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 for cooperative banks. COOP – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for cooperative banks. SAVING – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for savings banks. * p<0.05; 
** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
 Credit Credit to NFCs 
 ALL ALL LARGE LARGE OTHER OTHER ALL ALL LARGE LARGE OTHER OTHER 
T1RWA -0.41 -0.50 -3.07 -4.10*** 1.025231 -1.46*** -0.14 2.037*** -3.99 -0.49 1.95* 0.01 
 (-0.49) (-1.74) (-1.53) (-4.50) 1.35) (-4.79) (-0.16) (6.70) (-1.69) -0.51 (2.57) (0.05 
T1RWA^2 1.20 2.21*** 12.10* 18.54*** -1.69 2.88*** -0.42 -2.69*** 14.57*** 11.76*** -3.87* -0.19 
 (0.64) (3.87) (2.20) (6.27) (-1.06 (5.08) (0.20) (5.85) (2.25) (3.75) (-2.36) (-0.40) 
LARGE  0.18***  -  -  0.16***  -  - 
  (12.47)  -  -  (9.52)  -  - 
COOP  -0.02  0.07*  -  -0.30***  -0.22***  - 
  (-0.60)  (2.07)  -  (-7.04)  (-4.58)  - 
SAVING  0.01  -0.02  0.033  -0.07**  -0.01  -0.18*** 
  (0.28)  (0.55)  (1.51)  (-2.34)  (-0.19)  (-7.20) 
COUNTRY 
DUMMIES 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N 116 116 53 53 63 63 112 112 50 50 62 62 
R^2 0.002 0.134 0.061 0.151 0.058 0.078 0.000 0.108 0.069 0.155 0.137 0.023 
 Credit to households Credit to households for mortgage purposes 
 ALL ALL LARGE LARGE OTHER OTHER ALL ALL LARGE LARGE OTHER OTHER 
T1RWA -1.06 -2.28*** -1.60 -3.26** -2.29*** -2.23*** -4.97 -7.42*** -6.29*** -8.18*** 8.12** 8.125** 
 (-1.06) (-7.16) (-1.54) (-3.07) (-7.00) (-6.82) (-1.35) (-6.40) (-4.95) (-6.27) (2.69) 2.69) 
T1RWA^2 2.08 4.72*** 2.13 6.82* 4.80*** 4.69*** 12.53*** 16.42*** 17.17*** 22.87*** -44.17*** - 44.17*** 
 (0.87) (7.31) (0.66) (2.04) (7.35) (7.17) (1.26) (4.86) (4.75) (6.13) (-4.59) (-4.59) 
LARGE  0.08***  -  -  0.11***  -  - 
  (5.19)  -  -  (4.89)  -  - 
COOP  0.10***  0.21***  -  0.16***  0.29***  - 
  (3.35)  (5.69)  -  (4.20)  (5.92)  - 
SAVING  -0.06  -0.03  -0.16***  -0.04  -0.06  - 
  (-1.66)  (-0.48)  (-5.58)  (-0.52)  (-0.93)  - 
COUNTRY 
DUMMIES 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N 113 113 50 50 63 63 53 53 37 37 16 16 
R^2 .01213981 0.143 0.162 0.169 0.084 0.086 0.044 0.128 0.128 0.139 0.150 0.150 
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Table D.1.a: Effects of a positive one standard deviation aggregate demand shock (4Q following the shock) 
Legend: t-statistics under parameter estimates. Weighted Leas Square estimates with robust standard errors and observation weights proportional to the percentage of contemporaneous 
variance of variables explained by country models. LARGE – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for large banks (mainly G-SII and O-SII). COOP – a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 for cooperative banks. SAVING – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for savings banks. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.  
Table D.1.b: Effects of a positive one standard deviation aggregate demand shock (4Q following the shock) 
Legend: t-statistics under parameter estimates. Weighted Leas Square estimates with robust standard errors and observation weights proportional to the percentage of contemporaneous 
variance of variables explained by country models. LARGE – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for large banks (mainly G-SII and O-SII). COOP – a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 for cooperative banks. COOP – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for cooperative banks. SAVING – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for savings banks. * p<0.05; 
** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.  
 Credit Credit to NFCs 
 ALL ALL LARGE LARGE OTHER OTHER ALL ALL LARGE LARGE OTHER OTHER 
T1RWA -0.41 -0.50 -3.07 -4.10*** 1.025231 -1.46*** -0.14 2.037*** -3.99 -0.49 1.95* 0.01 
 (-0.49) (-1.74) (-1.53) (-4.50) 1.35) (-4.79) (-0.16) (6.70) (-1.69) -0.51 (2.57) (0.05 
T1RWA^2 1.20 2.21*** 12.10* 18.54*** -1.69 2.88*** -0.42 -2.69*** 14.57*** 11.76*** -3.87* -0.19 
 (0.64) (3.87) (2.20) (6.27) (-1.06 (5.08) (0.20) (5.85) (2.25) (3.75) (-2.36) (-0.40) 
LARGE  0.18***  -  -  0.16***  -  - 
  (12.47)  -  -  (9.52)  -  - 
COOP  -0.02  0.07*  -  -0.30***  -0.22***  - 
  (-0.60)  (2.07)  -  (-7.04)  (-4.58)  - 
SAVING  0.01  -0.02  0.033  -0.07**  -0.01  -0.18*** 
  (0.28)  (0.55)  (1.51)  (-2.34)  (-0.19)  (-7.20) 
COUNTRY 
DUMMIES 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N 116 116 53 53 63 63 112 112 50 50 62 62 
R^2 0.002 0.134 0.061 0.151 0.058 0.078 0.000 0.108 0.069 0.155 0.137 0.023 
 Credit to households Credit to households for mortgage purposes 
 ALL ALL LARGE LARGE OTHER OTHER ALL ALL LARGE LARGE OTHER OTHER 
T1RWA -1.06 -2.28*** -1.60 -3.26** -2.29*** -2.23*** -4.97 -7.42*** -6.29*** -8.18*** 8.12** 8.125** 
 (-1.06) (-7.16) (-1.54) (-3.07) (-7.00) (-6.82) (-1.35) (-6.40) (-4.95) (-6.27) (2.69) 2.69) 
T1RWA^2 2.08 4.72*** 2.13 6.82* 4.80*** 4.69*** 12.53*** 16.42*** 17.17*** 22.87*** -44.17*** - 44.17*** 
 (0.87) (7.31) (0.66) (2.04) (7.35) (7.17) (1.26) (4.86) (4.75) (6.13) (-4.59) (-4.59) 
LARGE  0.08***  -  -  0.11***  -  - 
  (5.19)  -  -  (4.89)  -  - 
COOP  0.10***  0.21***  -  0.16***  0.29***  - 
  (3.35)  (5.69)  -  (4.20)  (5.92)  - 
SAVING  -0.06  -0.03  -0.16***  -0.04  -0.06  - 
  (-1.66)  (-0.48)  (-5.58)  (-0.52)  (-0.93)  - 
COUNTRY 
DUMMIES 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N 113 113 50 50 63 63 53 53 37 37 16 16 
R^2 .01213981 0.143 0.162 0.169 0.084 0.086 0.044 0.128 0.128 0.139 0.150 0.150 
 
Appendix D: Regression results and additional information on benefit assessment  
 
Table D.1.a: Effects of a positive one standard deviation aggregate demand shock (4Q following the shock) 
Legend: t-statistics under parameter estimates. Weighted Leas Square estimates with robust standard errors and observation weights proportional to the percentage of contemporaneous 
variance of variables explained by country models. LARGE – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for large banks (mainly G-SII and O-SII). COOP – a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 for cooperative banks. SAVING – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for savings banks. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.  
Table D.1.b: Effects of a positive one standard deviati n aggregate demand shock (4Q following the shock) 
Legend: t-statistics under parameter estimates. Weighted Leas Square estimates with robust standard errors and observation weights proportional to the percentage of contemporaneous 
variance of variables explained by country models. LARGE – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for large banks (mainly G-SII and O-SII). COOP – a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 for cooperative banks. COOP – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for cooperative banks. SAVING – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for savings banks. * p<0.05; 
** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
 Credit Credit to NFCs 
 ALL ALL LARGE LARGE OTHER OTHER ALL ALL LARGE LARGE OTHER OTHER 
T1RWA -0.41 -0.50 -3.07 -4.10*** 1.025231 -1.46*** -0.14 2.037*** -3.99 -0.49 1.95* 0.01 
 (-0.49) (-1.74) (-1.53) (-4.50) 1.35) (-4.79) (-0.16) (6.70) (-1.69) -0.51 (2.57) (0.05 
T1RWA^2 1.20 2.21*** 12.10* 18.54*** -1.69 2.88*** -0.42 -2.69*** 14.57*** 11.76*** -3.87* -0.19 
 (0.64) (3.87) (2.20) (6.27) (-1.06 (5.08) (0.20) (5.85) (2.25) (3.75) (-2.36) (-0.40) 
LARGE  0.18***  -  -  0.16***  -  - 
  (12.47)  -  -  (9.52)  -  - 
COOP  -0.02  0.07*  -  -0.30***  -0.22***  - 
  (-0.60)  (2.07)  -  (-7.04)  (-4.58)  - 
SAVING  0.01  -0.02  0.033  -0.07**  -0.01  -0.18*** 
  (0.28)  (0.55)  (1.51)  (-2.34)  (-0.19)  (-7.20) 
COUNTRY 
DUMMIES 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N 116 116 53 53 63 63 112 112 50 50 62 62 
R^2 0.002 0.134 0.061 0.151 0.058 0.078 0.000 0.108 0.069 0.155 0.137 0.023 
 Credit to households Credit to households for mortgage purposes 
 ALL ALL LARGE LARGE OTHER OTHER ALL ALL LARGE LARGE OTHER OTHER 
T1RWA -1.06 -2.28*** -1.60 -3.26** -2.29*** -2.23*** -4.97 -7.42*** -6.29*** -8.18*** 8.12** 8.125** 
 (-1.06) (-7.16) (-1.54) (-3.07) (-7.00) (-6.82) (-1.35) (-6.40) (-4.95) (-6.27) (2.69) 2.69) 
T1RWA^2 2.08 4.72*** 2.13 6.82* 4.80*** 4.69*** 12.53*** 16.42*** 17.17*** 22.87*** -44.17*** - 44.17*** 
 (0.87) (7.31) (0.66) (2.04) (7.35) (7.17) (1.26) (4.86) (4.75) (6.13) (-4.59) (-4.59) 
LARGE  0.08***  -  -  0.11***  -  - 
  (5.19)  -  -  (4.89)  -  - 
COOP  0.10***  0.21***  -  0.16***  0.29***  - 
  (3.35)  (5.69)  -  (4.20)  (5.92)  - 
SAVING  -0.06  -0.03  -0.16***  -0.04  -0.06  - 
  (-1.66)  (-0.48)  (-5.58)  (-0.52)  (-0.93)  - 
COUNTRY 
DUMMIES 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N 113 113 50 50 63 63 53 53 37 37 16 16 
R^2 .01213981 0.143 0.162 0.169 0.084 0.086 0.044 0.128 0.128 0.139 0.150 0.150 
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Table D.2.a: Effects of a one standard deviation positive residential real estate price shock (4Q following the shock) 
 Credit Credit to NFCs 
 ALL ALL LARGE LARGE OTHER OTHER ALL ALL LARGE LARGE OTHER OTHER 
T1RWA 1.10*** 1.26*** 1.63 1.87 0.30 0.36 0.07 0.04 0.19 -0.80 1.40*** 1.194*** 
 (3.41) (3.95) (1.74) (1.93) (0.82) (0.98) (0.24) (0.12) (0.21) (-0.80) (4.91) (4.18) 
T1RWA^2 -2.05** -2.40*** -0.87 -1.55 -061 -0.72 -0.63 -0.52 -1.35 1.71 -2.95*** -2.54*** 
 (-3.13) (-3.71) (-0.28) (-0.48) (-0.86) (-1.02) (-1.08) (-0.85) (-0.41) (0.51) (-5.21) (-4.48) 
LARGE  0.01  -  -  0.04*  -  - 
  (0.50)  -  -  (2.45)  -  - 
COOP  -0.09**  -0.03  -  0.03  0.14*  - 
  (-2.74)  (-0.97)  -  (0.64)  (2.50)  - 
SAVING  -0.06  .06  -0.38***  -0.15***  -0.03  -0.41*** 
  (-1.19)  (0.88)  (-21.29)  (-3.40)  (0.48)  (-21.23) 
COUNTRY 
DUMMIES 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N 116 116 53 53 63 63 112 112 50 50 62 62 
R^2 0.085 0.086 0.089 0.090 0.089 0.094 0.085 0.087 0.091 0.094 0.093 0.102 
Legend: t-statistics under parameter estimates. Weighted Leas Square estimates with robust standard errors and observation weights proportional to the percentage of contemporaneous 
variance of variables explained by country models. LARGE – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for large banks (mainly G-SII and O-SII). COOP – a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 for cooperative banks. SAVING – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for savings banks. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.  
Table D.2.b: Effects of a one standard deviation positive residential real estate price shock (4Q following the shock) 
Legend: t-statistics under parameter estimates. Weighted Leas Square estimates with robust standard errors and observation weights proportional to the percentage of contemporaneous 
variance of variables explained by country models. LARGE – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for large banks (mainly G-SII and O-SII). COOP – a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 for cooperative banks. COOP – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for cooperative banks. SAVING – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for savings banks. * p<0.05; 
** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.  
 
 
 
 
 
 Credit to households Credit to households for mortgage purposes 
 ALL ALL LARGE LARGE OTHER OTHER ALL ALL LARGE LARGE OTHER OTHER 
T1RWA 0.85* 1.03** 1.14 1.78 -0.97* -0.84* 1.06 1.68 2.72* 3.39** -3.69 -3.69 
 (2.20) (2.71) (1.05) (1.59) (-2.27) (-1.96) (0.90) (1.41) (2.10) (2.61) (-0.93) (-0.93) 
T1RWA^2 -1.17 -1.61 3.00 1.21 2.05 1.79 4.89 2.95 2.07 0.05 14.53 14.53 
 (-1.35) (-1.86) (0.84) (0.33) (2.16) (1.89) (1.49) (0.89) (0.58) (0.01) (1.17) (1.17) 
LARGE  -0.02  -  -  -0.02  -  - 
  (-1.34)  -  -  -0.89  -  - 
COOP  -0.12***  -0.08*  -  -0.13**  -0.10  - 
  (-3.63)  (-1.99)  -  (-2.980  (-1.93)  - 
SAVING  -0.13**  0.08  -0.38  0.10  0.09  - 
  (-2.80)  (0.95)  (-14.64)  (1.13)  (1.05)  - 
COUNTRY 
DUMMIES 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N 113 113 50 50 63 63 53 53 37 37 16 16 
R^2 0.065 0.068 0.087 0.088 0.062 0.072 0.085 0.087 0.106 0.108 0.060 0.060 
 
Figure D.2.  The marginal effect of an increase 
in Tier1 ratio from the level of 8.5% on the 
cumulated credit to households following a 
positive aggregate demand shock (end of 
horizon): all, large and other banks  
 
 
Legend: Large banks: G-SII and O-SII banks. Estimates based on regressions 
of bank-level IRFs on the initial linear and squared Tier1 capital ratios. The 
confidence banks calculated with delta method.  
 
 
Figure D.4. The marginal effect of an increase in Tier1 
ratio from the level of 8.5% on the cumulated credit to 
household sector following a positive residential house 
price shock: all, large (G-SII and O-SII) and other banks 
 
Legend: Large banks: G-SII and O-SII banks. Estimates based on regressions of bank-level 
IRFs on the initial linear and squared Tier1 capital ratios. The confidence banks calculated 
with delta method.  
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Figure D.1.  The marginal effect of an increase in 
Tier1 ratio from the level of 8.5% on the cumulated 
credit to NFCs following a positive aggregate 
demand shock (end of horizon): all, large and other 
banks 
 
Legend: Large banks: G-SII and O-SII banks. Estimates based on regressions of 
bank-level IRFs on the initial linear and squared Tier1 capital ratios. The confidence 
banks calculated with delta method. For other banks the confidence bands are very 
broad for horizons 0-2 have and were not plotted to increase readability of the 
figure. 
Figure D.3. The marginal effect of an increase in Tier1 ratio 
from the level of 8.5% on the cumulated credit to non-
financial private sector following a positive residential house 
price shock: all, large (G-SII and O-SII) and other banks 
  
  
Legend: Large banks: G-SII and O-SII banks. Estimates based on regressions of bank-level IRFs 
on the initial linear and squared Tier1 capital ratios. The confidence banks calculated with delta 
method.  
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Table D.2.a: Effects of a one standard deviation positive residential real estate price shock (4Q following the shock) 
 Credit Credit to NFCs 
 ALL ALL LARGE LARGE OTHER OTHER ALL ALL LARGE LARGE OTHER OTHER 
T1RWA 1.10*** 1.26*** 1.63 1.87 0.30 0.36 0.07 0.04 0.19 -0.80 1.40*** 1.194*** 
 (3.41) (3.95) (1.74) (1.93) (0.82) (0.98) (0.24) (0.12) (0.21) (-0.80) (4.91) (4.18) 
T1RWA^2 -2.05** -2.40*** -0.87 -1.55 -061 -0.72 -0.63 -0.52 -1.35 1.71 -2.95*** -2.54*** 
 (-3.13) (-3.71) (-0.28) (-0.48) (-0.86) (-1.02) (-1.08) (-0.85) (-0.41) (0.51) (-5.21) (-4.48) 
LARGE  0.01  -  -  0.04*  -  - 
  (0.50)  -  -  (2.45)  -  - 
COOP  -0.09**  -0.03  -  0.03  0.14*  - 
  (-2.74)  (-0.97)  -  (0.64)  (2.50)  - 
SAVING  -0.06  .06  -0.38***  -0.15***  -0.03  -0.41*** 
  (-1.19)  (0.88)  (-21.29)  (-3.40)  (0.48)  (-21.23) 
COUNTRY 
DUMMIES 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N 116 116 53 53 63 63 112 112 50 50 62 62 
R^2 0.085 0.086 0.089 0.090 0.089 0.094 0.085 0.087 0.091 0.094 0.093 0.102 
Legend: t-statistics under parameter estimates. Weighted Leas Square estimates with robust standard errors and observation weights proportional to the percentage of contemporaneous 
variance of variables explained by country models. LARGE – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for large banks (mainly G-SII and O-SII). COOP – a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 for cooperative banks. SAVING – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for savings banks. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.  
Table D.2.b: Effects of a one standard deviation positive residential real estate price shock (4Q following the shock) 
Legend: t-statistics under parameter estimates. Weighted Leas Square estimates with robust standard errors and observation weights proportional to the percentage of contemporaneous 
variance of variables explained by country models. LARGE – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for large banks (mainly G-SII and O-SII). COOP – a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 for cooperative banks. COOP – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for cooperative banks. SAVING – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for savings banks. * p<0.05; 
** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.  
 
 
 
 
 
 Credit to households Credit to households for mortgage purposes 
 ALL ALL LARGE LARGE OTHER OTHER ALL ALL LARGE LARGE OTHER OTHER 
T1RWA 0.85* 1.03** 1.14 1.78 -0.97* -0.84* 1.06 1.68 2.72* 3.39** -3.69 -3.69 
 (2.20) (2.71) (1.05) (1.59) (-2.27) (-1.96) (0.90) (1.41) (2.10) (2.61) (-0.93) (-0.93) 
T1RWA^2 -1.17 -1.61 3.00 1.21 2.05 1.79 4.89 2.95 2.07 0.05 14.53 14.53 
 (-1.35) (-1.86) (0.84) (0.33) (2.16) (1.89) (1.49) (0.89) (0.58) (0.01) (1.17) (1.17) 
LARGE  -0.02  -  -  -0.02  -  - 
  (-1.34)  -  -  -0.89  -  - 
COOP  -0.12***  -0.08*  -  -0.13**  -0.10  - 
  (-3.63)  (-1.99)  -  (-2.980  (-1.93)  - 
SAVING  -0.13**  0.08  -0.38  0.10  0.09  - 
  (-2.80)  (0.95)  (-14.64)  (1.13)  (1.05)  - 
COUNTRY 
DUMMIES 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N 113 113 50 50 63 63 53 53 37 37 16 16 
R^2 0.065 0.068 0.087 0.088 0.062 0.072 0.085 0.087 0.106 0.108 0.060 0.060 
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Table D.2.a: Effects of a one standard deviation positive residential real estate price shock (4Q following the shock) 
 Credit Credit to NFCs 
 ALL ALL LARGE LARGE OTHER OTHER ALL ALL LARGE LARGE OTHER OTHER 
T1RWA 1.10*** 1.26*** 1.63 1.87 0.30 0.36 0.07 0.04 0.19 -0.80 1.40*** 1.194*** 
 (3.41) (3.95) (1.74) (1.93) (0.82) (0.98) (0.24) (0.12) (0.21) (-0.80) (4.91) (4.18) 
T1RWA^2 -2.05** -2.40*** -0.87 -1.55 -061 -0.72 -0.63 -0.52 -1.35 1.71 -2.95*** -2.54*** 
 (-3.13) (-3.71) (-0.28) (-0.48) (-0.86) (-1.02) (-1.08) (-0.85) (-0.41) (0.51) (-5.21) (-4.48) 
LARGE  0.01  -  -  0.04*  -  - 
  (0.50)  -  -  (2.45)  -  - 
COOP  -0.09**  -0.03  -  0.03  0.14*  - 
  (-2.74)  (-0.97)  -  (0.64)  (2.50)  - 
SAVING  -0.06  .06  -0.38***  -0.15***  -0.03  -0.41*** 
  (-1.19)  (0.88)  (-21.29)  (-3.40)  (0.48)  (-21.23) 
COUNTRY 
DUMMIES 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N 116 116 53 53 63 63 112 112 50 50 62 62 
R^2 0.085 0.086 0.089 0.090 0.089 0.094 0.085 0.087 0.091 0.094 0.093 0.102 
Legend: t-statistics under parameter estimates. Weighted Leas Square estimates with robust standard errors and observation weights proportional to the percentage of contemporaneous 
variance of variables explained by country models. LARGE – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for large banks (mainly G-SII and O-SII). COOP – a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 for cooperative banks. SAVING – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for savings banks. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.  
Table D.2.b: Effects of a one standard deviation positive residential real estate price shock (4Q following the shock) 
Legend: t-statistics under parameter estimates. Weighted Leas Square estimates with robust standard errors and observation weights proportional to the percentage of contemporaneous 
variance of variables explained by country models. LARGE – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for large banks (mainly G-SII and O-SII). COOP – a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 for cooperative banks. COOP – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for cooperative banks. SAVING – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for savings banks. * p<0.05; 
** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.  
 
 
 
 
 
 Credit to households Credit to households for mortgage purposes 
 ALL ALL LARGE LARGE OTHER OTHER ALL ALL LARGE LARGE OTHER OTHER 
T1RWA 0.85* 1.03** 1.14 1.78 -0.97* -0.84* 1.06 1.68 2.72* 3.39** -3.69 -3.69 
 (2.20) (2.71) (1.05) (1.59) (-2.27) (-1.96) (0.90) (1.41) (2.10) (2.61) (-0.93) (-0.93) 
T1RWA^2 -1.17 -1.61 3.00 1.21 2.05 1.79 4.89 2.95 2.07 0.05 14.53 14.53 
 (-1.35) (-1.86) (0.84) (0.33) (2.16) (1.89) (1.49) (0.89) (0.58) (0.01) (1.17) (1.17) 
LARGE  -0.02  -  -  -0.02  -  - 
  (-1.34)  -  -  -0.89  -  - 
COOP  -0.12***  -0.08*  -  -0.13**  -0.10  - 
  (-3.63)  (-1.99)  -  (-2.980  (-1.93)  - 
SAVING  -0.13**  0.08  -0.38  0.10  0.09  - 
  (-2.80)  (0.95)  (-14.64)  (1.13)  (1.05)  - 
COUNTRY 
DUMMIES 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N 113 113 50 50 63 63 53 53 37 37 16 16 
R^2 0.065 0.068 0.087 0.088 0.062 0.072 0.085 0.087 0.106 0.108 0.060 0.060 
 
Figure D.2.  The marginal effect of an increase 
in Tier1 ratio from the level of 8.5% on the 
cumulated credit to households following a 
positive aggregate demand shock (end of 
horizon): all, large and other banks  
 
 
Legend: Large banks: G-SII and O-SII banks. Estimates based on regressions 
of bank-level IRFs on the initial linear and squared Tier1 capital ratios. The 
confidence banks calculated with delta method.  
 
 
Figure D.4. The marginal effect of an increase in Tier1 
ratio from the level of 8.5% on the cumulated credit to 
household sector following a positive residential house 
price shock: all, large (G-SII and O-SII) and other banks 
 
Legend: Large banks: G-SII and O-SII banks. Estimates based on regressions of bank-level 
IRFs on the initial linear and squared Tier1 capital ratios. The confidence banks calculated 
with delta method.  
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Figure D.1.  The marginal effect of an increase in 
Tier1 ratio from the level of 8.5% on the cumulated 
credit to NFCs following a positive aggregate 
demand shock (end of horizon): all, large and other 
banks 
 
Legend: Large banks: G-SII and O-SII banks. Estimates based on regressions of 
bank-level IRFs on the initial linear and squared Tier1 capital ratios. The confidence 
banks calculated with delta method. For other banks the confidence bands are very 
broad for horizons 0-2 have and were not plotted to increase readability of the 
figure. 
Figure D.3. The marginal effect of an increase in Tier1 ratio 
from the level of 8.5% on the cumulated credit to non-
financial private sector following a positive residential house 
price shock: all, large (G-SII and O-SII) and other banks 
  
  
Legend: Large banks: G-SII and O-SII banks. Estimates based on regressions of bank-level IRFs 
on the initial linear and squared Tier1 capital ratios. The confidence banks calculated with delta 
method.  
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Table D.2.a: Effects of a one standard deviation positive residential real estate price shock (4Q following the shock) 
 Credit Credit to NFCs 
 ALL ALL LARGE LARGE OTHER OTHER ALL ALL LARGE LARGE OTHER OTHER 
T1RWA 1.10*** 1.26*** 1.63 1.87 0.30 0.36 0.07 0.04 0.19 -0.80 1.40*** 1.194*** 
 (3.41) (3.95) (1.74) (1.93) (0.82) (0.98) (0.24) (0.12) (0.21) (-0.80) (4.91) (4.18) 
T1RWA^2 -2.05** -2.40*** -0.87 -1.55 -061 -0.72 -0.63 -0.52 -1.35 1.71 -2.95*** -2.54*** 
 (-3.13) (-3.71) (-0.28) (-0.48) (-0.86) (-1.02) (-1.08) (-0.85) (-0.41) (0.51) (-5.21) (-4.48) 
LARGE  0.01  -  -  0.04*  -  - 
  (0.50)  -  -  (2.45)  -  - 
COOP  -0.09**  -0.03  -  0.03  0.14*  - 
  (-2.74)  (-0.97)  -  (0.64)  (2.50)  - 
SAVING  -0.06  .06  -0.38***  -0.15***  -0.03  -0.41*** 
  (-1.19)  (0.88)  (-21.29)  (-3.40)  (0.48)  (-21.23) 
COUNTRY 
DUMMIES 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N 116 116 53 53 63 63 112 112 50 50 62 62 
R^2 0.085 0.086 0.089 0.090 0.089 0.094 0.085 0.087 0.091 0.094 0.093 0.102 
Legend: t-statistics under parameter estimates. Weighted Leas Square estimates with robust standard errors and observation weights proportional to the percentage of contemporaneous 
variance of variables explained by country models. LARGE – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for large banks (mainly G-SII and O-SII). COOP – a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 for cooperative banks. SAVING – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for savings banks. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.  
Table D.2.b: Effects of a one standard deviation positive residential real estate price shock (4Q following the shock) 
Legend: t-statistics under parameter estimates. Weighted Leas Square estimates with robust standard errors and observation weights proportional to the percentage of contemporaneous 
variance of variables explained by country models. LARGE – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for large banks (mainly G-SII and O-SII). COOP – a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 for cooperative banks. COOP – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for cooperative banks. SAVING – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for savings banks. * p<0.05; 
** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.  
 
 
 
 
 
 Credit to households Credit to households for mortgage purposes 
 ALL ALL LARGE LARGE OTHER OTHER ALL ALL LARGE LARGE OTHER OTHER 
T1RWA 0.85* 1.03** 1.14 1.78 -0.97* -0.84* 1.06 1.68 2.72* 3.39** -3.69 -3.69 
 (2.20) (2.71) (1.05) (1.59) (-2.27) (-1.96) (0.90) (1.41) (2.10) (2.61) (-0.93) (-0.93) 
T1RWA^2 -1.17 -1.61 3.00 1.21 2.05 1.79 4.89 2.95 2.07 0.05 14.53 14.53 
 (-1.35) (-1.86) (0.84) (0.33) (2.16) (1.89) (1.49) (0.89) (0.58) (0.01) (1.17) (1.17) 
LARGE  -0.02  -  -  -0.02  -  - 
  (-1.34)  -  -  -0.89  -  - 
COOP  -0.12***  -0.08*  -  -0.13**  -0.10  - 
  (-3.63)  (-1.99)  -  (-2.980  (-1.93)  - 
SAVING  -0.13**  0.08  -0.38  0.10  0.09  - 
  (-2.80)  (0.95)  (-14.64)  (1.13)  (1.05)  - 
COUNTRY 
DUMMIES 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N 113 113 50 50 63 63 53 53 37 37 16 16 
R^2 0.065 0.068 0.087 0.088 0.062 0.072 0.085 0.087 0.106 0.108 0.060 0.060 
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Figure D.5 The effect of Tier1 capital buffers at the end of 2015 above the level of 8.5% on the outstanding credit to 
NFCs under the adverse scenario (at the end of a year) 
Legend: Estimates based on regressions of bank-level IRFs on the initial linear and squared Tier1 capital ratios for the full sample of banks.  
Figure D.6 The effect of Tier1 capital buffers at the end of 2015 above the level of 8.5% on the outstanding credit to 
households under the adverse scenario (at the end of a year) 
Legend: Estimates based on regressions of bank-level IRFs on the initial linear and squared Tier1 capital ratios for the full sample of banks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix E: Bank-level IRFs to credit supply shocks 
Figure E.1: IRFs of bank-level variables to a one standard deviation negative credit supply shock 
 
Legend: Large banks include mostly G-SII and O-SII banks. Figures are constructed on the basis of median responses of bank-level variables from the country models. All IRFs 
correspond with the behaviour of standardised variables on a cumulative basis. Red (blue) broken line marks the median response, and dark red (blue) fan represent 50% and light red 
(blue)  68% of the distribution of median responses of bank-level variables of G-SII and O-SII (other) banks. Solid black line marks the median response for the full sample of banks. 
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